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INTRODUCTION: 
ON SOME VARIETIES OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE 
– BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN AND PRAGMATISM1 
Anna Boncompagni 
University of California, Irvine 
anna.boncompagni@uci.edu 
Roberta Dreon 
University of Venice Ca’ Foscari 
robdre@unive.it 
 
 
Is it still possible to speak of immediate, unreflective 
experiences after the rejection of the myth of the given, 
after the pragmatic and semiotic criticism of the concept 
of non-mediated datum, and after the linguistic turn and 
the hermeneutic developments of phenomenology in the 
twentieth century? 
Can we honestly and non-dogmatically recognize 
those aspects of our more or less ordinary experiences 
where all references come to an end, we plainly 
understand what is happening or, maybe, it is not a 
cognitive question at all?  
Might it not be the case that a qualitative, pre-
scientific or a-scientific dimension is already present 
here, a dimension that cannot be translated into 
quantitative terms and which has to do with the 
significance of experience at multiple levels – from bodily 
perception to aesthetic and ethic sensibility? Can we 
reasonably state that some sort of “imponderable 
evidence” – to quote Anna Boncompagni’s essay – gives 
us access to the immediate background of our actions 
and thinking, which is already there prior to any 
cognitive enterprise or epistemic project? 
Classical pragmatism – particularly Peirce’s one, 
primarily considered in its semiotic aspect, as well as 
Dewey’s pragmatism, according to which “givens” are 
“takens” when dealing with the logic of inquiry – has 
correctly been described as the first source of criticism of 
the so-called “myth of the given”. On the other hand, it is 
well known to Wittgenstein’s readers that he understood 
                                                 
1
 Although this introduction has been a joint effort, 
Roberta Dreon wrote the first section of the preface 
while Anna Boncompagni wrote the second part of the 
text. 
philosophy as an eminently grammatical approach to 
language and that he consequently criticized any appeal 
to the allegedly experienced character of meaning, 
conceived as something primarily subjective. 
Nonetheless, it is equally known that James and 
Dewey tirelessly emphasized the qualitative, 
aesthetic and unreflective aspects of our experiences, 
which are significant for what they do directly on us, 
without being further deferred to other things (see 
Roberta Dreon’s paper). Wittgenstein all too frequently 
evokes those situations in which there is no need to 
speak and think any further, situations in which we are 
simply "to look at" what is happening as something 
“complete” in itself, dissolving its apparently problematic 
character – as Luigi Perissinotto explains in his essay. 
The point is that the appeal to immediacy is far from 
unambiguous and can serve very different goals, as 
Vincent Colapietro highlights in his paper: the range of 
possibilities extends from the typically modern 
philosophical aim of establishing a secure foundation for 
our knowledge to the post-metaphysical 
acknowledgment that our experience of the world, 
including its bodily anchorage (to which Ángel Faerna 
directs our attention), is prior to the formulation of any 
radical doubt.  
The articles collected in this issue of the journal 
share a basic downplaying of any epistemological claim 
for immediacy in favour of a more existential or 
anthropological understanding of the concept. They 
explore this subject by engaging with a variety of aspects 
and touching upon different nuances of the term: from 
the overlap between the concepts of immediate and 
direct experience to the distinction between the 
epistemological and existential interpretation of 
certainty; from the opposition between qualitative and 
quantitative experience to their intertwinement and 
mutual shaping; from an understanding of immediately 
experienced meanings in terms of gestures (as pointed 
out by Barbara Formis) to language-acquired habits 
which have "become nature to us" (as highlighted by 
Marilena Andronico); from the immediacy of 
competency, ability and the likes to the immediacy of 
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 6 
novelty (as noted by Giovanni Tuzet). This issue of 
Pragmatism Today represents the third step in the 
ongoing research on Wittgenstein and the Pragmatists 
conducted by a group of scholars mainly based in Italy 
and originally brought together by Rosa Maria Calcaterra 
(University of Roma Tre) and Luigi Perissinotto 
(University of Venice Ca’ Foscari) in 2015. The previous 
stages of the research focused on habits, norms, and 
forms of life and on psychologism. The papers resulting 
from them were respectively published in Paradigmi 
(issue XXXIV (3), 2016) and the European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy (issue IX (1), 
2017). Most of the papers published in this issue of 
Pragmatism Today were presented at a conference held 
at the University of Florence in September 2017, which 
also saw the participation of members of the research 
unit “Qualitative Ontology and Technology (Qua-Onto-
Tech)”, coordinated by Roberta Lanfredini, thus leading 
the research to address phenomenological topics. 
Additionally, we welcome and strongly appreciate the 
collaboration of Vincent Colapietro, Ángel Manuel 
Faerna, and Barbara Formis, who have joined us in the 
present phase of the project. We are also very grateful to 
Pragmatism Today and, more specifically, to Alexander 
Kremer for hosting this part of our collaborative inquiry 
and for giving us the chance to make it accessible to a 
wider audience. 
The three papers that open this issue retrace some 
central topics in the traditions that we are examining. 
Michela Bella offers an analysis of James’ conception of 
experience as a way to approach the difference between 
percepts and concepts, that is between the immediate 
and the mediated. James’ radical empiricism, she points 
out, can be usefully interpreted as ‘a theory of 
experience based on a theory of relations’, so that the 
thesis of relations being themselves experienced comes 
to play a key role. It is in the dialectic between the 
knower and the known, interpreted as a relation 
between parts of experience, that the difference 
between percepts and concepts emerges. Such a view 
also helps to better contextualize Wittgenstein’s criticism 
of James, centred on the latter’s use of introspection in 
his treatment of concepts. Alice Morelli’s contribution is 
focused on James and Wittgenstein, and more 
specifically on what she calls “the experiential account of 
meaning” that Wittgenstein attributes to James. After 
describing James’ approach as it emerges in the 
Principles of Psychology, she introduces Wittgenstein’s 
reservations about it, and clarifies that Wittgenstein’s 
aim is not to deny that there are experiential elements in 
meaning, but rather to oppose the tendency to ground 
meaning in experience. In her conclusion, Morelli also 
points in the direction of a Wittgenstein-inspired but at 
the same time broadly pragmatist notion of meaning as 
socially embedded and enacted, thus showing the 
contemporary relevance of these reflections. Andrea 
Pace Giannotta instead investigates the concept of 
experience by drawing a comparison between James’ 
radical empiricism and Edmund Husserl’s genetic 
phenomenology. This allows him to go beyond the 
apparent contrast between James’ later thought, 
characterized by a strong anti-dualism, and Husserl’s 
approach, focused instead on the dual dimension of 
intentionality. Giannotta points out that even in 
Husserl’s genetic phenomenology the flow of primal 
impressions is conceived of as a fundamental dimension 
of experience that precedes the duality between subject 
and object. In his view, this conception, by anchoring 
experience in the embodied subject, can also 
complement the Jamesian perspective in the direction of 
concreteness, against certain metaphysical 
interpretations.  
The five contributions that follow tackle more 
directly the theoretical core and the methodological 
aspects of the theme under discussion. The focus of 
Vincent Colapietro’s paper is on immediate experience 
as opposed to the artificial skeptical doubt that calls the 
very existence of the world into question. Both the 
classical pragmatists and Wittgenstein, he observes, 
oppose the usual move of traditional philosophy, which 
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detaches itself from ordinary life, as this were the only 
means for “true” philosophizing and for true critique. 
This opposition results in an appeal to the immediacy of 
the relationship between human beings and the world, 
that is, the immediacy of human beings’ inhabiting the 
world not as knowers, but as agents in an arena of 
action, where “action” is to be understood in a broad 
sense that encompasses both experience and language. 
In a similar spirit, Roberta Dreon articulates a 
deflationary pragmatist perspective on immediate 
experience by focusing mainly on Dewey, who in her 
view developed a novel approach to this issue as a result 
of his way of dissolving a tension between the young 
Peirce’s take on the mediated nature of human cognition 
and the later James’ views on immediate experience. 
Dewey’s solution hinges on a rich conception of 
experience as something strictly connected with human 
life, in such a way that language and cognition 
themselves are understood as parts of experience, and 
hence not in opposition to it. The later Wittgenstein 
interestingly turns out to be broadly in agreement with 
such a view. This is confirmed, from a methodological 
point of view, by Luigi Perissinotto, who draws attention 
to Wittgenstein’s use of the word “problematic” and 
observes that the aim of philosophy for him is precisely 
the disappearance of what is problematic in life. One 
form that this disappearance can take, Perissinotto 
argues, has to do with the capacity to acknowledge that 
what immediately appears incomplete is not something 
waiting to be completed (typically, by a sort of theory). In 
this sense, Wittgenstein’s philosophical method, centred 
on renouncing theory, is an appeal to immediacy: it is an 
appeal to see things as they are, by resisting the 
temptation to fill-in the gaps via theoretical moves. Fully 
in accordance with this claim, Marilena Andronico takes 
as her starting point Wittgenstein’s insistence on the fact 
that forms of life are a “given” that has to be accepted, a 
“given” which, in her interpretation, crucially includes 
linguistic habits and the following of rules. These broadly 
cultural and acquired habits, she observes, have an 
intrinsically normative aspect, but nevertheless remain 
immediate. Their being part of the immediate given 
means that they play the role of irreducible elements 
within a certain kind of grammatical inquiry, defining its 
very domain. In this way, Andronico suggests, a 
grammatical investigation remains compatible with a 
form of naturalism, yet differs from an approach (like 
James’, in Wittgenstein’s perception) that relies solely on 
experience. Another paper primarily dealing with 
Wittgenstein is Anna Boncompagni’s one, whose focus is 
on the apparently elusive notion of ‘imponderable 
evidence’ that Wittgenstein uses to describe our 
understanding of others’ feelings and emotions, as well 
as our aesthetic judgments. In these contexts, she 
observes, we are often guided by a form of immediate 
and qualitative evidence that remains unmeasurable, 
ungraspable, and almost impossible to put into words. In 
imponderable evidence, Boncompagni argues, 
immediacy and experience are interwoven: in order to 
clarify this point, she turns to Dewey’s conception of 
‘qualitative thought’, which shows surprising affinities 
with the Wittgensteinian perspective. Both thinkers, she 
concludes, help highlight the importance for philosophy 
of a fuller consideration of the qualitative dimension of 
human existence. 
The three papers that conclude our issue deal with 
more specific traits of immediate experience, which 
prove to be particularly salient. Ángel Faerna is 
interested in highlighting the epistemological 
significance of the body. In contrast with the traditional 
neglect of the body, he notes that according to the later 
Wittgenstein (as also underlined by neuropsychiatrist 
Oliver Sacks) we normally have a non-discursive, 
immediate awareness of our having a body. Moreover, 
as the pragmatists also help us realize, this somatic 
awareness if crucially practical, as it has to do with the 
potentialities of the active body within the situation in 
which it is embedded. In spite of some short-sighted 
interpretations of bodily awareness, which all too hastily 
conflate it with either the privateness of mental states or 
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the foundationalism of the “myth of the given”, Faerna 
urges us to fully acknowledge its role in knowledge. 
Barbara Formis’ contribution is close to this perspective 
in her emphasizing the importance of gestures and 
asking what the relationship between gestures and 
meaning is. Making use of John Dewey’s criticism of 
Darwinism, she highlights that a merely naturalistic 
approach risks overlooking that there is something more 
to a gesture than a simple organic discharge; yet, Formis 
also denies that gestures can be transformed into a 
formalized and logical form. By drawing from the later 
Wittgenstein, she finds a middle path between these two 
extremes, one that fully acknowledges the 
intertwinement between the biological and the social, 
and ultimately explains gestures as performed acts that 
carry an immediate quality and are characterized by an 
“overflow”, or a sort of “possibility of meaning”. Finally, 
Giovanni Tuzet distinguishes between two concepts of 
experience, the “singular” (“having an experience”) and 
the “general” (“having experience” or “being 
experienced”). After illustrating some insights of the 
classical pragmatists in the light of this distinction, he 
examines how some philosophers who are somewhat 
close to the pragmatists – Wittgenstein, Quine, and 
McDowell – dealt with experience, noting that they 
tended to privilege either one or the other aspect. 
Finally, he applies his distinction to the field of the 
philosophy of law, and reinterprets the dialectic between 
“stories” and “background generalizations” in the 
scholarship on the topic of evidence as a dialectic 
between the singular and the general concepts of 
experience, showing how this contributes to a better 
understanding of such problems. 
  
 
I. VARIETIES OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE 
   10
ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTS AND CONCEPTS  
IN WILLIAM JAMES’S PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE 
Michela Bella 
Roma Tre University 
michibella.85@gmail.com 
 
ABSTRACT: William James addresses the issue of the 
immediacy of experience from different angles and at 
different stages of his work. The topic looms at the 
centre of his reflection, mainly affecting the passage 
from a psychological analysis of the continuity of 
consciousness to a mature philosophical elaboration of 
the continuity of experience. Through a theoretical 
reconstruction of James’s ‘philosophy of experience,’ at 
the crossroad between psychology and philosophy, this 
article aims to shed light on James’s reinterpretation of 
perception within a naturalistic and pragmatic 
conception of knowledge that he developed by analogy 
to natural cognitive processes. His naturalistic and 
radically empirical conception of experience, moreover, 
corroborates the idea of the profound logical and 
epistemological influence of Darwinism in James’s 
psychology and philosophy, specifically as to the new 
metaphysical framework provided by Darwin’s theory of 
evolution.  
 
Keywords: William James; pure experience; 
percepts/concepts; darwinism; ontology 
 
 
William James addresses the issue of the immediacy of 
experience from different angles and at different stages 
of his work, at first within a psychological framework and 
then, later, from a more philosophical perspective. 
Indeed, from whatever angle he approaches it, the topic 
looms at the centre of his thought; its centrality is 
especially evident if one reads the evolution of his 
reflection in terms of the passage from a psychological 
analysis of the continuity of consciousness to the 
attempt to extend the same continuity to experience 
(Perry 1935, vol. 2, 583ff; Seigfried 1990, 351ff). From 
this standpoint, it is essential to understand what is 
meant by continuity and therefore to pay attention to 
the perceptual dimension, that is, to concrete, sensible, 
immediate experience. James combined his notion of 
experience as synthetic and empirically unitary, with a 
pluralistic metaphysics. His formulation of radical 
empiricism thus emerges as a critique of the 
epistemological and metaphysical assumptions of 
classical empiricism as well as that of extreme or 
absolute rationalism, which he called ‘vicious 
intellectualism’. 
When considering James’s conception of experience 
and immediacy, the doctrine of the ‘pure experience’ 
soon makes its entrance. As is well known, it was 
formulated publicly in the Essays in Radical Empiricism 
(‘Does 'Consciousness' Exist?’ July 1904; ‘The Thing and 
Its Relations’, November 1904) but, as can be seen from 
his notes and correspondence, James spent much more 
time on this hypothesis because of the cogent objections 
from Miller and Bode to which he had to reply (James 
1988, 65-129). In some articles and essays it is clear how 
he was trying to elaborate a philosophy of pure 
experience, in which ‘pure experience’ was both a 
metaphysical hypothesis and a methodological principle. 
In this article, I would like to highlight briefly the central 
role that this theme – the relationship between 
immediate and mediated, which in the author’s 
terminology is the relation between percepts and 
concepts – plays in the Jamesian philosophy of 
experience. In my view, this reconstruction helps to shed 
light on the naturalistic and pragmatic conception of 
knowledge that he developed by analogy to natural 
cognitive processes. Moreover, I contend that his 
naturalistic and radically empirical conception of 
experience helps to corroborate the idea of the profound 
logical and epistemological influence of Darwinism in 
James’s psychology and ontology. Finally, I would like to 
consider, in the light of this broader ontological picture, 
the central passages where the question of the 
immediacy of experience is raised, and to examine its 
main contemporary epistemological outcomes. 
 
Notes for a philosophy of ‘pure’ experience 
 
James’s philosophical reflection on immediate 
experience emerges from his philosophy of radical 
empiricism. The first definition of his philosophical 
doctrine can be found in the preface to The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897), a 
volume in which the author collects together a series of 
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articles already published in different places. He intends 
to shed light on their characteristic ‘philosophical 
attitude’ which James already calls ‘radical empiricism’. 
In this definition, he refers to the empirical philosophy, 
since the ‘certainties’ reached in the ‘matters of fact’ 
remain subject to change, that is, hypotheses open to 
future experiential verifications. The radicalism of this 
philosophical attitude concerns an antidogmatic tension 
between monism and pluralism, which James asserts at 
various places to be the most significant predicament in 
philosophy. Later, in the preface to The Meaning of Truth 
(1909), a text in which James finds himself having to 
answer a series of objections and misunderstandings 
raised by his pragmatic conception of truth, he returns to 
the definition of radical empiricism: 
 
Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, 
next of a statement of fact, and finally of a 
generalized conclusion. The postulate is that the 
only things that shall be debatable among 
philosophers shall be things definable in terms 
drawn from experience. [Things of an 
unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, 
but they form no part of the material for 
philosophic debate.] The statement of fact is that 
the relations between things, conjunctive as well 
as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct 
particular experience, neither more so nor less 
so, than the things themselves. The generalized 
conclusion is that therefore the parts of 
experience hold together from next to next by 
relations that are themselves parts of 
experience. The directly apprehended universe 
needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical 
connective support, but possesses in its own 
right a concatenated or continuous structure 
(James 1975b, 6-7). 
 
The philosophical framework within which James carries 
out his mature research and interests is precisely a 
philosophy of experience, which elsewhere he will also 
define as a ‘philosophy of pure experience’. The basic 
postulate is that only things that can be experienced can 
be the subject of philosophical discourses strictu sensu, 
which then marks the methodological parameters within 
which radical empiricism needs to remain. However, the 
heart of the doctrine is the declaration of the fact that 
the relations between things must also be directly 
experienceable. In this sense, we can read James’s 
radical empiricism as a theory of experience based on a 
theory of relations. Indeed, it strongly depends on the 
reality (experience) of relations and it is therefore on this 
point that the consistency of a radically empirical theory 
of experience and its attempt to distinguish itself, on the 
one hand, from idealism and, on the other, from 
empiricism, is at stake
1
.  
For James, the ‘great obstacle’ to radical empiricism, 
and thus to a philosophy of pure experience, is the idea 
cultivated by rationalism, but ultimately also shared by 
empiricism, that immediate experience is absolutely 
disconnected. The claim that already emerged in his 
psychological writings of the experienceability of 
relations makes it possible not to rely on transcendent 
principles of explanation. The unity of the world is not to 
be achieved through the operation of a superior unifying 
action, what James calls an ‘extraneous trans-empirical 
connective support’; but it is the very structure of the 
‘immediate experience’ of reality that possesses ‘a 
concatenated or continuous structure’ (James 1975b, 7). 
In other words, it is necessary to recognize the reality 
(actuality) of conjunctive and disjunctive relations and of 
a pure or immediate experience in which relations are 
immediately experienced in sensation. Relations are real 
in their immediacy but not in their specific constitution. 
They are therefore perceived but not yet classified or 
defined. It is a process that requires the occurrence of 
other successive experiences for our apprehension of the 
universe to move from being something to act upon to 
something known.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Seigfried’s reading of ‘relations’ in James (Seigfried 
1973). 
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Radicalized empiricism:  
the interconnection of psychology and philosophy  
 
It is no coincidence that the thesis that relations are part 
of the experience itself stems from another thesis James 
introduces in his Principles of Psychology, namely, that 
there are ‘feelings of relation’: 
 
there is no conjunction or a preposition, and 
hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or 
inflection of voice, in human speech, that does 
not express some shading or other of relation 
which we at some moment actually feel to exit 
between the larger objects of our thought. [...] 
We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a 
feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily 
as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold. 
(James 1981, 238) 
 
This passage was particularly inspiring for Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who was a critical reader of James. 
According to Russell Goodman (2002) and Richard Gale 
(1999), The Principles of Psychology was among James’s 
works a genuine “intellectual companion” for 
Wittgenstein
2
. However, because of the lack of 
introspective attention and the difficulty of confronting 
ephemeral phenomena, many psychologists and 
philosophers have been led to ignore what James calls 
the ‘transitive’ parts of consciousness, in other words, 
those parts that move at a relatively faster speed than 
the parts that he defines ‘substantive’. By ‘transitive’ 
James intends all the feelings of relation and tendency, 
the internal connections and the direction of our 
thoughts, which we often express discursively with the 
various prepositions and which in the brain would 
correspond to the phases of passage between two peaks 
of nervous activity. James’s insistence on these 
                                                 
2
 In Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts there are 
many references to James’s Principles. According to 
Stephen Hilmy (1987), this attention to one single author 
is sporadic in Wittgenstein. He found particularly 
interesting the chapters on The Stream of Thought and 
on the Will (cf. Boncompagni 2016, 167). For a historical 
and theoretical reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s reading 
of James see Goodman (2002). For a broader analysis of 
Wittgenstein and pragmatism see Boncompagni (2016).  
aesthetic
3
 but also relational aspects of our inner life, 
which have been almost entirely rejected by psychology 
and philosophy because of the difficulty they pose to 
analysis and verbalization, is due to their importance in 
restoring a more concrete, and therefore richer and 
more plural, image of the human mind. The analysis of 
mental phenomena taken in their concreteness, that is in 
the frayed, vague and changing aspects of lived 
experience, can already be said to be radically empirical 
or radically anti-intellectualist. In this way, James 
emphasized the epistemic value of sensory perception
4
, 
because it is the necessary access point to all the 
complex and varied phenomenology of mental life 
recognized in the empirical analysis.  
However, James’s intention is not to question the 
function of the substantive parts of thought, which are 
more stable and defined, as well as the value of 
concepts; rather, his criticism is directed at two great 
logical fallacies committed by empirical psychology: 1) 
thinking that one cannot have images except of perfectly 
defined things and 2) the idea that through subjective 
feelings we can know the simple qualities of objects, but 
not their relations. Thanks to the radical application of 
the empirical method, James defends the importance of 
perceptions for a more fundamental and concrete 
description of the facts of psychology. In his opinion, no 
introspective observation justifies the sacrifice of our 
perception of the continuity of our stream of thought. 
                                                 
3
 In Principles and elsewhere, James uses the expression 
‘aesthetical and practical interests’ to convey the 
philosophical use of ‘aesthetic’ in relation to the 
sensation. 
4
 Perry’s perspicuous comment on the role of perception 
in James’s philosophy is worth to be quoted here: ‘[…] if 
perception was qualified to play so great a role, it was 
because this faculty had long since lost the character 
which it possessed in the earlier empirical tradition. It 
had been a leading motive in James's philosophy not 
only to emphasize perception, but to reinterpret it; and 
in particular to impute to it a continuity and depth, a 
synthetic grasp and reach, which differed radically from 
the notions held by his predecessors.’ (Perry 1935, vol. I, 
459) 
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Indeed, any paradoxes and contradictions are produced 
precisely by the atomistic image of mental states shared 
by associationism and rationalism, and that for James is 
nothing more than the result of an inaccurate and faulty 
original description. 
 
What is wrong with empiricism and rationalism? 
 
The theory of relations that James gradually elaborates 
also on a philosophical level must therefore be framed in 
terms of his confrontation with the empiricism and 
rationalism. Empiricism and rationalism are paradigmatic 
philosophical attitudes that are also the expression of 
different mentalities or ways of thinking, as well as 
temperaments. Using broad and non-technical 
definitions, in order to sketch the main currents of 
thought which both pragmatism and radical empiricism 
had to confront for distinguishing themselves, the 
empiricists can be identified as those who explain the 
whole through the parts; that is, they privilege the parts, 
the elements, the individual, and consider the whole as a 
collection of parts and the universal as an abstraction. 
The rationalists, instead, are those who explain the parts 
by the whole, emphasize the universal and make the 
whole have priority over the parts both on the level of 
logic and of being. The same characteristics of these two 
positions can be found in many texts, both published and 
unpublished, not least in the article ‘A World of Pure 
Experience’ (James 1976, 21-44), in which James tries to 
formulate his philosophy of experience more explicitly 
and coherently. The rationalist temperament is defined 
as tending dogmatism, as it demands necessary 
conclusions; while the empirical temperament is more 
modest and works on hypotheses. 
The problem is the inadequacy of both idealism and 
associationism, respectively connected to rationalism 
and empiricism, as philosophies which, in different ways, 
do not faithfully describe the real, concrete way in which 
we have experience. On the one hand, the idealistic drift 
offers a principle of unity and an apodictic source of 
intelligibility but without being able to account for 
specificity; on the other, empirical associationism, while 
remaining close to the particularity of experience, could 
not offer a principle of unity or continuity.
5
 
James’s philosophy attempts to restore the philosophical 
legitimacy of our feeling of agreement or disagreement 
with reality by correcting the mistakes of these two-
great philosophical traditions. As a kind of empiricism, it 
adheres to a world description which considers the parts 
as a first order being and treats the whole as a second 
order being.
6
 This means a ‘mosaic’ philosophy that does 
not reduce plural facts to a unique substance (which is 
inert) or an absolute mind (which creates them). It is also 
‘radical’ in not admitting elements that are not 
experienced directly, nor in excluding any element 
directly experienced. In particular, 
 
the relations that connect experiences must 
themselves be experienced relations, and any 
kind of relation experienced must be accounted 
as ‘real’ as anything else in the system. (James 
1976, 22) 
7
 
 
The classical empiricism of Berkeley, Hume and Mill lays 
itself open to criticism with its tendency to fragment 
experience on the basis of an atomistic metaphysics, 
thus requiring a choice between cosmic disorder and 
                                                 
5
 For James, John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain and Herbert 
Spencer were empiricist-materialists; while Thomas Hill 
Green, Bernard Bosanquet, John and Edward Caird, and 
Josiah Royce exemplified the rationalist-spiritualist 
tendency. 
6 
James explains that concepts are only designative and 
argues that ‘the concept 'reality'’ once given back to 
immediate perception is ‘no new conceptual creation, 
but only a kind of practical relation to our Will, 
perceptively experienced’ (James 1979, 60). In other 
words, his attempt to recover a broader realm of reality 
is not to deny that concepts are real. Instead, it is to 
show how sensations and intellections are practically 
dynamically interrelated in an antifoundationalist 
fashion.  
7
 Moreover, ‘pure experience is also a methodical 
postulate’ according to which ‘Everything real must be 
experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing 
experienced must somewhere be real’. In conclusion, he 
strongly suggests that ‘real effectual causation as an 
ultimate nature, as a ‘category,’ if you like, of reality, is 
just what we feel it be, just that kind of conjunction 
which our own activity-series reveal’ (James 1976, 93-4).  
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rational order. This original fragmentation of reality is 
also a vision shared by rationalism. In this respect, 
rationalism has done nothing but correct an otherwise 
irrational vision by introducing trans-experiential 
unifying agents, such as substances, categories of 
intellect, or the transcendental ego. The problem 
eminently concerns conjunctive relations that have been 
neglected, even eliminated, by empiricism and have 
been elevated by rationalism to celestial realities, ‘as if 
the unity of things and their variety belonged to different 
orders of truth and vitality altogether’ (James 1976, 23). 
 
A world of experienced relations 
 
The challenge is therefore to rehabilitate the direct 
experience of various types of conjunctive relations, with 
different degrees of intimacy and inclusiveness which 
span from simple co-presence, through contiguity, 
resemblance, activity and causality, to the continuous 
transition between states of consciousness. The universe 
of human experience appears to be mostly chaotic, and 
this means that some parts are only co-present and (in 
any case): ‘No one single type of connexion runs through 
all the experiences that compose it [our universe]’ 
(James 1976, 24).
8
  
The conjunctive relation that a radical empiricist 
must consider most important is the co-conscious 
conjunctive transition. It is philosophically the most 
problematic, but it is also the phenomenon that allows 
us best to describe our experience in concrete terms. A 
co-conscious transition is a process whereby a specific 
experience of mine goes from one personal experience 
into another. This hypothesis implied some logical 
difficulties that James, in many of his writings, did not fail 
to recognize and tackle. In short, the distinction between 
                                                 
8
 This passage is pivotal. Pluralism means that the world 
of experiences is not reducible to a single type of 
connection; in other words, it is not entirely 
homogeneous. Some connections in fact – such as space 
connections, causes and purposes, etc. – do not work in 
specific contexts, though they do work in others. 
ultra-rationalism and radical empiricism is about defining 
the nature of relations. In fact, despite the world of 
internal and essential relations that absolutism projected 
onto experience, James provides an empirical description 
of it in terms of particular external or accidental 
relations. To understand relations between terms in a 
constitutive way seemed necessarily to imply a static and 
absolute image of reality, according to James, in which 
even the most ordinary experiences would become 
unintelligible.  
Specifically referring to his chapters on the ‘Stream 
of Consciousness’ and the ‘Self’ in Principles for a 
psychological description of the matter, James argues 
that change is a continuous transition, thus a conjunctive 
relation, which as such we experience immediately (it 
implies duration, or non-conceptual immediacy). 
Between two moments of our experience we feel that 
the transition is continuous, just as we feel that the 
transition is discontinuous between an experience lived 
and one merely conceived – for instance, someone else’s 
experience. The nature of this relation, which is of all the 
most intimate of which we are aware, is the same sense 
of continuity that we feel and which constitutes a real 
empirical content, as much as the sense of discontinuity 
that we feel in the other possible experience: 
 
Practically to experience one’s personal 
continuum in this living way is to know the 
originals of the ideas of continuity and of 
sameness, to know what the words stand for 
concretely, to own all that they can ever mean. 
(James 1976, 26) 
 
The radically empirical understanding of conjunctive 
relations is also a way of considering knowledge or 
cognitive relations as relations of continuous transition. 
This is precisely one of the three conceptual tools that 
radical empiricism employs to provide a fully empirical 
solution to the paradox of the self-transcendence of 
knowledge: namely, the epistemological leap between 
the idea and the object. Other indispensable tools are 
the notion of pure experience and the logical function of 
substitution. 
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A processual view of experience  
 
In the first of his radical empiricist essays, ‘Does 
Consciousness Exist?’ published in July 1904 and 
presented as a shorter version the following year at the 
Fifth Congress of Psychology held in Rome, James 
declared that ‘consciousness’ as traditionally 
investigated does not exist. Consciousness is a type of 
external relation, not internal (or constitutive) as 
rationalism has intended it to be. It is itself a function 
and not a substance, the function that our experiences 
are known. The distinction between the knower and the 
known is explained as a functional and not ontological 
difference that depends on external factors, specifically 
the different relational contexts to which experience is 
retrospectively connected: 
 
I think I may now claim to have made my thesis 
clear. Consciousness connotes a kind of external 
relation, and does not denote a special stuff or 
way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, 
that they not only are, but are known, which their 
‘conscious’ quality is invoked to explain, is better 
explained by their relations—these relations 
themselves being experiences—to one another. 
(James 1976, 14) 
 
Pure experience is, therefore, a fundamental hypothesis 
for a philosophy of experience since it requires that in 
immediate experience (or perceptive intuition) all of 
reality is given – including conjunctive and disjunctive 
relations that retrospectively make it possible to classify 
the parts of the experience. By ‘experience’ James 
clarifies that he intends a process that takes place over 
time through a series of terms that can be replaced and 
are in fact replaced through experienced relations that 
are as particular and real as the terms between which 
they occur
9
. 
As mentioned, pure experience is both a 
metaphysical hypothesis and a methodological 
postulate. In the introduction to James’s Manuscripts, 
                                                 
9
 For an accurate comparative analysis of James’s notion 
of pure experience and Husserl’s neutrality, see 
Lanfredini (2017).  
Essays and Notes, Ignas Skrupskelis points out that the 
notion of pure experience appears very few times in his 
published writings. It can only be found in the Essays in 
Radical Empiricism. In the following three excerpts, it is 
evident how similar are James’s descriptions of pure 
experience in ‘A World of Pure Experience’ and in ‘Does 
Consciousness Exist?’. In the latter, we can read: 
 
The instant field of the present is at all times 
what I call the ‘pure’ experience. It is only 
virtually or potentially either object or subject as 
yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified 
actuality or existence, a simple that. In this naïf 
immediacy it is of course valid; it is there, we act 
upon it; and the doubling of it in retrospection 
into a state of mind and a reality intended 
thereby, is just one of the acts. (James 1976, 13) 
 
Experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity; 
and the separation of it into consciousness and 
content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by 
way of addition. (James 1976, 6-7)  
 
Here, pure experience is defined as the experience that 
precedes subject-object distinction, therefore as 
something [stuff] that has no internal duplicity (which is 
only later added to it), and that yet accepts other 
predicates – i.e. spatiality, intensity, etc. In another 
article, a few months later, ‘The Thing and Its Relations’ 
(Nov. 1904), James defines pure experience in a slightly 
different way: 
 
‘Pure experience’ is the name which I gave to the 
immediate flux of life which furnishes the 
material to our later reflection with its 
conceptual categories. […] Its purity is only a 
relative term, meaning the proportional amount 
of unverbalized sensation which it still embodies. 
(James 1976, 46) 
 
In this second definition, there is no explicit reference to 
the absence of subject-object duplicity that we found in 
the first, and in this context pure experience seems not 
to accept any predicate. It is identified with the 
‘unverbalized sensation’: pure experience is another 
name for ‘feeling or sensation’. This condition is only 
possible, however, in infants and people who wake up 
from a semi-coma; it is not possible in adults in normal 
psycho-physical conditions. In fact, pure experience is a 
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that which is not yet any defined what, though it is ready 
to be any kind of ‘whats’. Adult experience loses at least 
part of its purity, that is it is widely conceptualized, and 
more and more it contains ‘adjectives, names, 
prepositions and conjunctions’. The description of the 
contents of immediate experience inevitably degrades its 
purity, which remains a relative term. 
In the hypothesis of pure experience there is no 
epistemological leap between the knower and the 
known – respectively solved by other philosophical 
schools via either representationalism, or the capacity of 
self-transcendence of ideas, or else by the act of an 
absolute agent. For James, knowledge is a natural 
process that runs entirely within the texture of our finite 
experience; it is made up of external relations that 
develop over time: ‘Certain extrinsic phenomena, special 
experiences of conjunction, are what impart to the 
image, be it what it may, its knowing office’ (James 1976 
[1912]: 28). In James’s famous example of the Memorial 
Hall, he shows how an ‘idea’ of mine leads me through a 
series of possible paths – therefore of external, 
accidental and particular relations – to the direct 
experience [acquaintance] of the Memorial Hall, within a 
relational context that demonstrates the non-
coincidence of the fact (e.g. I can talk about its history, I 
feel that my idea and perception of it correspond, etc.), 
and thus that the final perception of the Harvard building 
was what I meant by my ‘idea’ in the first place. 
Therefore, the trans-experiential continuity ensures that 
the process of knowledge is not interrupted on the way, 
and at the end it is possible to classify the starting point 
as the knower, and the perceptual term as the known – 
the one which in a certain sense creates the cognitive 
function. This is for James the nature of knowledge in 
terms of experience; both the type of perceptual 
knowledge, in which there is a direct experience of a 
present object, and the type of discursive knowledge, in 
which the object is not immediately present. 
 
 
The unions we come to know in this way are 
however empirical unions, that is, unions by continuous 
transition or continuity, not substantial in the sense of a-
temporal absolutes. This is the case not only for 
experiences of discursive knowledge (going from idea to 
perception) but also for personal identity or logical 
predication (‘is’). Furthermore, even starting from the 
very same point, the experiential process can run 
through different possible paths. Some experiences can 
functionally replace others in their task of leading us to 
the same perceptual goals. Indeed, substitution is an 
essential logical function and overall conceptual 
experiences, as alternative paths, are much more 
convenient and more rapid ways compared to 
perceptual ones. The majority of our knowledge is never 
completely verified, they never reach the perceptual 
term from which they would obtain a full retroactive 
validation. For the most part, we remain in the ‘virtual 
stage’ of transiting knowledge. Indirect verifications 
prove to be sufficient in ordinary life, for we only need it 
to be possible that our thoughts proceed without any 
contradiction being felt between the present experience 
and the context of our acquired knowledge. 
The same argument can be found in the discussion of 
the notion of truth in Pragmatism (1907), in which truth-
ideas are presented as cognitive relations in the making. 
This notion of ongoing knowledge, which combines with 
that of ‘pure experience’ as something on which I 
‘proceed and act’ and that only retrospectively conceive 
in a more structured way, obviously involves various 
issues including the validation of the cognitive process – 
even assuming that, as James believes, it is ‘a function of 
our active life’ and not ‘a static relation out of time’ 
(James 1976, 37). 
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The difference between percepts and concepts 
 
Finally, the functional replacement of perceptions with 
conceptions implies a necessary reduction of perception. 
 
Now the immediately present moment in 
everyone's experience, however complex the 
content of it may be, has this same absolute 
character. […] So far as we tend to act on that, it 
is real naively or practically. So far as we reflect 
on it and criticize and ‘reduce’ it, it appears to us 
to have subjective status merely, to be a simple 
'state of mind' of our own, one of our errors, or 
delusions perhaps. […] Our percepts reduce our 
concepts and, unreduced themselves, constitute 
our world of material reality. (James 1988, 30) 
 
The relations between immediate and mediated 
knowledge, or perceptions and concepts, is something 
that commits James both psychologically and 
philosophically to the task of showing how much they 
are effectively interwoven in our ordinary experience 
and what risks are involved in an ‘intellectualistic’ or 
absolute philosophy, which excludes the somatic-
physiological component from the factors of knowledge. 
In Principles, the terms perceptions and concepts denote 
those complex objects, more vivid or faint, to which our 
substantive mental states refer. They correspond 
respectively to the sensation and the image as far as 
simple objects are concerned. We can analytically 
distinguish the respective semantic areas of the two 
terms, so that synonyms of ‘concept’ are terms such as 
‘idea, thought and intellection’, all that is the mediated; 
whereas, the term ‘perception’ stands for what is 
immediate or simply perceived, therefore its synonyms 
are ‘sensation, feeling and intuition’ and expressions 
such as ‘sensitive experience, immediate flow’. Their 
most distinctive characteristic is that perceptions are 
continuous, while concepts are discreet as regards their 
meaning. In fact, as he states again in the posthumous 
Some Problems of Philosophy (1911), a concept means 
what it means and nothing else, while a perception 
means many things together and without that ‘much-at-
onceness’ it implies a contradiction. The perceptual 
stream shows the characters of ‘duration, intensity, 
complexity or simplicity, interestingness, excitingness, 
pleasantness or their opponents’ (James 1979, 32). 
Wittgenstein made an interesting point about 
concepts in James’s Principles. Besides being a scientist, 
James claims his belonging to the empiricist tradition of 
Mill and Hume. This was quite a distant background from 
Wittgenstein’s view. In his Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein saw James’s employment of the 
introspective method of analysis as particularly 
problematic for its possible metaphysical outcomes: “We 
are not analyzing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a 
concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a 
word” (Wittgenstein 2009, § 383)
10
. According to 
Goodman, Wittgenstein dismisses James’s conviction 
that any reference to or description of experience could 
provide a sort of special ‘bedrock’ for meaning. He 
warned instead that:  
 
Philosophical investigations: conceptual 
investigations. The essential thing about 
metaphysics: that the difference between factual 
and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A 
metaphysical question is always in appearance a 
factual one, although the problem is a 
conceptual one. (Wittgenstein 1980, § 949) 
 
In this sense, that between grammar and experience 
remains a significant distinction for Wittgenstein and a 
matter of disagreement with James. Even though 
empirical propositions may sometimes work as 
regulative-normative ones, in his view, logic still ‘brings a 
different kind of certainty’ (Goodman 2002, 27). The 
‘riverbed of thoughts’ metaphor he uses to investigate 
empirical propositions has been interpreted by Anna 
                                                 
10
 This critique partially resonates with Richard Rorty’s 
critique of Dewey’s metaphysics of ‘experience’, and 
more generally with the supposed opposition of 
‘language’ and ‘experience’ in pragmatism. According to 
Rosa Calcaterra (2018, chap. 2), the pragmatist notion of 
experience can be understood as a form of 
epistemological holism which is framed within a 
processual and dynamic view of cognitive processes. For 
a critical analysis of Dewey’s attempt to think ‘language’ 
and ‘experience’ in an anti-dichotomic perspective, see 
Dreon (2014). 
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Boncompagni (2016) as a criticism of James’s ‘stream of 
thought’. Wittgenstein considers James’s confusion 
between logical and empirical propositions as a defect of 
his description. Boncompagni rightly suggests that ‘the 
continuity between logical and empirical is not a defect, 
but a precise claim’ of James (247). Such a claim should 
be considered as an aspect of the naturalistic and 
scientific view shared by pragmatists, in parallel with 
their insistence on the continuity between philosophy 
and science. A view that Wittgenstein could not share. 
For James, concepts introduce ideal cuts in 
perception by isolating and defining the immediate 
sensible life that comes as ‘a big blooming buzzing 
confusion’
11
, an expression James uses to convey the 
aspects of vitality, variety, confusion, excess and 
continuity of reality. In dealing with perceptions, we can 
feel no neat boundaries in a continuous fusion of aspects 
that suffuse even the marginal or successive parts of the 
present moment. The unity of the stream of experience 
is unbroken, as its edges or margins are also part of the 
same stream. Our intellectual life systematically 
substitutes the abstract order of concepts for the 
perceptual order of experience. Concepts ideally and 
eternally identify those objects that our attention has 
carved out of the perceptive abundance for aesthetic or 
practical purposes. We cut out portions of the 
experiential continuum to which we give names and 
which we classify according to temporary purposes, and 
in doing so we also modify the order of perceptual 
experience as initially perceived. 
The practical utility of concepts as well as their 
reality is undeniable, especially for those who, like 
James, would consider themselves meliorists. Indeed, 
both percepts and concepts are fundamental to our 
                                                 
11
 In 1865 James joined as a teaching assistant Louis 
Agassiz’s ‘Thayer expedition’ to Brazil. In my forthcoming 
book (Bella 2019), I suggest that James’s experience of 
the tropical rainforest, the overwhelming impression of 
which he described in a letter to his brother Henry Jr. 
James, forced him to appreciate the variety of nature 
ever after.  
existence for us to be able fully to know and deal with 
reality. In every actual situation, concepts are mixed with 
our present and future perceptions, and concepts enable 
us to extend our immediate perceptual environment 
beyond the here and now, as well as to organize and 
drive perceptual experiences according to our practical 
and aesthetic interests. As James explains again in 1909 – 
and long before in Principles
12
 – things are ‘special 
groups of sensible qualities, which happen practically or 
aesthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give 
substantive names, and which we exalt to this exclusive 
status of independence and dignity’ (James 1979, 274). 
As in a topographical system, the substitution of 
percepts for concepts allows us to introduce the whole 
system of conceptual relations involved and thus to be in 
a position to say a great deal more about the replaced 
perception. The important thing, however, is not to 
forget the perceptive origin of all our possible ‘universes 
of thought’ (i.e. such contexts as: the world of common-
sense ‘things’, the mathematical world of pure forms, 
the world of music), otherwise there is the risk of an 
indiscriminate rationalization of all the sensible aspects 
of reality. In fact, to maintain that the perceptual stream 
is continuous is once again a way to contradict the 
Kantian idea that discontinuity characterizes experience. 
This position is crucial to the aim of avoiding reliance on 
logical conditions that guarantee the possibility of 
connection; that is to say, rejecting the idea that 
whatever connection there is can only be a matter of 
conceptual understanding. It is quite the opposite. Just 
as with the nature of concepts, so the patterns of 
relation between concepts are static; and against 
Wittgenstein’s view, the logical relations do not reveal a 
more profound or less illusory level of reality than the 
stream of sensations. 
                                                 
12
 ‘But what are things? Nothing, as we shall abundantly 
see, but special groups of sensible qualities, which 
happen practically or aesthetically to interest us, to 
which we therefore give substantive names, and which 
we exalt to this exclusive status of independence and 
dignity.’ (James 1981, 274) 
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The conceptual order is static with respect to the 
stream of experience, for static and abstract objects 
produce fixed orders whose relations and patterns are 
static in turn. Conceptual relations can be analytically 
compared, but they can by no means entirely replace the 
dynamic relations of the experiential stream. James does 
not intend to establish an absolute difference between 
knowing and living; these two processes are somewhat 
inseparable from each other. However, from the 
empiricist standpoint, he argues that: ‘the significance of 
concepts always consists in their relation to perceptual 
particulars’ (James 1979, 36); ‘to hold percepts fast – in 
James’s words – if our conceptual powers are to mean 
anything distinct’ (James 1979, 44). 
The ‘theoretical’ inadequacy of concepts concerning 
the function of letting us know the nature of reality and 
the implicit thesis of the ‘insuperability of sensation’ 
strongly emerges in the changing character of experience 
and therefore in the problematic question of a dynamic 
identity
13
. In continuous processes, the punctual 
reduction of perceptions to concepts (therefore the 
translation of a perceptive experience into the 
conception of the same), fails to reproduce it faithfully 
and fully
14
 And indeed, the attempt to reconvert the 
conceptual analysis of reality into the original perceptual 
continuum is entirely misleading, as we can see in all 
those processual experiences that turn out to be 
incomprehensible at the level of conceptual explanation: 
activity and causality, the conceptual impossibility of 
personal identity and the attribution of conceptual limits 
to all reality. The reality in its integrity is given to us in 
the immediate perception that grasps the deepest and 
                                                 
13
 In Maddalena’s theory (2015), complete ‘gestures’ as 
synthetic instruments allow dealing with identities as 
changing processes. 
14
 James insists that the ‘full nature of reality’ is not 
conceptual, rather it is only given in the perceptual flux. 
Concepts are secondary ‘in point of genesis’, they are 
secondary order realities: ‘concept-stuff may often be 
treated, for purposes of action and even of discussion, as 
if it were a full equivalent for reality. But […] no amount 
of it can be a full equivalent, and […] in point of genesis it 
remains a secondary formation.’ (James 1979, 59).  
thickest aspects of it, while more superficially, as a 
subtler representation of sensation, it is given to us in 
the concepts that help us to extend and ideally complete 
those same contents. 
 
Conclusive observations on pluralism  
and indeterminism in an evolutionary perspective 
 
In 1909 James published A Pluralistic Universe, a book 
that reveals the strong interconnection between his idea 
of the continuity of experience and his radical 
reconstruction of empiricism. Radical empiricism is 
conceived as a doctrine of experiential continuity, which 
takes advantage of the immediate and therefore sensible 
experience of continuity; such an approach discloses the 
intimate interconnection between his principal 
conceptions, namely pure experience, radical 
empiricism, pragmatism, humanism and pluralism. They 
are all ways of illustrating the relation of empirical and 
contingent continuity that constitutes the field of 
possible experience in which we operate, as well as of 
reducing the value of abstract knowledge. Knowledge is 
above all a means to lead us somewhere in experience. 
According to James’s philosophical reception of Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection, ideas are instruments of 
adaptation to reality. In this sense, James like Peirce 
seems to stress the idea that knowledge has an 
existential dimension: it is needed to live. It is only 
because something happens to fall into one’s universe of 
connections that one comes to care about it.  
James is proposing a ‘philosophy of experience’ that 
connects with humanism in its attempt to reconcile our 
intellectual faculties with our sensible ones and to 
disregard any dogmatic, incontestable or absolute form 
of knowledge. Such a philosophy has to be tailored to 
reality as integrated and plural as possible. It should 
avoid depriving reality of its qualitative characteristics, 
even if vague and more challenging to take into account, 
to make it apparently more intelligible. In this effort, it is 
evident how James’s theory is in sharp contrast to any 
absolute, naturally and socially disembodied use of 
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intellect because of its perverse and illusory outcomes, 
while also explaining his urgent call for a constant 
confrontation with Anglo-American idealism. 
The pragmatic perspective, from which radical 
empiricism does not de facto diverge, is rooted in the 
concrete character of the present experience and always 
remains open to its future convalidation. This view goes 
in the direction of an indeterminist epistemology and 
metaphysics, as future consequences are never fully 
predictable as far as their concrete (contingent and 
contextual) developments are concerned. This complex 
interconnection of psychology, epistemology, and 
ontology also reveals how profound was the influence of 
a logical understanding of Darwin’s theory of evolution 
on James.
15
 The flowing structure of consciousness is 
thus analogous to the current of experiences. In other 
words, we can translate continuity into the practical-
ambulatory transcendence of meanings, in the sense 
that as human beings, affectable and fallible, we are 
vectors of continuous processes of change concerning 
which reality proves to be to a certain extent modifiable 
or ‘plastic’. Like Dewey and Schiller, James’s 
argumentation is based on the inductive generalization 
of psychological processes on the basis of an analogical 
connection with natural processes. There are interesting 
connections between the definitions provided by 
pragmatism and the direction taken by scientists towards 
more genuine scientific criteria, in particular, the notions 
of approximation, indeterminateness and pluralism. 
James’s scientific hypothesis points toward a level of 
approximate generalization, that is, an abandonment of 
                                                 
15 
The debt of Peirce and James with Chauncey Wright’s 
logical and epistemological understanding of Darwinism 
is evident here. See Parravicini (2012). On pragmatism 
and Darwinism see McGranahan (2017); Fabbrichesi 
(2011); Franzese (2009). However, this is not to deny the 
well-known influence of other authors on James’s 
conception of pluralism, first of all that of Charles 
Renouvier (see Perry 1935, vol. 1, 659ff). More recently, 
Russell Duvernoy (2015, 508) talked about ‘the 
intersection of an epistemic need (or condition of 
possibility) with a quasi-metaphysical intuition or 
postulate (continuity)’ in James. 
the idealistic view of natural laws, as well as a move 
toward the acceptance of the indefiniteness that 
constitutes the peculiar traits of the ‘living present’.
16
 
This is why James proposes the metaphysical view of 
a reality that, unlike the absolute idea of a world which 
has always been given, is still ‘in the making’, that is, that 
at the same time it undergoes and acts continuous 
processes of change which involve some real ‘variation’, 
or the ‘free play’ on which metaphysical pluralism is 
built
17
. Despite the accusation of endorsing a 
downgraded form of utilitarianism
18
, James’s 
philosophical intention is to highlight that, beneath 
consolidated and seemingly irremovable definitions, 
meanings are continually flowing and undergoing 
profound changes according to practical conveniences, 
or evolutionary processes. This is not a claim for 
relativism; as far as thought processes are concerned, 
which are conceived as analogous to natural processes, 
there is a constant interplay between function and 
structure, so that pure arbitrariness does not really exist. 
In thought, it is coherence and continuity that connect us 
to the past and the future. It is within the 
epistemological and ontological evolutionary perspective 
that one can also appreciate the value of the 
demystifying work James carries out in his intense 
pragmatist analysis of conventional meanings, by asking 
for their ‘cash-value’. His attitude, however, is that of a 
man of science – the new science – who is tirelessly 
campaigning for the abandonment of any undue 
introduction of a priori metaphysical notions, insisting 
instead on the fundamental significance of the 
                                                 
16
 James’s attention to the ‘present’ goes in the direction 
of what G.H. Mead claims in his The Philosophy of the 
Present (1932), namely to take time seriously. In this 
view, pragmatists’ anti-reductionist naturalism 
anticipates several issues related to ‘emergentism.’ See 
Baggio (2013). 
17
 In Pragmatism, James underlines that pluralism is 
satisfied with just ‘some separation among things, some 
tremor of independence, some free play of parts on one 
another, some real novelty or chance’ (James 1975a, 78). 
18 
For James’s reply to this accusation, see James (1975b, 
chap. 8). 
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philosophical treatment of scientific hypotheses. James 
opposes any form of dogmatism, either philosophical or 
scientific, therefore both absolutism and scientism, 
asking them to give reasons in concrete, ‘cash-value’ 
form for their convictions so that they can be verifiable 
in principle. He sheds light on the fact that even scientific 
convictions inevitably involve personal temperament, 
preferences, and conventional beliefs. Therefore, he 
advocates the necessity for scientists to ‘lay their cards 
on the table’, so that all personal, social and political 
matters ultimately would fall within the supposed 
neutral, rational arena of science.  
Only such a change of perspective can make it 
possible to achieve greater freedom of movement in the 
field of research: every domain of human life can be the 
subject of scientific investigation – as James himself 
demonstrated when dealing with religious experience 
and other paranormal phenomena. Furthermore, science 
has to investigate everything that is human by involving 
humanistic methods and criteria. Science can investigate 
everything, and indeed it is right that it can do so, as long 
as we clarify what ‘science’ means and enlarge its 
boundaries to redeem its humanist origins and 
philosophical depth.  
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ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical engagement with James’ thought on the 
experiential account of meaning and understanding. 
According to this account, meaning is characterized as a 
state of mind of the subject, while understanding is 
conceived as a kind of experience of the subject. This 
paper argues that, although Wittgenstein criticizes the 
experiential model as a tempting but deceptive 
philosophical view, James’s account has a pervasive 
positive influence on Wittgenstein’s thought. It will be 
shown that, even though Wittgenstein argues against 
the idea that meanings are experiences, the Jamesian 
principle of the absence of the will act informs 
Wittgenstein’s alternative conceptions of meaning as use 
and understanding as mastery of a technique. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing in the second 
part of the Philosophical Investigations follows the 
discussion of the experiential account. Wittgenstein’s 
discussion is presented as an instance of the distinction 
between experience and grammar and as an example of 
a broader engagement with James’s philosophy on the 
concept of experience. 
 
Keywords: Wittgenstein; James; experience; meaning; 
pragmatism. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of experience is at the core of an interesting 
“imaginary dialogue” between Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
William James on meaning. I use the word “dialogue” 
because, mainly in the spirit of Goodman’s work, I think 
that James exerted a pervasive positive influence on 
Wittgenstein’s thought (Goodman 2002). Wittgenstein 
worked with The Principles of Psychology
1
 from the 30’s 
till the end of his life and he thought James to be a 
serious philosophical interlocutor. 
In this paper, I will address the issue of the 
experiential account of meaning and understanding 
which is paradigmatically found in James’ masterpiece. 
More specifically, I will focus on two theses that 
                                                 
1
 From now on “The Principles”. 
Wittgenstein ascribes to James: 1. The idea that meaning 
is a state of mind of the subject, 2. The conception of 
understanding as an experience of the subject. Overall, 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the experience of meaning is 
presented as an instance of the distinction between 
experience and grammar, or language. Contrary to the 
general trend among critics, I will trace Wittgenstein’s 
engagement with James on meaning and experience by 
looking at Wittgenstein’s early discussion found in The 
Brown Book, rather than looking at part II of the 
Philosophical Investigations. Moreover, I will show that, 
although Wittgenstein argues against the idea that 
meanings are experiences, the Jamesian principle of the 
absence of the will act informs Wittgenstein’s alternative 
conceptions of meaning as use and understanding as 
mastery of a technique. This specific topic, therefore, is 
an example of a more general philosophical engagement 
between Wittgenstein and James on the concept of 
experience.
2
 
 
The experiential model 
 
In ordinary life, we often find ourselves suddenly 
uttering expressions such as “Now I understand!”, “Now 
I know how to do it!” while reading a text, or while 
listening to an instruction, or just while deeply thinking 
about something. Moreover, if we think about what 
happens when we read a text with understanding we 
feel as something different is going on than when we 
read a text we don’t understand. We feel like we are 
having a specific and particular experience. 
Correspondingly, we tend to see meaningful words as 
words that are intimately infused with their meaning. 
When an expression is seen as meaningful, it is not seen 
as a mere sound or black mark, but rather as an entity 
which would not be the same if the meaning changed. 
When we employ familiar words, we feel like we are 
having a specific experience of meaning. This can take 
many forms: we experience a loss of meaning when the 
                                                 
2
 Wittgenstein uses the german term “Erlebnis” when he 
writes about the experience of meaning. It is this 
concept of experience which is at issue here, that is, the 
individual’s primary and inner experience.  
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word is repeated several times (RPP I §194)
3
, or we 
experience different meanings of the same word, such as 
experiencing “bank” as meaning a financial institution 
and then as meaning a river’s edge, or we take a proper 
name to be intimately connected to its bearer (PI p. 282). 
Overall, it seems that every familiar word “carries an 
atmosphere with it in our minds, a corona of faintly 
indicated uses” (PPF §35). Is then understanding an inner 
process, namely the collection of all these experiences? 
Is the meaning of a word the experience one has in 
hearing or uttering it? 
The phenomenology of understanding seems to 
suggest that meaning is something that we experience, 
that is, a state of the mind. We are thereby inclined to 
define understanding as a kind of experience which 
accompanies the hearing and uttering of words. After all, 
isn’t this experience that distinguishes an intelligent 
uttering or reading from an automatic one? According to 
Wittgenstein, the experiential account of meaning and 
understanding is a tempting – but still deceptive – 
philosophical view and it is paradigmatically endorsed by 
James in The Principles. 
 
James and the priority of experience 
 
James does not actually say that meanings are a kind of 
experience. However, Wittgenstein ascribes to him the 
experiential account of meaning and understanding and 
this ascription, as I shall argue, is not unjustified. As 
Goodman suggested, experiences seem to stand as the 
best candidate for linguistic meaning in James’ system of 
thought (Goodman 2002, 75). The experiential account is 
found at least in four settings of The Principles in 
chapters IX and X: 1. The passage about the feelings 
attached to words, 2. James’ discussion on the sense of 
familiarity, 3. The Ballard case, 4. The empirical self.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 See “Bibliography” for abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s 
works. 
1. In chapter IX, James famously states that “there is not 
a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial 
phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human 
speech, that does not express some shading or other of 
relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist 
between the larger objects of our thought. […] We ought 
to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and 
a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue 
or a feeling of cold” (James 1983, 238). Wittgenstein 
reads this passage as a view on meaning, that is, the idea 
that the meaning of a word is the specific feeling, or 
experience attached to it. However, to be precise, James 
is not dealing with the problem of linguistic meaning in 
this setting. This gets clearer if we report the entire 
passage. Before speaking about the feeling of words, 
James states that “if there be such things as feelings at 
all, then so surely as relations between objects exist in 
rerum naturâ, so surely, and more surely, do feelings 
exist to which these relations are known” and, after 
saying that we ought to say all those feelings, he 
complains that “we do not: so inveterate has our habit 
become of recognizing the existence of the substantive 
parts alone, that language almost refuses to lend itself to 
any other use” (James 1983, 238). In this context, James 
is mainly concerned about the misleading classical 
empiricist view of thought and experience as a set of 
separate and isolated “atoms”. According to James, by 
contrast, the thought is sensibly continuous, that is, even 
the relations are part of it. He indeed distinguishes 
between substantive parts – the “resting places”, and 
transitive parts – the “places of flight”, and he criticizes 
traditional philosophy for not taking into account the 
latter.
4
 However, even if the context is not specifically 
semantic, James repeatedly states that language is 
                                                 
4
 James criticises the dichotomy between sensationalism 
and intellectualism: sensationalists have denied the 
existence of relations and tendencies; intellectualists, on 
the other hand, have similarly denied the existence of 
feelings but they have concluded that, since so, relations 
must be known by a pure act of Reason, or Intellect. This 
is a point which will be greatly emphasised in The Essays 
on Radical Empiricism (James 1996).  
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inadequate and it does prevent us to see the truth given 
by experience. In particular, the naming process is what 
inclines us to see only the substantial parts of thought: 
we think that where we have a separate name, a 
separate thing must be there, whereas where there is no 
name, no entity can exist (James 1983, 238). This point 
introduces the priority given by James to experience over 
language and this is indeed a central part of the 
experiential model we are discussing. 
 
2. What is the difference between an experience tasted 
for the first time and the same experience recognized as 
familiar? The sense of familiarity is generally something 
we badly manage to describe and characterize. In this 
context, James immediately moves to the linguistic level. 
 
When we read such phrases as “naught but”, 
“either one or the other”, “a is b”, “but, although 
it is, nevertheless”, “it is an excluded middle, 
there is no tertium quid”, […] is it true that there 
is nothing more in our minds than the words 
themselves as they pass? What then is the 
meaning of the words which we think we 
understand as we read? What makes that 
meaning different in one phrase from what it is 
in the other? “Who?” “When?” “Where?” Is the 
difference of felt meaning in these interrogatives 
nothing more than their difference of sound? 
(James 1983, 244). 
 
Meaning is here conceived as something that we feel 
and, moreover, it is something that attaches to the word 
so that the word is not a mere word that passes in our 
mind. If the meaning is so conceived, then, accordingly, 
“that first instantaneous glimpse of some one's meaning 
which we have, when in vulgar phrase we say we 'twig' 
it” is “surely an altogether specific affection of our mind” 
(James 1983, 245). If we are still not convinced about the 
genuine linguistic import of James’ passages, it might be 
useful to point out that James mentions and endorses 
Dr. Campbell’s theory on sense and nonsense. 
 
That connection [he says] or relation which 
comes gradually to subsist among the different 
words of a language, in the minds of those who 
speak it, is merely consequent on this, that those 
words are employed as signs of connected or 
related things. […] Hence the sounds considered 
as signs will be conceived to have a connection 
analogous to that which subsisted among the 
things signified; I say, the sounds considered as 
signs; for this way of considering them constantly 
attends us in speaking, writing, hearing, and 
reading. When we purposely abstract from it, 
and regard them merely as sounds, we are 
instantly sensible that they are quite 
unconnected, and have no other relation than 
what ariseth from similitude of tone or accent 
(James 1983, 252). 
 
According to James, Dr. Campbell’s view helps to 
emphasize the fact that when we experience a sentence 
as meaningful, certain grammatical expectations are 
fulfilled. Nonsense in grammatical form would sound 
half-rational to us. If we know a language, then when we 
hear the first words of a sentence we expect other words 
to come after and we have a glimpse of the thought 
expressed even before the end of the uttering (James 
1983, 245). In other words, when a sentence is 
understood and experienced as the expression of a 
unitary thought, then each word is felt not only as a 
word but as having a meaning. More specifically, this 
happens when we take meaning dynamically in a 
sentence. In this case, meaning can be reduced to a bare 
fringe of felt suitability or unfitness to context and 
conclusion. But meaning can also be taken statically, that 
is, without context. “The static meaning, when the word 
is concrete, as 'table,' 'Boston,' consists of sensory 
images awakened; when it is abstract, as 'criminal 
legislation’, 'fallacy’, the meaning consists of other words 
aroused, forming the so-called 'definition'” (James 1983, 
255). Whether we take meaning dynamically or 
statically, the meaning seems to be a kind of mental 
state: an experience of fittingness in the former case, 
and a proper sensory image attached to the word in the 
latter. Moreover, this conception of meaning seems to 
presuppose a kind of priority of thought over language: 
language seems to be a mere vehicle of autonomous and 
pre-constituted thoughts. This suggestion brings us to 
the Ballard case. 
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3. Mr. Ballard is a deaf-mute man from birth who wrote 
some reminiscences of his childhood. He claimed to have 
been able to think before he could speak. Ballard writes: 
“It was during those delightful rides, some two or three 
years before my initiation into the rudiments of written 
language, that I began to ask myself the question: How 
came the world into being? When this question occurred 
to my mind, I set myself to thinking it over a long time” 
(James 1983, 257). James takes Mr. Ballard reports being 
sufficient proofs of the fact that thought is perfectly 
possible without language or speech. This conclusion is 
based, I think, on two assumptions: the idea that thought 
may be entirely divorced from behaviour, including the 
verbal one, and the methodological acceptance of 
introspection.
5
 This brings us to the last point. 
 
4. A man’s empirical self is “the sum total of all that he 
CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, 
but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his 
ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his 
lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account” (James 
1983, 279). The self, so conceived, is constituted by the 
material self, the social self, the spiritual self and the 
pure ego. For our purposes, I will focus on the spiritual 
self. James defines it as “a man's inner or subjective 
being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken 
concretely” (James 1983, 283). What is to be underlined 
is that, according to James, we consider the spiritual self 
through a reflective process which is intimately different 
from an outward-looking point of view. Human beings 
immediately know their own inner states. “This attention 
to thought as such, and the identification of ourselves 
with it rather than with any of the objects which it 
reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a rather 
mysterious operation, of which we need here only say 
that as a matter of fact it exists” (James 1983, 284). 
Moreover, thanks to introspection we can individuate a 
certain portion of the stream that James calls “the active 
                                                 
5
 Both points are extensively criticized by Wittgenstein 
(PI §§327-343).  
element” in all consciousness. This element is what, in a 
certain sense, gives life to thought, to words, to 
everything that is experienced and it is something that is 
felt by the subject by direct acquaintance.  
Overall, we might conclude that the experiential 
model endorsed by James involves four aspects: the idea 
that meanings are experiences, that is, feelings 
associated with the words; the idea that understanding 
is an affection of the mind which accompanies the 
uttering or reading of the words; the priority of thought 
over language, that is, the view of language as a vehicle 
of pre-constituted thoughts inwardly uttered; finally, 
epistemic priority given to the first person in the light of 
the methodological value of introspection. The priority of 
experience – even epistemologically – is then a core trait 
of James’ thought and it is one of the elements of 
continuity between The Principles and The Essays on 
Radical Empiricism. Wittgenstein, as we shall see, argues 
against such priority and charges James with the failure 
to distinguish experience from meaning, language, or 
grammar. 
 
Wittgenstein’s concern 
 
According to Goodman, Wittgenstein is mainly 
interested in James’ empiricism, that is, the idea that 
experience is a sufficient fundamental category. 
However, whereas James aims to analyze and classifying 
phenomena, Wittgenstein considers concepts. As a 
result, it is the concept of experience which is mainly at 
issue in his remarks about the experiential model. First of 
all, Wittgenstein warns us that the concept of experience 
is often used in philosophy to refer to something solid 
which could furnish a kind of “bedrock, deeper than any 
special methods and language-games”. Something 
similar applies to the concept of fact or happening. 
However, he goes on, “such extremely general terms 
have an extremely blurred meaning. They relate in 
practice to innumerable special cases, but that does not 
make them any solider, no, rather it makes them more 
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fluid” (RPP I §648). Secondly, further misunderstandings 
stand behind the attempt to use such alleged “solider 
concept” to give an account of language. Wittgenstein’s 
interest in the experiential model is therefore essentially 
semantic; he is concerned with James’ conception of the 
experience of meaning as a deceptive model of meaning 
and understanding. Wittgenstein does not say that we 
don’t have experiences of meaning, he rather warns us 
against the tendency to think that those experiences 
constitute meaning.  
It is generally assumed that Wittgenstein writes 
extensively about the experience of meaning after 
finishing Part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations in 
1945 because he feels that something is missing in the 
account of meaning as use exposed in that work.
6
 
However, there is evidence of an early interest in this 
topic in writings from the first half of the 1930s and 
Wittgenstein does draw the distinction between 
meanings as states of mind and meanings construed in 
terms of “rules” already in The Big Typescript: 
 
What are we to understand the “meaning” of a 
word? A characteristic feeling that accompanies 
the asserting (hearing) of the word? (The and-
feeling, if-feeling of James.) Or are we to use the 
word “meaning” completely differently; and, for 
example, say two words have the same meaning 
when the same grammatical rules apply to both 
of them? (BT p. 29e). 
 
I argue that Wittgenstein’s discussion of the experience 
of meaning is part of his reflection about the concepts of 
meaning and understanding and it helps to shape the 
alternative model of meaning as use. Therefore, it is not 
the later conception of meaning. For this reason, I will try 
to retrace Wittgenstein’s engagement with James by 
looking at an extensive discussion we find in The Brown 
Book, dated 1935-1936. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Zemach 1995, Voltolini 2009.  
Limits and sources of the experiential model 
 
Wittgenstein famously writes that “for a large class of cases 
of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ – though not for 
all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of 
a word is its use in the language” (PI §43). For “use” 
Wittgenstein does not mean the practical function of the 
word. Rather, he is pointing to a certain public and shared 
practice with the word: the way a word is used in a system 
of signs, that is, a language. A word is used in accordance 
with certain rules, therefore normativity stands at the core 
of Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning: meaning is best 
characterized as the correct use of a word in a specific 
language, or language game. Wittgenstein introduces the 
notion of grammar to elucidate this new perspective on 
language. Although the term “grammar” is used by 
Wittgenstein in a variety of ways, I will be using this term to 
refer to the rules of usage of a particular word or 
expression.
7
 There is, therefore, a knowing how and when 
to use a term and this also provides a criterion for 
someone’s understanding it. The concept of understanding, 
correspondingly, is best characterized in terms of a capacity 
to use the word, a “mastery of a technique” which is learned 
by training in a particular cultural system or, better, in a 
“form of life” (PI §§150, 19). 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein admits that the idea of 
meaning as some sort of conscious mental phenomenon is 
very seductive because it comes from some basic intuitions 
about the phenomenology of understanding.  
 
We think of the meaning of signs sometimes as 
states of mind of the man using them, sometimes as 
the role which these signs are playing in a system of 
language. The connection between these two ideas 
is that the mental experiences which accompany 
the use of a sign undoubtedly are caused by our 
usage of the sign in a particular system of language. 
William James speaks of specific feelings 
accompanying the use of such words as ‘and’, ‘if’, 
‘or’ (BB p. 78).  
 
                                                 
7
 Wittgenstein also talks about the grammar of an entire 
language to refer both to the set of rules that constitute 
that language and the study of the rules of that 
particular language (PG §§44, 23a, 23e, BT p. 58). 
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Overall, Wittgenstein does not want to deny a certain 
phenomenology of the use of familiar terms. He rather 
criticizes the philosophical tendency to use such 
experiential elements to ground the meaning of terms. 
The outcome of his discussions is that “[t]he meaning of 
a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying 
it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such 
experiences” (PPF §37). We surely have specific 
experiences when we engage with familiar words, 
however, these experiences can’t determine the 
meaning because, as we shall see, they presuppose such 
a meaning. In what follows I will first expose two limits of 
the experiential model that Wittgenstein discusses in the 
Brown Book: essentialism and the confusion between 
“expressing an experience” and “describing an 
experience”.  
After mentioning James, Wittgenstein admits that 
“there is no doubt that at least certain gestures are often 
connected with such words, as a collecting gesture with 
‘and’, and a dismissing gesture with ‘not’. And there 
obviously are visual and muscular sensations connected 
with”. However, “it is clear enough that these sensations 
do not accompany every [my emphasis] use of the word 
‘not’ and ‘and’” (BB pp. 78-79). When we understand the 
meaning of a word, we say, a specific experience must 
occur in me other than the mere hearing or reading the 
word. However, do we always have that particular 
experience when we understand the meaning? It is 
useful to imagine the following case: I give to a person a 
list of words and I ask her to say “yes” or “no” after the 
uttering of each word according to whether she 
understands the word or not. We then ask this person to 
remember what happened in her mind when she 
understood the word and when she did not understand 
the word. According to Wittgenstein, this mental 
experiment will show us a multitude of different 
characteristic experiences, but it will not show us one 
experience which we should call “the experience of 
understanding”.  
 
There will be such experiences as these: I hear 
the word "tree" and say "Yes" with the tone of 
voice and sensation of "Of course". […] I hear 
"Mamma", this strikes me as funny and childish-
"Yes". […] I hear "spinthariscope", and say to 
myself, "Must be some sort of scientific 
instrument", perhaps try to think up its meaning 
from its derivation and fail and say "No". […] 
There will, on the other hand, be a large class of 
cases in which I am not aware of anything 
happening except hearing the word and saying 
the answer (BB p. 155). 
 
When we describe the characteristic experiences that 
accompany our use of signs we are describing just one 
possible case within many, but our way of speaking 
assumes that there should be a specific experience which 
characterizes what we want to define. This experience is 
thought to be the essential feature of the phenomena, 
the element which must be in common of all phenomena 
of that type. Wittgenstein thinks that this philosophical 
tendency comes from a dissatisfaction toward his own 
descriptions. Let’s go back to the previous example: 
there could be the case in which the person should have 
to say simply “I know of no particular experience at all, I 
just said 'Yes', or 'No'" after hearing the uttered words. I 
merely reacted in that way. This description, however, is 
thought to be too meagre. One could say that surely this 
couldn't have been all. The experiential element seems 
to offer a more solid basis for a description which is 
more respectful of the human character of language but, 
since we cannot really point to any such essential 
experience, we find ourselves in  
 
a curious difficulty: on the one hand it seems we 
have no reason to say that in all cases in which 
we understand a word one particular experience-
-or even one of a set--is present. On the other 
hand, we may feel it's plainly wrong to say that in 
such a case all that happens may be that I hear or 
say the word. For that seems to be saying that 
part of the time we act as mere automatons. And 
the answer is that in a sense we do and in a 
sense we don't (BB p. 156).  
 
It is in this context that Wittgenstein applies to language 
James’s view of “the absence of an act of volition” and 
he explicitly employs James’ example: 
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It has been said that when a man, say, gets out of 
bed in the morning, all that happens may be this: 
he deliberates, "Is it time to get up?", he tries to 
make up his mind, and then suddenly he finds 
himself getting up. Describing it this way 
emphasizes the absence of an act of volition. […] 
Now there is something in the above description 
which tempts us to contradict it; we say: "We 
don't just 'find', observe, ourselves getting up, as 
though we were observing someone else! (BB p. 
150). 
 
In this context, Wittgenstein is thinking along with 
James. We are not content with that description as we 
are not content with the picture of meaning as use. 
There must be something more, we say, otherwise we 
would employ mere words, mere sounds whereas when 
we speak and read we are dealing with meaningful signs. 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of various cases has a 
deflationary force: just like it is not necessary that there 
is a willing act every time we do a voluntary act, so there 
does not have to be an act, or experience of 
understanding or meaning in order for someone to 
understand or mean something. 
The second limit of the experiential model concerns 
our misleading way of employing the concept of 
experience. In particular, according to Wittgenstein we 
fail to distinguish between “reporting an experience” 
and “expressing an experience” (Schulte 1993, 60-62). 
Wittgenstein writes that the philosophical trouble we 
have been turning over is connected with the use of the 
word “particular”. “We have been inclined to say that 
seeing familiar objects we have a particular feeling”, 
“that we had a particular experience when we acted 
voluntarily”, or that we feel a particular sensation when 
we hear or read a known word (BB p. 158). The word 
“particular” has two different uses: the transitive use, 
and the intransitive one. In the first case, the word is 
used preliminarily to a description, a specification or a 
comparison. That means I can answer the question “In 
what way particular?” by explaining in different words. 
For example, we might describe the smell of a dish by 
saying that “This pasta has a particular smell. It is the 
smell I felt every day when I was a child at school”. In the 
second case, the word is used to give emphasis and it 
does not require further description. It is an expression 
similar to “peculiar”, “out of the ordinary”, or 
“uncommon”. For example, the sentences “What a 
peculiar smell!”, or “This face has a particular 
expression!”. However, this is not the only way we could 
emphasize something with words. Wittgenstein 
introduces the interesting notion of “reflexive use of 
words”. Like the intransitive use, the reflexive form of 
speech is a matter of emphasis but the difference is that 
it can always be “straightened up” (BB p. 161), that is, we 
can always rephrase what we want to say in straight – 
not reflexive – terms. For example, we say in the 
reflexive mode “That’s that” meaning “The matter is 
closed”, or “That is settled”. The reflexive form, 
therefore, is a special case of the transitive use. 
According to Wittgenstein, when we philosophize about 
understanding and meaning we use the word 
“particular” in a way which is very similar to the 
intransitive use but “we are regarding its use as a special 
case of the transitive use” (BB p. 160), i.e., the reflexive 
use. We think we are denoting with the word 
“particular” an elusive and mysterious experience which 
cannot be properly grasped by language. In particular, 
“we feel as though we could give an experience a name 
without at the same time committing ourselves about its 
use. […] We are emphasizing, not comparing, but we 
express ourselves as though this emphasis was really a 
comparison of the object with itself; there seems to be a 
reflexive comparison” (BB pp. 159-160). However, when 
we employ such expressions we indeed are not properly 
describing anything, we are just expressing those 
particular experiences we are having. We might say that 
those expressions are expressions that we correctly 
employ as expressions of particular experiences – it is a 
use which is included in their grammar – but they are not 
descriptions of those experiences. When I say that I feel 
a particular experience when I read with understanding, 
a further demand of specification about such an 
experience may put the mind on a whirl because I would 
point to that experience again. I am not comparing that 
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experience with another paradigm, I am just giving 
emphasis to it, I am saying that I am having it. This is a 
temptation, though, that it is strictly connected to the 
philosophical perspective and in particular to a way of 
doing philosophy that clearly echoes James’ 
introspective method. 
 
When we philosophize about this sort of thing 
we almost invariably do something of this sort: 
We repeat to ourselves a certain experience, say, 
by looking fixedly at a certain object and trying to 
'read off' as it were the name of its colour. And it 
is quite natural that doing so again and again we 
should be inclined to say, "Something particular 
happens while we say the word 'blue'". […] But 
ask yourself: Is this also the process which we 
usually go through when on various occasions--
not philosophizing--we name the colour of an 
object? (BB p. 149). 
 
Two senses of “experience” 
 
In the Brown Book Wittgenstein introduces also an 
intimate connection between the discussion on the 
meaning experience and the discussion on aspect-
perception. “Our sentence ‘I have this feeling while I'm 
writing’ is of the kind of the sentence ‘I see this’” (BB p. 
174). Aspect perception is a mechanism that stands 
between sensory information and conceptual 
elaboration. What does it mean to say that one can see a 
certain object at one time as this and at another time as 
that? When we look for a man in a puzzle picture, for 
example, we might start seeing mere dashes, and then 
later appears a face. We would then say: “Now I see it as 
a face” (BB p. 163). In cases like these, Wittgenstein says 
that we are inclined to think that seeing a man in a 
puzzle picture is not merely seeing a complex of lines, 
but rather it is having an additional and particular 
experience different from the mere seeing of the puzzle 
picture. Here, however, we are dealing with two 
different uses of the term “seeing”: seeing tout court and 
seeing an aspect. Is aspect-seeing an additional process 
to seeing tout court? Is the meaning experience an 
additional process to the mere hearing or uttering the 
word? Wittgenstein writes against this philosophical 
tendency. Seeing an aspect is not seeing an additional 
and different object, but it is rather seeing the same 
object in a different way. Aspect-perception, therefore, is 
not perception of a particular property of the object but 
it is rather an exercise of some recognition capacities. 
At this point, we are in better position to understand 
Wittgenstein’s discussion in Part 2 of the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
 
Only of someone capable of making certain 
applications of the figure with facility one says 
that he saw it now this way, now that way. The 
substratum of this experience is the mastery of a 
technique (PPF §224). 
 
The outcome of Wittgenstein’s discussion is to show 
that, as we are inclined to think about aspect-seeing as 
an additional process to mere seeing, so we are inclined 
to conceive the experiences of meaning and 
understanding as additional processes which accompany 
the mere reading of words. However, Wittgenstein 
clarifies the fact that when we speak about the 
experience of meaning, the concept of experience used 
is not that of the primary experience, like having some 
sensation, feeling pain, etc, but a kind of experience 
which presupposes a particular ability, or competence. 
This competence is the mastery of the use of words 
which constitutes their grammar. Such an experience 
already presupposes meaning as use, therefore it cannot 
be what constitutes such a meaning. 
 
But how odd for this to be the logical condition 
of someone’s having such-and-such an 
experience! After all, you don’t say that one ‘has 
toothache’ only if one is capable of doing such-
and-such. – From this it follows that we cannot 
be dealing with the same concept of experience 
here. It is a different concept, even though 
related. Only of someone who can do, has 
learned, is master of, such-and such, does it 
makes sense to say that he has had this 
experience (PPF §223). 
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According to Wittgenstein, therefore, the experience of 
meaning is an experience that we actually have when we 
engage with familiar words, but it is accommodated – 
together with other subjective aspects of the use of 
language – by the notion of secondary meaning of a 
word. This meaning presupposes the primary meaning, 
that is, meaning as the role and use of the word in the 
language- its grammar. The expression “to experience 
the meaning of a word” is a secondary use of language, 
that is, an expression for which the primary use of 
“meaning” is essential.  
 
Conclusion: from experience to grammar 
 
The experiences of understanding and meaning occur 
simultaneously with the reading or hearing of the signs, 
hence seem radically different from understanding in the 
sense of the ability to use words and meaning as the role 
of signs in a system. Wittgenstein’s discussion is meant 
to show, by contrast, at least the semantic dispensability 
of the notion of meaning experience: it is not a necessary 
condition for understanding an expression and for 
correctly employing it.
8
 Overall, Wittgenstein’s remarks 
are meant to reverse the Jamesian view on experience 
and thought: the priority is given to grammar, that is, the 
rules according to which we employ and understand 
words. Part of the philosophical task is then to clarify the 
grammar of the concept of experience and to show that 
even such concept, like every other concept, is used in 
accordance with rules embedded in a certain public and 
shared practice, therefore it cannot provide a more solid 
ground for the meaning of words. 
To conclude, I would like to highlight two points. 
Firstly, the priority of grammar over experience involves 
a different view of language itself. Whereas James 
sometimes, especially in The Principles, seems to 
conceive language as a tool to share pre-constituted 
thoughts, Wittgenstein rather conceives language as a 
                                                 
8
 Wittgenstein provides further proof for this point by 
discussing the case of the “meaning-blind person” (PPF 
§§257-261). 
human activity, or practice the mastery of which must be 
presupposed in order to formulate inward thoughts 
themselves. 
 
An intention is embedded in its situation, in 
human customs and institutions. If the technique 
of the game of chess did not exist, I could not 
intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do 
intend the construction of a sentence in advance, 
that is made possible by the fact that I can speak 
the language in question (PI §337). 
 
Secondly, I would like to suggest that Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between two senses of “experience” might 
also be used – independently of Wittgenstein’s own 
interest – to highlight a concept of immediate experience 
which is not that of the Erlebnis. Such a concept does not 
involve any epistemological priority of the first person 
and, indeed, it rather focuses on the continuous 
interaction between the subject and a world which is 
inherently social; a way of doing and undergoing. The 
philosophical engagement between Wittgenstein and 
James on the experiential model of meaning and 
understanding is, then, an instance of a broader 
philosophical reflection on the concept of experience, 
which is a core issue for the pragmatist tradition. By 
stating that, I do not want to argue that Wittgenstein 
might be considered a pragmatist philosopher, but 
rather I want to stress the philosophical relevance of a 
research which takes into consideration Wittgenstein 
and the pragmatist tradition together. Wittgenstein, as 
we have seen, argues against the Jamesian priority of 
experience over language. However, in the light of what 
has been suggested above, we might add a further step 
which can be the object of further research: not just 
from experience to grammar, but from Erlebnis to 
Embodiment.
9
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 In this way, the research might be extended so to 
include Dewey’s reflection on experience (Dewey 1939). 
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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I develop a comparison between 
the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their 
concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have 
acknowledged the affinity between James’ early 
psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late 
development of James’ philosophy is often considered in 
opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. 
This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-
dual dimension of experience that precedes the 
functional division into subject and object, thus 
contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the 
dual structure of intentionality. However, I argue that 
the later “genetic” development of phenomenology 
converges with some central aspects of James’ radical 
empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology 
leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as 
a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes 
the subject-object duality and is at the base of the 
process of co-constitution of the subject and the object 
in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl 
conceives of the impressional core of experience as 
structured by formal conditions that depend on the 
concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this 
reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology 
can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading 
to the development of the doctrine of pure experience 
as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism. 
 
Keywords: genetic phenomenology, qualia, 
consciousness, pure experience, neutral monism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare the concepts of 
experience that are developed in the philosophies of 
Edmund Husserl and William James. Various authors 
have stressed the affinities between James’ early 
psychology, as presented in the Principles of Psychology 
(James 1958, hereafter referred to as Principles), and 
Husserl’s phenomenology (see Schutz 1941; Gurwitsch 
1946; Wilshire 1969; Kessler 1978). In fact, certain ideas 
presented in James’ Principles prefigure central features 
of Husserl’s phenomenology. In particular, the starting 
point of James’ inquiry in the Principles is the 
epistemological dualism of knower (subject) and known 
(object), conceived of as an essential character of mental 
states. This dualism is expressed by the notions of 
“conception” and “cognitive function”, which can be 
likened to Husserl’s concept of intentionality (see Schutz 
1941; Gurwitsch 1946; Wilshire 1969: 32). This common 
starting point of the philosophies of Husserl and James is 
also developed in similar ways. For example, James’ 
distinction between “topic” and “object of thought” is 
very close to Husserl’s distinction between the “object 
which is intended” and the “object as it is intended” (see 
Schutz 1941; Gurwitsch 1946). Furthermore, James’ idea 
that the various parts of the stream of thought are 
surrounded by fringes, which also account for the unity 
of consciousness and the unity of the object, anticipates 
the phenomenological concept of horizon
1
. For these 
reasons, Husserl’s phenomenology can be conceived of 
as a “radicalization” (see Gurwitsch 1946) of James’ 
programmatic dualism through the investigation of the 
fundamental correlation subjective-objective. 
However, the same reasons that lead us to 
acknowledge this continuity between James’ Principles 
and Husserl’s phenomenology also lead us to find a 
tension between Husserl’s phenomenology and James’ 
later doctrine of pure experience, which is presented in 
the Essays in Radical Empiricism (James 1912, hereafter 
referred to as Essays). This is because, in contrast to the 
analysis of the dual structure of experience by means of 
notions such as “cognitive function” (in James) and 
“intentionality” (in Husserl), the doctrine of pure 
experience achieves a non-dual dimension of experience 
that precedes the functional division into subject and 
object. 
For this reason, various authors have stressed the 
opposition between James’ late philosophy and Husserl’s 
phenomenology (see Gurwitsch 1946: 163; Wilshire 
1969; Kessler 1978). In contrast to this reading, I shall 
argue that Husserl’s genetic development of 
phenomenology also reaches a non-subjectivist concept 
                                                 
1
 Husserl (1970: 234) claims that James recognized the 
“phenomena of horizon […] under the title of ‘fringes’” 
(see Wilshire 1969: 34). 
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of experience that is near to James’ doctrine of pure 
experience. This is because the genetic “deepening” of 
phenomenology finds in the flow of primal impressions a 
fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the 
subject-object duality, being at the base of the process 
of co-constitution of the subject and the object in 
reciprocal dependence. At the same time, reading 
James’ view in the light of Husserl’s phenomenology 
allows us to address an open question in the doctrine of 
pure experience. This view could be interpreted as a 
form of metaphysical realism, i.e. as a doctrine about 
ultimate reality and, specifically, as a metaphysical form 
of neutral monism. However, the metaphysical reading 
of James’ view contrasts with the rejection of the 
absolutistic and trans-empirical claims of metaphysics in 
James’ empiricist and pragmatist philosophy. I shall 
argue that the comparison with Husserl’s 
phenomenology leads us to develop a non-metaphysical 
reading of the doctrine of pure experience. In fact, 
Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience 
as structured by formal conditions that depend on the 
concrete constitution of the subject of experience. I shall 
argue that the phenomenological account of the 
intertwining of form and matter of experience 
complements James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to 
the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a 
form of empirical and not metaphysical realism.
2
 
 
1. The doctrine of pure experience 
 
James conceives of the doctrine of pure experience as a 
“rearrangement” in philosophy and as a 
Weltanschauung into which his mind has grown for 
many years (James 1912: 40). This doctrine goes beyond 
the epistemological dualism of subject-object that was at 
the heart of the Principles and it arises from a radical 
gaze into experience that enters into contact with its 
                                                 
2
 With these notions I refer to the distinction, which is 
present in Kant, between two notions of reality: 
empirical (i.e. relative to the cognitive relation) and 
metaphysical (i.e. absolute, “in itself”). 
originary nature, before any conceptualization and 
theorization has taken place. This inquiry finds a “pure” 
dimension of experience that precedes the functional 
distinction between subject and object. According to 
James, the subject and the object of experience are 
constituted by series of pure experiences and the 
distinction between them is merely practical, depending 
on the function that they have in a certain context, 
which we thereby call “physical” or “mental”. Pure 
experiences are thus situated at the intersection of the 
subject and the object, being the neutral (James 1912: 
25, 123) dimension from which the subjective and the 
objective are constructed for practical purposes. In 
James’ view, the reification of this functional duality is 
the source of old philosophical dilemmas that can be 
solved when we recognize the non dual nature of pure 
experience:  
 
“My thesis is that if we start with the supposition 
that there is only one primal stuff or material in 
the world, a stuff of which everything is 
composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure 
experience,' then knowing can easily be 
explained as a particular sort of relation towards 
one another into which portions of pure 
experience may enter. The relation itself is a part 
of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes 
the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the 
knower, the other becomes the object known.” 
(James 1912: 4) 
 
This view constitutes an account of knowledge and, 
above all, of perception. In particular, it constitutes an 
alternative to both the representative theories and the 
common-sense theories of perception (James 1912: 52). 
In the light of the doctrine of pure experience, “external” 
objects as well as the “internal” images of the objects, 
turn out to be constituted of the same “stuff”, i.e. by 
pure experiences. According to James, each segment of 
experience is made "of just what appears, of space, of 
intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what 
not." (James 1912: 26). These “sensations” are 
qualitative elements that are neutral, being neither 
absolutely subjective nor absolutely objective but rather 
the matter out of which the subjective (mental state) 
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and the objective (physical reality) is made of (James 
1912: 215). Pure experiences are therefore immediately 
accessible qualitative elements of experience or 
“qualia”. James presents us with an original account of 
qualia that is different from both the internalism and the 
externalism about qualities that can be found in various 
theories of perception.
3
 
 
2. Neutral monism and the metaphysics  
    of pure experience 
 
The doctrine of pure experience is, foremost, a theory of 
knowledge. At the same time, James presents it as a 
metaphysics, defining pure experiences as the “stuff of 
which everything is composed” and the “materia prima 
of everything” (James 1912: 4; 138). These passages can 
be read as referring to a metaphysical doctrine 
concerning ultimate being and, in particular, to a form of 
neutral monism. Some authors (e.g. Banks 2010) 
consider James as one of the main proponents of neutral 
monism. In fact, James presents his view as a form of 
“monism” that is centred on the concept of a “primal” 
and “neutral” reality (James 1912: 226)
4
. 
                                                 
3
 I refer, on one hand, to internalist representationalism, 
which conceives of qualia as merely subjective 
properties of mental states and, on the other hand, to 
externalist representationalism (for e.g. in Fred Dretske) 
and direct realism (for e.g. in James Gibson), which 
conceive of qualia as external properties of mind-
independent objects. 
4
 The expressions used by James in French are 
“monisme” and “réalité première de nature neutre”. The 
expression “neutral monism” is explicitly introduced by 
Bertrand Russell, who finally embraced it under the 
influence of James (see esp. Russell 1921). James 
develops this view in tandem with the doctrines of 
pragmatism and pluralism. However, the relationship 
between radical empiricism and metaphysical pluralism 
in James’ late philosophy is debated (see Slater 2011). 
For the purposes of this paper, we can understand 
James’ neutral monism as opposed to substance dualism 
(i.e. the thesis that mind and matter constitute two 
distinct ontological domains). However, James also 
claims that pure experience is manifold and not 
reducible to an “all form” principle, clarifying that 
“[a]lthough for fluency's sake I myself spoke early in this 
article of a stuff of pure experience, I have now to say 
that there is no general stuff of which experience at 
large is made. There are as many stuffs as there are 
When interpreted as a metaphysical view, neutral 
monism is the theory according to which the immediate 
data of experience constitute the “intrinsic nature of 
ultimate reality” (Stubenberg 2014: 1). In this way, it 
constitutes a specific solution to classic metaphysical 
issues and in particular to the mind-body problem, being 
an alternative to both the Cartesian dualism of 
substances and the monistic absolutization of the 
subject (idealism) or of the object (materialism). A 
fundamental precursor of this doctrine is David Hume, 
according to whom the impressions can be conceived of 
as either subjective or objective, depending on the 
context (see Hume 1888: 202). The first full-blown form 
of neutral monism is found in Ernst Mach’s doctrine of 
elements. Mach argues that basic qualitative elements 
of experience such as hot, cold, red, etc. are neither 
exclusively physical nor psychological but rather neutral. 
As in James, according to Mach the grouping of the 
elements into the domains of physics or psychology 
depends on the direction of our investigation and on our 
practical interests.  
The reference to the affinity between James’ and 
Mach’s views is significant because it leads us to 
problematize the interpretation of the doctrine of pure 
experience in metaphysical terms. In fact, Mach 
conceives of his theory as a scientific hypothesis that is 
aimed at dealing with the problem of the relationship 
between two scientific domains of inquiry – physics and 
psychology – and he does so in the context of a criticism 
of the absolute claims of metaphysics.
5
 
Also concerning James’ doctrine of pure experience, 
we are faced with the contrast between a metaphysical 
and a non-metaphysical interpretation of it. On one 
hand, James presents his view as an ultimate account of 
the fundamental constituents of reality. On the other 
hand, James’ pragmatism and empiricism can be 
                                                                       
'natures' in the things experienced” (James 1912: 25). 
5
 This point is stressed by Paolo Parrini (2017). On the 
contrary, Erik Banks (2003; 2010) develops a 
metaphysical interpretation of Mach’s view and closely 
links it to the neutral monism of James and Russell. 
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conceived of in opposition to the absolute claims of 
metaphysics and therefore in opposition to metaphysical 
realism, i.e. to he idea that we can reach knowledge of 
an absolute reality “in itself”. It is also in order to 
address this ambiguity that is useful to compare James’ 
view with Husserl’ phenomenology. 
 
3. The concept of experience in phenomenology 
 
Husserl’s phenomenology is a radical inquiry into the 
nature of experience and has its roots in the empiricist 
tradition. Husserl conceives of Hume as a fundamental 
forerunner of phenomenology who, however, “almost 
sets foot upon its domain, but with blinded eyes” 
(Husserl 1983: 118). In fact, Husserl combines the 
empiricist faithfulness to phenomena with a 
transcendental standpoint that seeks to account for the 
conditions of possibility of the manifestation of 
phenomena. In pursuing this objective, the 
phenomenological inquiry into the nature of experience 
reveals a fundamental co-implication of subject and 
object.  
This central aspect of the phenomenological view is 
enclosed in the concept of intentionality, which, as we 
have seen, is in accordance with James’ analysis of the 
mind in terms of cognitive functions in the Principles. On 
the other hand, the epistemological dualism that is 
expressed by the concept of intentionality clashes with 
James’ late philosophy and its critique of all forms of 
dualism. In particular, James’ late view opposes also the 
functional dualism that is theorized by neokantian 
philosophers. According to them, “experience is 
indefeasibly dualistic in structure” and a functional but 
not substantial duality of “subject-plus-object” 
constitutes the minimal element of experience (James 
1912: 5). However, this functional dualism is an essential 
aspect of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. 
This contrast between James’ radical empiricism and 
Husserl’s phenomenology emerges when we consider 
Husserl’s account of perception in the transcendental 
framework of Ideas I. We have seen that in Essays James 
considers the sensations as pure experiences that are 
neutral, i.e. neither subjective nor objective. The 
phenomenological account of perception also clashes 
with the one-sidedness of internalist 
representationalism on one hand and externalism or 
direct realism on the other hand, which conceive of the 
qualitative properties (colors, sounds, etc.) as, 
respectively, merely subjective properties of mental 
states or objective properties of a mind-independent 
world. However, the specificity of Husserl’s account of 
perception is that it admits both “immanent” sensations 
and “transcendent” sensory properties and develops an 
analysis of the intentional correlation between them. In 
the transcendental framework of Ideas I, the perceptual 
act consists in the intentional animation of sensations 
(hyletic contents) by means of which the perceptual 
object, with its sensory properties, is constituted. This is 
a central aspect of the phenomenological view that 
seems to distance it from James’ doctrine of pure 
experience.  
This point can be also highlighted by looking at the 
relationship between the philosophies of Husserl and 
Mach, whose point of view is very close to James’ radical 
empiricism. While stressing the influence of Mach on the 
genesis of phenomenology (see Fisette 2012: 53ff.), 
Husserl repeatedly criticizes him for not acknowledging 
the distinction between immanent sensations and 
transcendent sensory properties (Husserl 2001b: 90; see 
Fisette 2012: 62, 64). According to Husserl, the flaw in 
Mach’s view is that it reduces – as do the British 
empiricists – transcendent objects to sensory contents 
and for this reason, despite Mach’s anti-metaphysical 
claims, his theory is a type of phenomenalism. According 
to Husserl, what is missing in Mach’s doctrine of 
elements is the theory of intentionality as correlation 
subjective-objective (Fisette 2012: 65). The same 
criticism of Mach’s doctrine of neutral elements, from 
the standpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology, can be also 
applied to James’ doctrine of pure experience. 
At the same time, from the standpoint of James’ late 
philosophy, Husserl’s “phenomenology of constitution” 
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can be considered as an overly intellectualist philosophy 
that loses contact with the experience of a concrete 
human being in its pragmatic relation with the others 
and the world. This kind of criticism of Husserl has been 
put forward by various authors, especially after the 
publication of the first volume of the Ideas (for e.g. in 
Heidegger 1992) and it can also be expressed in the 
terms of a pragmatist critique of the alleged 
intellectualism and residual dualism of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. For this reason, 
Wilshire (1969: 40) sees in James’ pragmatism an 
alternative to Husserl’s alleged inclination to idealism 
and he does so by likening James’ late philosophy with 
the existential phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Kessler (1978) also argues that 
there is an “existential divergence” between the 
philosophies of James and Husserl and that, for this 
reason, James’ late philosophy is closer to Sartre’s and 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology. However, 
in the following pages I shall argue that a deeper look at 
the development of Husserl’s phenomenology shows 
that the opposition to James’ radical empiricism is not 
that radical and that they do have some significant 
points in common. 
 
4. Genetic phenomenology 
 
The alleged intellectualistic and dualistic aspects of 
Husserl’s phenomenology can be seen to be in opposition 
to James’ radical empiricism. However, I would like to 
show that the transition from the epistemological dualism 
of the Principles to the doctrine of pure experience, with 
its deconstruction of the subject-object duality, is a 
movement that can be seen at play also in the transition 
from static to genetic phenomenology. In fact, the fore-
mentioned aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology belong to 
a level of the phenomenological inquiry that Husserl 
himself conceives of as not “ultimate” but as “preliminary” 
to further developments. The investigation of the dual 
structure of experience, by means of the notion of 
intentionality, constitutes the starting point of the 
phenomenological inquiry but it is also developed within a 
fundamental delimitation. This is because this inquiry 
abstains from the investigation of the inner temporal 
unfolding of the experiences (Erlebnisse) and considers 
them rather as unitary acts of perception, imagination, 
thought, etc. In this way, the experiences are turned into 
mental “states” that are intentionally directed towards 
objects. This level of inquiry is what Husserl calls “static 
phenomenology” and that methodologically precedes 
“genetic phenomenology” (see Husserl 2001: 644 ff.), 
which investigates the deeper temporal and processual 
nature of the stream of experiences. Husserl explicitly 
distinguishes between static and genetic phenomenology 
in his late works, but he implicitly presents this distinction 
already in Ideas I, where he claims that: “The level of 
consideration to which we are confined […] abstains from 
descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate 
consciousness which constitutes all […] temporality as 
belongs to mental processes, and instead takes mental 
processes as they offer themselves as unitary temporal 
processes in reflection on what is immanent.” (Husserl 
1983: 171). The subsequent broadening of the inquiry in 
genetic phenomenology “deepens” the analysis of the 
dual structure of experience, investigating the genesis of 
the intentional correlation between subject and object. 
At this point, it is useful to compare the genetic 
analysis of experience in phenomenology with James’ 
doctrine of pure experience. In fact, from the standpoint 
of genetic phenomenology, at the heart of experience we 
find a flow of “primal impressions” (Urimpressionen) that 
are neither subjective nor objective, being the primal 
dimension on the basis of which the subject and the 
object are co-constituted in reciprocal dependence. This is 
because, according to Husserl, the subject of experience is 
not a pre-constituted substance but it comes to be self-
constituted in the process of constituting objects. Genetic 
phenomenology investigates the “genesis of the 
constitution” (Husserl 2001, 644) that is at the same time 
the genesis of the “monadic individuality” (Husserl 2001: 
635). The notion of “monad” refers to the concrete 
subject of experience, which “necessarily has the form of 
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the unity of becoming, of a unity of unflagging genesis” 
(Husserl 2001: 635). Therefore, according to Husserl – and 
in contrast to an alleged residual Cartesianism in his view 
– the subject of experience is not a substance but an 
ongoing process that emerges in correlation with 
objectivity in the process of experience. On this point, 
Husserl agrees with James who, already in the Principles, 
tends to reduce the subject to a “vanishing point” (Dewey 
1940: 589; see Schutz 1941: 443). In particular, in the 
Essays James clarifies that, when claiming that 
“consciousness” does not exist, he means “only to deny 
that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most 
emphatically that it does stand for a function” (James 
1912: 5). 
Therefore, in the light of the genetic inquiry in 
phenomenology, Husserl seems to admit a “neutral” 
dimension of experience, which precedes the functional 
distinction into subject and object. The flow of 
impressions can be conceived of as a primal dimension of 
experience that precedes the subject-object duality, as in 
James’ concept of “pure experience”. In this way, by 
comparing Husserl’s genetic phenomenology with James’ 
doctrine of pure experience, we see that both lead to the 
deconstruction of the subject-object duality, finding at its 
heart a process of co-emergence of the subject and the 
object of experience. This is an outcome of Husserl’s 
phenomenology that is stressed, for instance, by Francisco 
Varela, who argues that the phenomenological reduction 
“does not sustain the basic subject-object duality but 
opens into a field of phenomena where it becomes less 
and less obvious how to distinguish between subject and 
object (this is what Husserl called the ‘fundamental 
correlation’).” (Varela 1996: 339). For this reason, 
Husserl’s phenomenology “does not seek to oppose the 
subjective to the objective, but to move beyond the split 
into their fundamental correlation.” (Varela 1996: 339)
6
. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Concerning Varela’s acknowledgement of a pragmatic 
dimension of phenomenology see Pace Giannotta 
(2017). 
However, at this point I would like to consider also 
some significant differences between James’ and 
Husserl’s views of the impressional core of experience. 
First of all, James seems to conceive of pure experiences 
as the object of an immediate acquaintance or intuition 
that precedes any theoretical reflection. It is this 
reflection that introduces the duality of knower-known. 
On the contrary, Husserl finds the impressional 
dimension of experience through a regressive analysis 
that takes, as its starting point, the dual structure of 
intentionality. The phenomenological inquiry begins with 
epochè and reduction and therefore with a detachment 
from the ordinary and pragmatic “immersion” in the 
lifeworld. The latter concept, which is central in Husserl’s 
late works and is very consonant to James’ pragmatism, 
is the outcome and not the starting point of the 
transcendental phenomenological inquiry. Yet, we can 
say that, despite this difference in method, both Husserl 
and James reach a similar outcome, finding in the 
qualitative core of experience a neutral dimension from 
which the subject and the object are co-constituted in 
the cognitive process. 
 
5. Form and matter 
 
In the light of the comparison of James’ view with 
Husserl’s phenomenology, we can now look back at the 
issue of the relationship between the doctrine of pure 
experience and metaphysics. We can do so by asking if 
Husserl’s view concerning the impressional genesis of 
experience can be conceived of in terms of a 
metaphysical form of neutral monism. I shall argue that 
it is not so and that the motivations against this 
conclusion can also be applied to James’ doctrine of pure 
experience. 
In developing the phenomenological analysis of 
experience, Husserl takes the Kantian conception of the 
cognitive process in terms of an essential intertwining of 
form and matter. As is known, in Kant’s view, the 
knowledge of a certain phenomenon requires the 
synthetic unification of a manifold of sensations through 
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functions of subjectivity. For this reason, Kant denies the 
possibility of attaining knowledge of pure matter that is 
not structured by the forms of our cognitive faculties. 
The appearance of a sensible world is not an immediate 
acknowledgment of a pure “given”, because certain 
features of our sensibility and understanding necessarily 
give form to sensory matters. Husserl takes this 
conception of experience as an intertwining of form and 
matter, developing it in his own way.  
Within genetic phenomenology, this interplay of 
form and matter is investigated at the fundamental level 
of time-consciousness – within an inquiry that was 
deeply influenced by James’ chapter in Principles on the 
“stream of thought”. Husserl highlights the fact that the 
field of consciousness has a certain structure. In fact, 
each moment of an experience is constituted by a new 
primal impression that is intrinsically joined to two 
primal forms of intentionality: retentions and 
protentions (Husserl 2001a: 115ff.). By developing this 
analysis of the temporal unity of consciousness, Husserl 
agrees with the Jamesian concept of the “specious 
present” and with its account of it in terms of fringes. 
Husserl argues that it is in virtue of retentions and 
protentions that the living present is not limited to the 
now-point but has a temporal “thickness”, as it includes 
the retention of past impressions and the protention 
towards expected ones (see Gurwitsch 1946; Zahavi 
2010: 320 ff.). In the light of this analysis, the sensory 
matters turn out to be always given within a temporal 
horizon, which requires the intentionality of retentions 
and protentions. Primal impression, retention and 
protention constitute the non-independent parts of a 
whole, i.e. the continuous flow of consciousness. This 
means that in Husserl’s account of time-consciousness 
the primal, qualitative dimension of experience is always 
structured through the proto-intentional animation of 
the impressions. I would like to stress an implication of 
this analysis that is shared by both James’ and Husserl’s 
views, against reductionist empiricism. That is: we do 
not find pure impressions of “redness”, “coldness”, 
“heaviness”, etc. but an enduring flow of these 
impressions that are continuously intertwined with 
retentions and protentions. The "pure" impression 
becomes a limit that we achieve by analysing the 
concrete flow of experience, which is constituted by 
sensory matters that are “formed” by the intentionality 
of retentions and protentions. This is a first level of the 
intertwining of form and matter in phenomenology that 
goes against the possibility of turning the sensory matter 
into an absolute, ontological domain that would be 
known as it is “in itself” (i.e. metaphysical realism). 
The essential interplay between form and matter is 
also present at higher levels of the constitution of 
objectivity, in relation to the concrete constitution of the 
subject of experience. In the context of the genetic 
phenomenological inquiry, Husserl develops a 
conception of the embodiment of the field of 
consciousness, acknowledging the essential role of 
bodily structures and functions in constituting the form 
and the matter of experience. As is known, according to 
the phenomenological doctrine of eidetic seeing, when 
perceiving individual objects and events we can grasp 
essences that are arranged in a hierarchy of genus and 
species (e.g. the relationship between a certain shade of 
red, the genus “color” and its relationship of bilateral 
foundation with spatial extension). In the light of this 
doctrine, the “given” is not “amorphous” but has a 
structure that is expressed by material a priori 
judgments. In the context of genetic phenomenology, 
Husserl argues that these material a priori judgements 
are based on the sensory intuition of a “concrete 
subjectivity” and, for this reason, they are “contingent a 
priori” (Husserl 1969: 26). This is because the capability 
to grasp the eidetic truths expressed by material a priori 
judgments is based on the bodily “make-up of the 
experiencing subject” (Husserl 1989: 56). Our capacity to 
perceive, for e.g., sounds and colors, depends on this 
makeup of the human body (see Husserl 1969: 26-27). In 
fact, we must acknowledge that the sensory matters 
that lie at the basis of the constitution of objects are 
relative to specific senses, which vary between different 
animal species. Following Thomas Nagel's famous 
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example of the bat (Nagel 1974), we can point to the 
experience of other beings with different senses, 
without being able to acquire any intuitive knowledge 
about it. Nagel refers to the fact that third-person 
knowledge of the physiology of echolocation doesn’t 
give us knowledge of “what it is like” to perceive through 
this perceptual system. Precisely, what we cannot know 
is the subjective, felt qualitative experience that is 
associated with this form of perception. From the 
standpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology, in the light of 
its theory of the cognitive role of intuition, the reason 
why we cannot know what it is like to be a bat is that we 
cannot give an “intuitive filling” to the third-person 
description of the bat’s perception by means of 
echolocation. Husserl puts forward this thesis when 
referring to the case of a blind person who cannot have 
any “intuitive clarity about the sense of color” on the 
basis of a third-person knowledge about the process of 
vision (Husserl 1999, 63; see also p. 30). This analysis 
thus reveals another level of the intertwining of form 
and matter in the process of the co-constitution of 
subject and object, which is based on certain features of 
the bodily constitution of a living being. In this way, in 
contrast to the metaphysical absolutization of the 
elements of experience that makes of them elements of 
an absolute reality, genetic phenomenology 
acknowledges certain transcendental structures that 
make possible our experience and that depend on 
specific features of the living body.
7
 
Therefore, there is a peculiar circularity in the 
process of co-constitution, because constituted features 
of a living being are conditions of the possibility of the 
constitution of objects. This circularity is assumed as 
fundamental by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose notions 
such as flesh and chiasm (Merleau-Ponty 1968) refer to 
the living body as locus of an intertwining of subject and 
object.
8
 Kessler (1978) stresses the closeness between 
                                                 
7
 On this point, see especially the analyses concerning 
the role of the body in the constitution in Ideas II 
(Husserl 1989). 
8
 This circularity is also placed at the heart of the 
Merleau-Ponty’s and James’ philosophy, by opposing the 
concept of “pragmatic body”, which he finds in these 
two authors, to Husserl’s concept of “transcendental 
ego”. However, various scholars have also stressed the 
closeness between Merleau-Ponty’s and Husserl’s 
phenomenology (see Zahavi 2002), finding already in 
Husserl’s investigation of the living body a 
“phenomenology of the flesh” (Bernet 2013). According 
to these readings, Merleau-Ponty’s investigation of the 
embodiment of consciousness is continuous with 
Husserl’s inquiry. 
In particular, Merleau-Ponty develops the 
phenomenological analysis of the role of the body in the 
process of co-constitution of subject and object by 
means of the concept of body schema. Samantha 
Matherne (2016) argues that, with this notion in mind, 
Merleau-Ponty develops, in a non-intellectualist 
direction, the Kantian doctrine of schematism (Matherne 
2016: 195). Doing so, Merleau-Ponty redefines the 
Kantian notions of “transcendental” and “a priori” in an 
embodied direction, by conceiving of them as the 
expressions of “the formal features of our facticity, 
without which there would be no experience.” 
(Matherne 2016, 217). Merleau-Ponty, therefore, 
stresses the dependence of transcendental conditions 
on contingent features of our bodily constitution, seeing 
in them formal features of our facticity that make 
possible the manifestation of phenomena and, in so, 
agreeing with Husserl’s concept of the contingent a 
priori.  
According to this direction of inquiry that is present 
in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the 
qualitative and “neutral” core of experience is 
constituted by sensory matters that are necessarily 
                                                                       
enactive approach of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
(1991), who combine Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology with the relationism of the 
Madhyamaka philosophy. The central thesis of the 
enactive approach in this original formulation is that 
“Knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation 
to each other through mutual specification or dependent 
coorigination.” (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991: 
150). 
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structured by forms that depend on the embodiment of 
a living being. In my opinion, this inquiry on the 
intertwining of form and matter of experience 
complements James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to 
its development in empirical and not metaphysical 
terms. This is because, in the light of this analysis, we 
cannot conceive of “pure experiences” as the elements 
of an absolute reality that would be known as it is “in 
itself”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The comparison between Husserl’s genetic development 
of phenomenology and James’ radical empiricism has 
revealed significant points of contact between them. In 
fact, they both find at the heart of experience a 
qualitative core that precedes and is at the basis of the 
functional distinction between subject and object. 
However, a certain interpretation of James’ view as a 
metaphysics of pure experience could lead us to 
conceive of it as a form of neutral monism that attains 
knowledge of ultimate reality. On the contrary, the 
phenomenological investigation of the relationship 
between form and matter at the fundamental level of 
the co-constitution of subject and object shows that 
sensory matters do not constitute a pure given, being 
always structured through forms that depend on the 
concrete constitution of a living being. In this way, 
Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement 
James’ doctrine of pure experience leading us to develop 
it in empirical and not metaphysical terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Banks, Erik C. 2003. Ernst Mach’s World Elements. A Study 
in Natural Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. 
———. 2010. “Neutral Monism Reconsidered.” 
Philosophical Psychology 23 (2): 173–87. 
Bernet, Rudolf. 2013. “The Body as a ‘Legitimate 
Naturalization of Consciousness.’” Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Supplement 72: 43–65. 
Dewey, John. 1940. “The Vanishing Subject in the 
Psychology of James.” Journal of Philosophy 37 
(22): 589–99. 
Fisette, Denis. 2012. “Phenomenology and 
Phenomenalism: Ernst Mach and the Genesis of 
Husserl’s Phenomenology.” Axiomathes 22 (1): 
53–74. 
Gurwitsch, Aron. 1946. “On the Object of Thought.” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research VII 
(3): 347–53. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-2942-3. 
Heidegger, Martin. 1992. History of the Concept of Time: 
Prolegomena. Edited by Theodore Kisiel. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hume, David. 1888. A Threatise of Human Nature. Edited 
by L. A. Selby Bigge. London: Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press. 
Husserl, Edmund. 1969. Formal and Transcendental Logic. 
The Hague: Martinus Nihoff. 
———. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
———. 1983. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: 
General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. 
Edited by F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nihoff. 
———. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second 
Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of 
Constitution. Edited by Richard Rojcewicz and 
André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
———. 1999. The Idea of Phenomenology. A Translation 
of Die Idee Der Phänomenologie, Husserliana II. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
———. 2001a. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active 
Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. 
Edited by Anthony J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
———. 2001b. Logical Investigations. Edited by J. N. 
Findlay and Dermot Moran. London: Routledge. 
James, William. 1912. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New 
York: Longman Green & Co. 
———. 1958. Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover 
Publications. 
Kessler, Gary E. 1978. “Pragmatic Bodies Versus 
Transcendental Egos.” Transactions of the Charles 
S. Peirce Society 14 (2): 101–19. 
Matherne, Samantha. 2016. “Kantian Themes in Merleau-
Ponty’s Theory of Perception.” Archiv Fur 
Geschichte Der Philosophie 98 (2): 193–230. 
 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
TH E  C O N C E P T  O F  E X P E R I E N C E  I N  H U S S E R L ’S  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  A N D  JA M E S ’  R A D I C A L  E M P I R I C I S M  
A n d r e a  P a c e  G i a n n o t t a  
 
 
 42 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The Visible and the 
Invisible. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat.” 
Philosophical Review 83 (October): 435–50. 
Pace Giannotta, Andrea. 2017. “Varela on the Pragmatic 
Dimension of Phenomenology.” Constructivist 
Foundations 13 (1): 78–81. 
Parrini, Paolo. 2017. “Introduzione. Mach Scienziato-
Filosofo.” In Conoscenza Ed Errore. Abbozzi per 
Una Psicologia Della Ricerca, edited by Ernst 
Mach, 7–54. Milano - Udine: Mimesis. 
Russell, Bertrand. 1921. The Analysis of Mind. London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
Schutz, Alfred. 1941. “William James’ Concept of the 
Stream of Thought Phenomenologically 
Interpreted.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 1 (4): 442–52. 
Slater, Michael. 2011. “William James’s Pluralism.” The 
Review of Metaphysics 65 (1): 63–90. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stubenberg, Leopold. 2014. “Neutral Monism.” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2014. 
Varela, Francisco J. 1996. “Neurophenomenology. A 
Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4): 330–49. 
Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 
1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and 
Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wilshire, Bruce. 1969. “Protophenomenology in the 
Psychology of William James.” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society 5 (1): 25–43. 
Zahavi, Dan. 2002. “Merleau-Ponty on Husserl: A 
Reappraisal.” In Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of 
Husserl, edited by T. Toadvine and L. Embree. 
Boston: Kluwer. 
———. 2010. “Inner (Time-)Consciousness.” In On Time - 
New Contributions to the Husserlian 
Phenomenology of Time, edited by Dieter Lohmar 
and Ichiro Yamaguchi, 197:319–39. 
Phaenomenologica. Dordrecht: Springer 
Netherlands. 
 
  
  
 
 
IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION AND DIRECT EXPERIENCE: 
IMMEDIACY, INDEXICALITY, AND INTELLIGIBILITY 
Vincent Colapietro 
University of Rhode Island 
colapietrovm@gmail.com 
 
ABSTRACT: Though anti-skeptical, the classical pragmatists 
and the later Wittgenstein do not endeavor to refute the 
radical skeptic in a direct manner. There is no attempt 
on either side to “prove” the existence of the external 
world, while there is considerable attention paid to our 
relationship to the world. For both parties, the 
relationship of human beings to the everyday world is 
taken to be not that of knowers to the known (or what is 
presumed to be knowable); it is rather envisioned as that 
of actors to an arena of action. In that context and 
indeed even in ones far removed yet ineradicably tied to 
this context (e.g., theoretical inquiry), immediate 
perception and direct experience play a critical and 
ineliminable role. But these and related expressions are 
anything but unambiguous. In disambiguating such 
expressions, the author shows how experience in 
particular is, at once, direct yet mediated. The appeal to 
immediate perception or direct experience is, however, 
not made by the classical pragmatists or the later 
Wittgenstein in order to provide an incorrigible 
foundation for our epistemic claims. Rather this appeal is 
made primarily for the sake of an experiential recovery 
of the everyday world: the point is not to secure the 
possibility of knowing, but rather to embrace the 
actuality of this world. 
 
Keywords: belief and doubt; categories (Peirce’s); 
experience; immediacy and mediation; perception; 
practice; pragmatism; signs (linguistic and otherwise); 
skepticism; world 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Countless thinkers from pre-Socratics to postmodernists 
have, in one way or another, called into question the world 
we directly encounter in experience. The disposition or 
resolve to call this world into question, in a radical way, 
seems to be constitutive of philosophy. Simply to be a 
philosopher would seem to entail not only being critical but 
also being radically critical, not taking anything for granted. 
Here the word radical implies the necessity to call 
everything, including the existence of the world, into 
question.
1
 And this implies the both the inherent possibility 
and the human ability to question everything virtually all at 
once.
2
 
The classical pragmatists
3
 and the later Wittgenstein
4
 
however call into question the intelligibility of such 
questioning. They have radical doubts about such radical 
skepticism.
5
 In effect, the possibility of calling into question 
the existence of the world presumes the possibility of 
withdrawing into oneself and then establishing, solely 
                                                 
1
 “The bottom of being is,” William James asserts in “The 
Sentiment of Rationality,” in The Will to Believe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), “left 
logically opaque to us, as something we simply come 
upon and find, and about which (if we wish to act) we 
should pause and wonder as little as possible. The 
philosopher’s tranquility is thus in essence no other than 
the boor’s. They differ only as to the point at which each 
refuses to let further considerations upset the 
absoluteness of the data he assumes” (p. 64). At some 
point, we cannot help but acknowledge the world, 
though the forms of this acknowledge often mark 
differences that make a difference. See James, The 
Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 41-42. Also see 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II, 
226; also On Certainty, #343. See Anna Boncompagni on 
hinge propositions. 
2
 As Susan Haack astutely observes in “Descartes, Peirce, 
and the Cognitive Community,” in The Relevance of 
Peirce, edited by Eugene Freeman (La Salle, IL: Monist 
Library of Philosophy, 1983), Peirce and others are not 
entirely fair to Descartes when they contend that he 
tries, in a single stroke, to call everything into question. 
In my judgment, this criticism is itself just. 
3
 By this expression, I mean Charles S. Peirce, William 
James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and to a less 
extent C. I. Lewis. 
4
 Those interpreters associated with the “new” 
Wittgenstein are disposed to stress the continuity 
between the early and later phase of his philosophical 
life. See Crary and Read 2000. My focus on the later 
Wittgenstein should not be taken to run counter to this 
hermeneutic turn on the part of very gifted scholars. 
Even so, the affinity between this enigmatic figure and 
the classical pragmatists is more evident in reference to 
his Philosophical Investigations (1953) and On Certainty 
(1969) than Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922).  
5
 See, however, Peirce on the art of doubting, “one 
which has to be acquired with difficulty (6.498). He goes 
so far as to claim that the pragmatist’s “genuine [rather 
than sham or make-believe] doubts will go much further 
than those of any Cartesian” (ibid.). In accord with 
established practice, I am citing The Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-58) by identifying the 
volume and, then, the paragraph number (so, 6.498 
refers to volume 6 of The Collected Papers, paragraph 
#6.498). 
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within the sanctuary of one’s innermost self, the epistemic 
authority to use such words as I, think, and doubt in an 
intelligible manner. Even radical skeptics are precluded from 
doubting the relatively stable meaning of the words on 
which the articulation of their doubts is dependent. For the 
intelligibility of their doubts depends on the meaning of 
their words. If only in relation to itself at later moment, the 
skeptic is ineluctably an implicated member of a linguistic 
community (the reflexive community
6
 of earlier and later 
selves
7
 is, in however circumscribed a form, a human 
community). The meaning of our words, not least of all that 
of doubt, stretches indefinitely across a span of time; 
moreover, it, in principle, encompasses an indefinite 
number of possible others (in other words, it can never be 
invincibly private). A philosophical meditation in the manner 
conducted by Descartes cannot avoid being a dialogue of 
the self with itself and, thus, a process extended across a 
span of time. Accordingly, the minimal conditions of 
intelligibility require that the seemingly solitary cogito is, 
however well disguised, a dialogical subject. The possibility 
of saying anything meaningful is destroyed by severing 
meaning from community and history. The solitary self who 
is imprisoned in the present moment is deprived of using 
the sound or inscription doubt meaningfully. The “word” 
                                                 
6
 In Toward a General Theory of Human Judgement (NY: 
Dover Publications, 1979), Justus Buchler helpfully 
distinguishes between the reflexive community from 
community in its more commonplace sense, the social 
community (a group of individuals rather than a 
relationship of the individual self to itself). “The 
individual in himself constitutes,” Buchler insists, “a 
community, the reflexive or proceptive community. 
Logically and generically, the reflexive community 
presupposes a social community. The soul converses 
with itself … but it also articulates itself, ears with itself, 
consoles itself, and fools itself. It is a community not just 
of two roles but of at least two roles” (p. 39). Cf. Peirce, 
5.421 (“a person is not absolutely an individual,” i.e., an 
individuum, but in truth an indefinitely divisible being. 
there being no determinate limits to the forms or degree 
of self-division). 
7
 As Peirce notes, “even in solitary meditation every 
judgment is an effort [by the present self] to press 
home, upon the self of the immediate future and of the 
general future, some truth. It is a genuine assertion … 
and solitary dialectic is still of the nature of dialogue” 
(5.546; see, e.g., also 4.6). 
doubt so used is, in truth, a sound or shape without 
meaning. Its use implicates us in a community no less open-
ended than the history in which this use ties us. 
Linguistic agency is just that – a distinctive form of 
human agency – and, as such, is itself intelligible only in the 
context of our practices. The limits of intelligibility are, 
accordingly, defined by the range of our practices and the 
experiences available through our engagement in those 
practices. C. S. Peirce makes this point emphatically when 
he writes: “I hold … that man is so completely hemmed in 
by the bounds of his possible practical experience, his mind 
is so restricted to being an instrument of his needs, that he 
cannot, in the least, mean anything that transcends those 
limits” (5.536). But the meaning of this claim regarding the 
limits of meaningfulness is likely to be misinterpreted. This 
becomes readily apparent when we juxtapose the passage 
just quoted with one written around the same time: “if 
pragmatism is the doctrine that every conception is a 
conception of conceivable practical effects, it makes 
conception reach far beyond the practical” (5.196) or what 
we so often reductively conceive as “the practical.” 
Pragmatism “allows [and, indeed, encourages] any flight of 
imagination, provided this imagination ultimately alights 
upon a possible practical effect” (ibid.). Hence, it is crucial to 
see that Peirce attaches an expansive, rich sense to the 
word practical, as used in such expressions as “conceivable 
practical effects” or consequences. In a narrow sense, 
however, the practical sharply contrasts with the 
theoretical; in the expansive sense, it encompasses the full 
array of our theoretical practices.
8
 Theory is itself a form of 
practice but, even in its loftiest aspirations (e.g., framing a 
theory of the cosmos), it must ultimately fall back on the 
most rudimentary practices, such as immediate perception 
or direct experience.
9
 Above all, what we must appreciate is 
                                                 
8
 As most of us do, Peirce used the word practical in 
both its narrow and expansive sense. Hence, pains must 
be taken to ascertain in any given context how he is 
using this word. 
9
 We learn how to observe and to make judgments on 
the basis of our observations. While we do not learn this 
by rules, we do acquire a repertoire of competences, for 
the most part, in the company, and under the guidance, 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IM M E D I A T E  PE R C E P T I O N  A N D  D I R E C T  E X P E R I E N C E :  IM M E D I A C Y ,  IN D E X I C A L I T Y ,  A N D  IN T E L L I G I B I L I T Y  
V i n c e n t  C o l a p i e t r o  
 
 
 45 
that Peirce
10
 in his insistence upon humans being “hemmed 
in by the bounds of their possible practical experience” does 
foreclose possibilities of what we might yet mean by some 
word or other sign, but only ties those possibilities to our 
practices. 
 
The “Practical” Limits of Even Theoretical intelligibility 
 
But does not this unduly restrict the range of meaning or 
intelligibility? And, returning to a point made above, could 
not the language in which the dialogue of the self with itself 
is carried on conceivably be the invention of a solitary self or 
is it necessarily an inheritance from others? To the readers 
of this journal, the answers to these questions by the later 
Wittgenstein and the classical pragmatists are well known. 
There are no invincibly private languages. So, too, there are 
no completely “abstract” meanings, if we mean by this 
expression the use of signs having no bearing upon how we 
might comport ourselves in the world. As Peirce puts it, 
“there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in 
anything but a possible difference of practice” (5.400). It 
would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the 
adjective possible: meaning is inextricably tied to possible 
differences in one or another of our shared practices. This 
does not make meaning crudely practical, but it does make 
meaning necessarily practical in a sophisticated sense and 
practically possible in the unpredictable differences 
discoverable by imaginative practitioners. 
Even as theorists and philosophers, we are agents in the 
world, a world of other human beings and of natural 
entanglements. For Wittgenstein and the pragmatists, the 
self can no more extricate itself from other selves than s/he 
can extricate herself from the world. But their drive to call 
into question our capacity to call the world into question 
also draws heavily upon an unabashed commitment to 
immediate experience and to kindred phenomena (e.g., 
                                                                       
of elders. Wittgenstein thus refers to “die Praxis des 
empirischen Urteilens” (On Certainty, #140).  
10
 I am taking Peirce here to be representative, not only 
of other such pragmatists as William James and John 
Dewey but also a pronounced tendency in the later 
Wittgenstein. 
direct experience or immediate perception). This brings us 
to the center of our concern, the topic to which this number 
of this journal is devoted: immediacy and experience 
between the pragmatists and Wittgenstein. More precisely, 
my focal concern is our immediate perception or direct 
experience of the everyday world, a world so often in the 
history of philosophy called into question. Are the classical 
pragmatists and the later Wittgenstein naïve or uncritical or 
dogmatic in refusing either to call this world into question 
or to prove its existence?  
For some purposes, it might be important to try to get 
behind even the most forceful disclosures of immediate 
perception or direct experience. But in this very endeavor 
we cannot avoid falling back on such perception or 
experience. In one context a theorist, in the role of an 
experimental psychological, might argue that what we 
ordinarily take to be immediate perception is an 
unconscious inference and, as an inference, is a mediated 
cognition. But this same theorist,
11
 in the context of 
phenomenology, might insist upon painstaking attention to 
the salient features of whatever we directly observe, 
without speculating about the processes by which the 
immediate object of our direct awareness might have 
become available to us. The world of our experience cannot 
be gainsaid, though it unquestionably can be questioned in 
myriad and deep-cutting ways. For such questioning to be 
intelligible, it however must grant immediate perception 
and direct experience their full weight (i.e., the weight they 
have in our practices).  
Since these are hardly equivalent terms or expressions, 
distinctions are critical. Since the words immediate and 
direct are not necessarily synonyms,
12
 disambiguation is 
                                                 
11
 Of course, Peirce is just such a theorist. He is not 
contradicting himself when, in the context of 
experimental psychology, he defines perception as 
unconscious inference and, in the context of 
phenomenology and indeed also that of critical 
commonsensism, he defends what he calls the doctrine 
of immediate perception. 
12
 Of course, immediate and direct are often used 
synonymously. But, in some contexts at least, this makes 
for confusion. Part of my task in this paper is to suggest 
how we might avoid such confusion.  
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essential. This distinction is especially pivotal, since (to use 
the language of Peirce’s categories
13
) the secondnesss
14
 of 
perception or experience is ordinarily interwoven with 
thirdness
15
 (or intelligibility). Observation and experience 
are affairs in which secondness is predominant, though 
thirdness is hardly absent. In perception or experience, we 
encounter what is irreducibly other than us: without regard 
necessarily for our desires or expectations, objects and 
events forcefully assert themselves and, therein, we are 
confronted with their secondness. Perceived objects and 
experienced events strike us with a force and insistence 
typically greater than (and in other respects different from) 
the manner in which imagined or dreamt objects and 
events strike us. But they are, to some extent, inherently 
intelligible and therein we are faced with their thirdness. In 
the contexts of our practices, identification, description, and 
often even explanation are unproblematic. In such contexts, 
innumerable objects and events are immediately intelligible 
in the sense that we are able spontaneously, effortlessly, 
and (for our purposes) effectively to make sense of them. 
                                                 
13
 For a brief accessible, accurate, and illuminating 
account of these categories, see Richard J. Bernstein’s 
Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 177-83, also T. L. Short’s 
Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), Chapter 3. “There is,” Bernstein 
stresses, “a descriptive, empirical, pragmatism temper 
manifested in Peirce’s use of the categories” (179). 
While much ink has been spilled and much ingenuity 
expended to show how Peirce, inspired by the example 
of Kant, tried to offer a transcendental deduction of his 
three categories, Bernstein is sage to suggest, the 
“‘proof’ or, more accurately, the adequacy of the 
categories is to be found in the ways in which Peirce 
uses them to illuminate fundamental similarities and 
differences in everything we encounter” (ibid.). They 
seem quite apt for identifying distinct and seemingly 
incompatible facets of perception and experience.  
14
 Our experience of what Peirce calls secondness is that 
of opposition, of being energetically and forcefully 
opposed, “a sense of resisting as much as being acted 
upon” (5.45) (there being no effort without resistance, 
no resistance without effort). It designates “not mere 
twoness but active oppugnancy” (8.291; emphasis 
omitted). It calls attention to “that which “jabs you 
perpetually in the ribs” (6.95).  
15
 While the category of secondness is that of brute 
opposition, the category of thirdness is that of indefinite 
or boundless mediation. To complete the picture, the 
category of firstness is that of qualitative immediacy.  
To press doubt as far as we can intelligibly extend it, there 
will always be some immediately intelligible objects and 
events, including the meanings of our words and the force 
of our utterances. “My life consists,” Wittgenstein reminds 
us in On Certainty, “in my being content to accept many 
things” (#344). The possibility of rejecting some things 
depends upon having accepted and continuing to accept 
countless other things, just as the “game of doubting itself 
presupposes certainty” (OC, #115). This is however not 
transcendent certainty, but the everyday certitude on which 
we ineluctably rely whenever we make use of our linguistic 
inheritance or simply exert ourselves in the rough-and-
tumble world of our quotidian engagements.  
My recognition that this is my hand is however one 
thing, the philosophical appeal to this everyday certainty, 
made for the sake of proving the external world, is quite 
another.
16
 In general, the philosophical appeal to, say, 
immediate perception or direct experience is made in 
response to theoretical claims and, hence, needs to be 
understood in that context. It assumes a discursive 
background, frequently an extensively mediated network of 
claims and counterclaims. In addition, such appeals are 
made for a variety of reasons and even for opposite reasons 
(sometimes the purpose of such an appeal is to call the 
world into question, but sometimes it is used to prove the 
existence of the world being called into question by 
skeptics). The appeal to immediacy cannot be immediately 
comprehended. It can only be historically appreciated (it is a 
move in a language-game and, unlike many games, 
linguistic or otherwise, the appeal to immediacy, as such a 
move, needs to be understood historically
17
). 
                                                 
16
 See, of course, G. E. Moore, “Proof of an External 
World” in Proceedings of the British Academy (1939), 
also in his Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1949), but also Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, 
especially #19, 24, 32. 
17
 There is an ambiguity here. In a sense, all moves in a 
language game or, more broadly, a game need to be 
understood historically (e.g., in a game of chess, an 
individual moves the remaining castle in light of previous 
moves and anticipation of anticipated ones). In another 
sense, however, the game might be taken as it stands, 
without reference to how it evolved from precursors 
into its present form. The moves within a language-game 
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What is, for our purpose, most striking is that the later 
Wittgenstein and the classical pragmatists reject the 
problematic of modernity, not because it is untrue but 
because the kind of radical doubt by which it established 
itself cannot be intelligibly formulated. “If you tried to doubt 
everything,” as Wittgenstein puts it in On Certainty, “you 
would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of 
doubting itself presupposes certainty” (#115). The endeavor 
of the self to call into doubt the existence of the world and, 
from within itself, to recover most (if not all) of that world is 
a self-defeating project. 
By considering this topic, we can bring into sharper 
focus than has yet been done the deep affinity between 
these pragmatists and the mature Wittgenstein but also 
fundamental differences. Doing so means joining these 
thinkers in their efforts to clarify the meaning of our 
practices and experience at least as much as that of our 
words and utterances. That is, our task is as much 
philosophical as it is hermeneutic. Immediacy and its 
cognates (especially its adjectival and adverbial forms) must 
be disambiguated, not least of all by means of painstaking 
attention to actual usage and pragmatic clarification in its 
Peircean sense. We must consider not so much how such 
expressions as immediate experience might be abstractly 
defined but ultimately on how these expressions are 
actually used,
18
 especially outside of philosophy. Moreover, 
                                                                       
are intelligible only as events in a history. In some cases, 
the language-game itself (especially a language game in 
which appeals to immediacy play such a critical role) 
need to be understood historically. How did we get to 
this point? What are we doing when we are making such 
appeals? Why are they – or why do they feel to be – 
necessary? See Wittgenstein’s Investigations, #644. But 
to the Wittgensteinian question (“What does history 
have to do with me?”, the pragmatists would almost 
certainly say, “Everything, whether or not you 
knowledge its inescapable significance or try to ascertain 
its present import.” And here is a difference of 
fundamental importance, though Wittgenstein’s position 
is perhaps more subtle and qualified than this question 
taken in siolation suggests.  
18
 “One cannot guess,” Wittgenstein insists in the 
Investigations, “how a word functions. One has to look 
at its use and learn from that” (#340). This is harder than 
we appreciate: “the difficulty is to remove the prejudice 
which stands in the way of doing this.” This prejudice is 
we must identify how these expressions function in our 
practices (what roles they play, what work they do). This 
involves also identifying the habits woven into the very 
meaning of these expressions (e.g., the disposition to go on 
in certain ways alongside that of going certain judgments, 
without trying to get behind or underneath them). While 
the issues being debated by F. H. Bradley, Bertrand Russell, 
G. E. Moore, and earlier historical figures (most notably, 
René Descartes and Immanuel Kant) – that is, by the figures 
against whom the pragmatists and Wittgenstein were 
reacting – appear to be abstruse, what is at stake for the 
pragmatists and Wittgenstein is the defense of nothing less 
than an orientation toward the world. The world in question 
is the everyday world of human experience. It is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that, despite appearances, these 
authors are not directly engaged in epistemological 
disputes. They are truly trying to change the conversation, 
to treat traditional topics in an innovative manner but also 
to consider hitherto ignored matters. Yet it is all too easy to 
miss what they are doing, all too common to position them 
squarely within one or another of the familiar polemics of 
academic philosophy. In fact, they are in overlapping ways 
engaged in a polemic against such philosophy. This is 
evident in their treatment of a number of topics, not least of 
all their stance toward immediacy. 
As a result of the disputes to which I have alluded, our 
relationship to our world becomes attenuated to the point 
of being conceivably severed, if not at least temporarily 
dissolved. In its most extreme form, the act of calling into 
question the world of our experience takes as 
unproblematic only the immediate data of one’s own 
solitary consciousness and, then, only those data in the self-
luminous immediacy of the present moment,
19
 judging all 
                                                                       
not stupid. The more intelligent we are, the more likely 
we are to fall prey to it. 
19
 Adding this reference to time (to the luminosity of the 
present) might seem redundant, i.e., it might seem 
already implied in the expression “the immediate data of 
one’s own solitary consciousness,” but this is part of 
what is at issue. For Peirce, James, and Dewey, the 
present is not an instant (a temporal atom in principle 
separable from past and future) but a stretch of time. 
We immediately perceive and experience continuity: 
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else to be either invincibly unknowable or (at best) 
problematically inferable.
20
 In such instances, the appeal to 
immediacy renders dubitable or distant what 
commonsensically seems beyond doubt, what could not be 
any closer to hand. Such appeals can however be made for 
the sake of restoring, recovering, or even “proving” what 
most people never question, an enveloping world 
frequently at odds with human desires. Part of my purpose 
in this paper is to highlight how philosophical appeals to 
immediacy serve a variety of intellectual aims, including 
opposite goals. For the moment, however, let us focus on 
those made for the sake of rendering problematic the world 
in its totality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
time in its immediacy is not a self-contained present but 
a self-differentiating continuum in which any one of the 
dimensions of time mediates between the other two 
(while the present obviously mediates between the past 
and the future, the past at least in the form of memory 
and, to a greater extent, habits mediates between the 
present and the future, just as the future in the form of 
imagination and the release of impulses capable of 
altering the vectors of habituation mediates between 
the past and the present). We are not located in the 
present in such a way that both that from which we have 
moved and that toward which we are moving are less 
real that that through which we are now moving. In our 
experience, past, present, and future are inherently 
inseparable, though distinguishable in myriad ways. See 
especially Dewey’s “Events and the Future” (LW 2, 62-
68). “No becoming can be perceived or thought of,” he 
insists in this important essay, “except as out of 
something into something, and this involves a series of 
transitions which, taken distributively, belong both to 
the ‘out-of’ and the ‘into,’ or form a ‘through.’ The 
present has thus nothing privileged about it; it is as 
legitimate to speak of the present century or the present 
geological age as of the present ‘moment’ [or ‘instant’]. 
The present is defined in relation to an ‘out-of’ and by a 
future or ‘into,’ as truly is the past by the present” (LW 2, 
66). See also MW 10, 9-10. 
20
 Though there are numerous examples of philosophers 
starting with the immediate and allegedly indubitable 
data of present, solitary consciousness. the opening 
chapters of George Santayana’s Skepticism and Animal 
Faith provide an especially good example of such 
methodic skepticism. 
Such thinkers have in effect derealized this world,
21
 that 
is, stripped it of ultimate significance by divesting it of its full 
or primordial ontological status.
22
 From their perspective, 
the actual world of our immediate experience is 
ontologically derivative and, as a consequence, largely (if 
not wholly) illusory. Nature appears to us adorned in 
qualities, but (in truth, as least as alleged by the thinkers in 
question) it is in itself utterly devoid of them. Accordingly, a 
chasm opens between the world as it appears to us and the 
world as it really is in itself. As A. N. Whitehead puts it in 
Science and the Modern World, sensations are, on the 
account offered by Galileo, Descartes, and their 
multitudinous progeny, “qualities of the mind alone.” 
 
These sensations are projected by the mind so as to 
clothe bodies in external nature. Thus, the bodies 
are perceived with qualities which in fact are purely 
the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit 
which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the 
rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and 
the sun for his radiance. … Nature [in itself] is a dull 
affair, soundless, scentless, colourless, merely the 
hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly. (54) 
 
For the most part, however, these thinkers have questioned 
the world only to reaffirm it,
23
 though their reaffirmations 
have rarely extended to a full recovery of the qualitative 
                                                 
21
 “In a world where both the terms [or relata] and their 
distinctions [and relationships] are affairs of experience, 
conjunctions that are experienced must be,” William 
James insists, “at least as real as anything else. They will 
be absolutely ‘real’ conjunctions, if we have no 
transphenomenonal [or trans-experiential] absolute 
ready, to derealize the whole experienced world by, at a 
stroke” (MT, 230; emphasis added). 
22
 This is an example of what Whitehead calls “the fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness.” “No alternative system of 
organizing the pursuit of scientific truth has been 
suggested. It is not only reigning, but it is without rival” 
(54). “And yet – it is quite unbelievable. This conception 
of the universe is surely framed in terms of high 
abstractions, and the paradox arises only because we 
have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities” 
(54-55). 
23
 Of the “doubts and negations” pressed by “Saint 
Michel de Montaigne,” R. W. Emerson means “honestly 
by them, – that justice shall be done to their terrors. I 
shall not take Sunday objections, made up on purpose to 
be put down. I shall take the worst I can find, whether I 
can dispose of them or they of me” (“Montaigne; Or, the 
Skeptic,” 328). 
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world of our immediate experience
24
 (Descartes’ Sixth 
Meditation is emblematic of this tendency). They tend to 
admit only a greatly reduced or austere world (e.g., one in 
which bodies possessing mass, shape, and position are 
objectively real, whereas qualities are not). In their 
judgment, the doctrine of direct realism and that of 
immediate perception are instances of naïve realism. Being 
naïve, they take them to be untenable. This is the inevitable 
result of granting theoretical knowers ultimate authority. 
The world posited by such knowers is taken by them and 
countless others to be the really real, while the one directly 
encountered in our experience is judged to be in some 
fundamental ways subjective or illusory. But if the classical 
pragmatists and later Wittgenstein are correct, the 
primordial relationship between human beings and the 
experiential world in which they are inextricably entangled 
is not that of knower to known (especially not that of the 
theoretical knower to the abstracted domain of 
contemporary physics). It is rather the relationship of an 
agent to the world as an arena of action. We inhabit and 
indeed incorporate the world (it is as much in us as we are 
in it). 
In the later Wittgenstein’s writings, the appeal to 
everyday language is bound up with his commitment to a 
recovery of our everyday world. This appeal takes our 
linguistic utterances themselves to be bound up with the 
circumpressure of the world, as registered indexically in 
“the circumpressure of experience itself.”
25
 Such 
experiential pressure is never more acutely felt than of 
when it results from our energetic exertions to address 
                                                 
24
 See especially Dewey’s “Affective Thought” (LW 2, 
104-110), “Qualitative Thought” (LW 5, 243-62), 
“Peirce’s Theory of Quality” (LW 11, 86-94), and of 
course Art as Experience (LW 10). 
25
 In The Meaning of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), James writes: “The only real 
guarantee we have against licentious thinking is the 
circumpressure of experience itself, which gets us sick of 
concrete errors, whether they be a trans-empirical 
reality or not” (p. 213). We however instinctively take 
the circumpressure of our experience to be indicative of 
the pressure of the world itself, however modified this 
pressure might be by the constitution and state of a 
given human organism. 
practical exigencies. In the writings of the classical 
pragmatists, the insistence upon human experience in its 
varied forms is bound up with their commitment to the 
recovery of just this world. Just as Wittgenstein’s notion of 
language-games includes action, so the pragmatist 
conception of experience encompasses language. 
 We appear to be confronted with the choice of turning 
our backs on nature, as it is disclosed in our immediate 
experience,
26
 or on science, as it claims for itself the 
ultimate authority to identify the most fundamental 
features of the real work. The world as disclosed in our 
immediate experience thus stands in marked contrast to 
the world as revealed in what seems to be the most reliable 
source of ontological insight (certain highly successful 
branches of natural science, above all, theoretical physics). 
In truth, no choice is necessary, at least if natural science is 
not allowed to usurp the primordial world of our immediate 
experience.
27
 
 From Wittgenstein’s perspectives, nothing warrants 
calling into question the reality of the everyday world. The 
attempt to sketch a metaphysics of this world however 
undermines the very world such a sketch tries to recover or 
save. So, too, the very possibility of providing a proof of this 
world is in his judgment ruled out. Things speak adequately 
and, indeed, eloquently, for themselves. They do so 
however in a practical rather than philosophical or 
theoretical idiom: the rough-and tumble give-and-take of 
everyday action is effect a dialogue in which objects and 
events have their say.
28
 There is consequently no exigency 
                                                 
26
 Our immediate experience of distinct colors plays an 
important role in how Wittgenstein thinks through issues 
of immediacy. On this occasion, however, I can only note 
this connection.  
27
 “The world as we experience it is,” Dewey stresses, “a 
real world [we might interject: the real world]. But it is 
not in its primary phases a world to be known, a world 
that is understood, and is intellectually coherent and 
secure” (LW 4, 235). It is rather a world in which we act 
and undergo the consequences of our actions. 
Experiences are primarily had, not known.  
28
 Dewey appropriates for his purpose a pun hit upon by 
the classicist Basil Gildersleeve: “Object is that which 
objects, that to which frustration is due” (LW 1, 184). 
The object in the sense of that which has the power to 
object, to thwart our purpose or oppose our efforts, is 
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to speak in their behalf, especially when this is done in the 
form of an apologia.  
 We are in direct yet mediated contact with reality, both 
the “internal” reality of our own minds and the “external” 
reality of what is distinct from those minds. Though often 
used as synonyms, immediate and direct can be 
distinguished. Doing so is a delicate task, since the result can 
readily be made to appear to be a distinction without a 
difference.
29
 Part of the problem here is that our 
understanding of mediation tends to seduce us into 
supposing any mediated relationship is one in which a 
wedge is driven between the terms being mediated (say, 
human beings and the everyday world in which they are 
ineluctably entangled). Certain instances of mediation 
certainly do involve gross distortions (e.g., the manner in 
which various forms of deeply rooted prejudices occlude 
the perception of, say, a woman or a person of color). 
While experience is a phenomenon in which 
secondness is predominant, it is also a phenomenon in 
which firstness and thirdness are discernible. Indeed, to 
begin to do justice to this phenomenon, we need to use 
Peirce’s categories to delineate at least these features of 
experience: qualitative immediacy, brute opposition, and 
boundless intelligibility. It would be better to speak not of 
our affective experience but the affection dimension or 
facet of any human experience, since this dimension is 
inextricably intertwined with the conative and the cognitive 
dimensions of experience. Firstness is in this instance 
inseparable from secondness and thirdness.  
 However complexly and variously our relationship to 
the world is mediated, it is not mediated in these ways. 
First, it is not mediated in the way insisted upon by 
                                                                       
distinguishable from the object in the sense of that 
which we aim at. But the senses can be practically 
conjoined, since our purpose might be to discover the 
contexts and ways in which various objects exert their 
distinctive or differential resistances to human effort and 
ingenuity. 
29
 While we may use the same word to distinguish the 
two senses calling for disambiguation (by saying 
immediate in one sense and, then, in another sense), it 
seems to me more effective to use two different words 
to clarify this situation. In the case of Peirce especially, 
this is desirable.  
representationalists. Inner or mental representations of 
external reality are not the original data of human 
cognition. They do not mediate between mind and reality. 
Our perceptual judgments, the most rudimentary level of 
human cognition, are indexical signs and, thus, instances in 
which there is a causal relationship between the perceiving 
organism and the perceived object.
30
 Here it is instructive to 
recall a distinction drawn, but left undeveloped by Peirce: 
“We experience vicissitudes, especially. We cannot 
experience the vicissitude without the perception which 
undergoes the change; but the concept of experience is 
broader than that of perception, and includes much that is 
not, strictly speaking, an object of perception” (CP 1.336). In 
brief, we observe objects but experience sequences of 
events, especially changes of an unwelcome or 
disconcerting character. Experience is “the compulsion, the 
absolute constraint upon us to think otherwise than we 
have been thinking” (ibid.). It is a phenomenon in which 
secondness is predominant. But even from Peirce’s 
perspective, it is not illicit to speak of “perceptual 
experience,” since the object of perception constrains our 
consciousness of it. This relationship between the perceiver 
and the perceived is at once causal and semiotic. Our 
knowing is tethered to the world by innumerable and 
insistent indices (or indexical signs).  
The other two senses can be dealt with much more 
briefly. Second, our relationship to the world is not 
mediated by language as a tertium quid, if interposing 
language in this sense implies that there is a gap to be 
bridged between mind and world (Sorrell). The need for 
such a bridge assumes the existence of a chasm. From both 
the Wittgensteinian and the pragmatists perspectives, 
however, there is no such chasm, hence no such need. We 
are always already entangled in a world. Third and finally, 
no mode of symbolization other than language is needed to 
bridge this alleged gap. For there is no gap here to be 
                                                 
30
 “The index,” Peirce asserts, “asserts nothing; it only 
says ‘There!’nIt takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and 
forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it 
stops” (W 5, 163). By only such signs as these are we 
able to distinguish between the actual world and an 
imaginary one (W 5, 164). 
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bridged. We are in the world in such a way as to be unable 
intelligibly to extricate ourselves.
31
 
 “Few things are more completely hidden from my 
observation,” Peirce wryly notes, “than those hypothetical 
elements of thought which the psychologist finds reason to 
pronounce ‘immediate,’ in his sense” (CP 8.144). The first 
impressions of sense, as conceived by a variety of theorists 
(not just psychologist), are in fact hypothetical entities, not 
experienced data. “When we wake up to the fact that we 
are thinking beings and can exercise some control over our 
reasonings, we have to set out upon our intellectual 
travels,” Peirce adds, “from the home where we already 
find ourselves” (ibid.). This “home is the parish of percepts”: 
it is not inside our skulls but out in the open. We directly 
observe the external world. Of course, such direct 
perception does not preclude error. But the correction of 
our errors and indeed the very detection of them takes 
place at the level of judgment, not beneath that level. 
While “our knowledge of the external world is 
fallible,”
32
 “there is a world of difference between fallible 
knowledge and no knowledge” at all (CP 1.37), that is, 
between, Peircean fallibilism and radical skepticism. The 
possibility of error is ubiquitous and radical. But such 
fallibilism should not be mistaken for skepticism. The only 
way of detecting, let alone correcting, our mistakes is by a 
critical appeal to direct experience. On this account, 
immediate cognition in the sense of an intuitive grasp of an 
                                                 
31
 “Only because the [human] organism is in and of the 
world, and its activities correlated with those of other 
things in multiple ways,” Dewey asserts, “is it susceptible 
to undergoing things and capable of trying to reduce 
objects to means of securing its good fortune” (MW 10, 
11). Decades before this, James in “Remarks on 
Spencer’s Definition of Mind” (1878) in Essays in 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1978), insists: “the knower is not simply a mirror floating 
with no foot-hold anywhere. … The knower is an actor. … 
In other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth 
upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not 
a mere looker-on” (p. 21).  
32
 Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism is in its own way radical, for 
he contends our knowledge of our own minds is fallible. 
See my “A Peircean account of first-person ‘authority: 
The radical implications of thoroughgoing fallibilism” in 
Thinking Thinking, edited by Donata Schoeller and Vera 
Saller (Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2016), 160-80. 
immutable form is replaced by the uncontrollable 
judgments of perceptual experience. These judgments do 
not serve as a foundation for knowledge. Rather they serve 
as invaluable constraints for monitoring and altering our 
deliberate endeavors. 
 What such an understanding or clarification of our 
condition grants is a reprieve from the task of proving the 
existence of the world. The everyday world of our 
immediate experience is truly the matrix from which 
philosophy and, indeed, all forms of thought spring forth. To 
conjure the image of a world other than the quotidian and, 
then, to use that image to discredit the everyday are so 
deeply woven into the intricate fabric of traditional 
philosophy that insistence upon the quotidian worlds seems 
to many philosophers to be the abandonment of their 
historical task. Even worse than this, it appears to them to 
be an uncritical acquiescence in inherited prejudices.  
 This is deceiving. To accept the everyday world does 
not entail acquiescing in such prejudices (see, e.g., Dewey 
LW 1, 40-41). Far from being such an acquiescence, 
“philosophy is,” Dewey suggests, “a critique of prejudices” 
(40), undertaken for the sake of what we might call a 
transvaluation of the everyday (LW 1, 41). As often as not, it 
involves contesting some of its most salient features. The 
task of acknowledgment however means giving finitude, 
transience, temporality, sociality, and relationships more 
generally their due. It does not thereby jettison the 
possibility of knowing. Quite the contrary, it shows how 
these and other features of our condition secure that 
possibility. 
 Skepticism is not a position to be refuted but an 
experience to be undergone and, ordinarily, endured 
without any assurance of coming out the other side (Cavell 
2005, Ch. 6; Rorty 1982, Ch. 10). While Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and classical pragmatism are both anti-skeptical 
and anti-foundationalist, Wittgenstein, on the one side, and 
Peirce, James, and Dewey, on the other had immediate 
experience of the most radical doubts and, moreover, a 
commonplace confidence in the capacity of ordinary people 
to meet their spiritual crises. It is, after all, these crises to 
which both sides are responding. As so often happens in a 
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therapeutic situation, the problem turns out to be its own 
solution in disguise. The unmasking of the problem as a 
solution is central to Wittgenstein and the pragmatists. 
Looking behind, or beyond, or beneath, the condition in 
which the problem arises is itself symptomatic of being held 
in the vise of the problem. Attending more patiently, 
carefully, humbly to the most salient features of the 
problematic condition is, in contrast, an indication that the 
recovery of self and world is underway. How could 
something as wayward and contingent as human 
experience provide the resources to address our mundane 
problems, let alone our philosophical perplexities? How 
could something as parochial and (again) contingent as 
ordinary language, etc.? 
 Seeking resources beyond such experience or 
language
33
 hardly points to a solution. The effort to do so 
only exacerbates and indeed multiples problems and 
perplexities. This is true because our linguistic inheritance is 
a bottomless source of rhetorical innovation, just as our 
experience is itself such a source of novelty, intended and 
otherwise. There are not only traditions of innovations but 
also the irrepressible tendencies of even the most 
hidebound inheritances to modify themselves in their 
ongoing struggle to maintain themselves.  
 The appeal to immediate experience has assumed 
myriad forms and served various functions. Nothing could 
be farther from either Wittgenstein or the pragmatists than 
making this appeal for the sake of securing unshakable 
foundations for the edifice of human knowledge. But, then, 
nothing could be more central to their aspiration than, in 
the case of Wittgenstein, a circuitous and hence indirect 
“defense” of immediate experience or, in the case of the 
pragmatists, a more direct and “metaphysical” account of 
the everyday world. As much as anything else, both sides 
were convinced that such experience and this world needed 
to be defended against their defenders (e.g., G. E. Moore 
and the realists with whom James and Dewey took issue). 
To imagine that the everyday world needs to be proven 
                                                 
33
 It is not my intention to imply an equivalence between 
the Wittgensteinian appeal to ordinary language and the 
pragmatist appeal to everyday experience. 
betrays a misunderstanding of everything (most obviously, a 
misunderstanding of mind, world, language, and proof). In 
turn, to image that human experience needs to buttress 
itself by transcendental structures reveals a fatally flawed 
comprehension of our human practices, including the 
evolved and evolving practices of experimental inquiry. The 
public criteria inherent in these shared practices make of 
even our solitary performances (e.g., observing a bird alight 
on the branch of a tree) publicly corrigible endeavors. As 
Wittgenstein implies in On Certainty, observation is itself a 
practice.  
 As Cora Diamond has noted, a realistic spirit pervades 
the Wittgensteinian corpus (1995, Chapter 1). For the 
pragmatists under consideration here, this is also true 
(arguably, even truer). The critical appeal to experiential 
reality (or “immediate” experience) is, for both sides, a 
defining feature of their philosophical endeavors. The form 
of life in which such appeals are ceaselessly made is, at 
once, a humanly recognizable one (Could we imagine any 
human form of life in which such an appeal was altogether 
absent?) and our historically identifiable form of human 
life.
34
 We ineluctably appeal to others but we do so in 
circumstances in which we are ordinarily also appealing to 
commonly observable phenomena. Others help us the 
individual see what stares that person in the face.
35
 What 
seizes the attention of the individual might be so forceful 
yet unexpected as to prompt that person to seek the 
corroboration of others. We ordinarily do not have to ask, 
“Do you perceive what I perceive?” since our somatic 
attunement to one another is so spontaneous, massive, and 
                                                 
34
 This bears upon the question of whether we ought to 
interpret Lebensform trans-culturally or relativistically. 
35
 In an interview in The Paris Review, James Baldwin 
offers this recollection: “I remember standing on a street 
corner with the black painter Beauford Delaney in the 
Village, waiting for the light to change, and he pointed 
down and said, Look. I looked and all I saw was water. 
And he said, Look again, which I did, and I saw oil on the 
water and the city reflected in the puddle. It was a great 
revelation to me. I can’t explain it. He taught me how to 
see, and how to trust what I saw. Painters have often 
taught writers how to see. And once you’ve had that 
experience, you see differently” (2007 [1984], 243). See 
Wittgenstein, OC, #140. 
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yet delicate that this goes without saying. In subtle, almost 
imperceptible, and dramatic, often explicit, ways we show 
one another what is on our minds or what is being disclosed 
in our experience. A gestural conversation of a typically 
intimate character is taking place between human animals 
whenever they are in proximity of one another and, indeed, 
but only between such animals but also humans and other 
animals (see, e.g., Peirce; Mead).  
 For pragmatists at least, the relationship between mind 
and world is in its most primordial form that between one 
embodied mind and other. For the infant, the mother so 
mediates between it and the world that she is its world (or 
the infant is itself the world inclusive of the mother) 
(Winnicott 1990, Chapter 3, especially p. 39, footnote 1; see 
also Margolis, Chapter 1). This is an urgently practical 
relationship, though it can evolve into a boundlessly 
theoretical stance (James, MT, 277-80; Dewey, MW 14, 128-
31). The other from whom one is compelled by experience 
to differentiate oneself is a being inscribed in the innermost 
recesses of the self and, at the same time, an elusive, even 
enigmatic, being from whom the self feels separated 
(Mead, Chapters 18 and 24). How can this relationship be 
both unseverable and attenuated to the point of being 
destroyed? The world of our immediate experience is 
however just that: a world from which we can never be 
absolutely exiled,
36
 yet one in which we are time and again 
finding ourselves “on the outs.” The face of one of the most 
intimate of our friends without warning turns into that of a 
stranger.  
 The scandal of skepticism primarily concerns the self in 
relation to others and, only secondarily, in relationship to 
the world without any reference to other selves.
37
 It 
                                                 
36
 This of course needs to be qualified. Except for death, 
it is a world from which one cannot be absolutely exiled. 
There is arguably a sense in which even the dead person 
is, for a time at least, not altogether banished.  
37
 “But in the everyday ways in which denial [of the 
other] occurs in my life with the other – in a momentary 
irritation, or a recurrent grudge, in an unexpected rush 
of resentment, in a hard glance, in a dishonest 
attestation, in the telling of a tale, in the believing of a 
tale, in a fear of engulfment, in a fantasy of solitude or of 
self-destruction – the problem is,” Stanley Cavell 
concerns our acknowledgment of others in their irreducible 
otherness. The acknowledgment in question is primarily 
practical: it concerns how we comport ourselves our 
concrete other beings, especially sentient ones.  
To recall the lesson derived from Peirce’s categories, 
the qualitative immediacy and brute otherness of human 
experience need to be conjoined to an unfathomable 
intelligibility. Such intelligibility is secured only by means of 
mediation but recourse to mediation always threatens the 
loss of felt immediacy, irreducible otherness, or both. The 
recovery of a lively and orienting sense of immediacy and 
facticity paradoxically often relies on one or more forms of 
mediation, not least of all therapeutic recollections and 
philosophical maps charting paths to direct experience 
waiting to be had (Dewey, LW 1, 389). It is far from clear 
that James is right when he asserts, “The return to life [and 
of course he means life in its immediacy] can’t come about 
by talking. It is,” James insists, “an act” (1977, 131). Talk or 
discourse as itself an instance of action woven into an 
expanding tapestry of conjoined activities might in fact be 
one of the most effective ways of returning to life. The 
paradox of pragmatism, Jamesian and otherwise, bears 
eloquent testimony to the efficacy of what is in effect “talk 
therapy.” The act of returning to the precarious yet 
indestructible world of immediate experience is, 
accordingly, the point of pragmatism, also that of 
Wittgenstein. If an immediate or instantaneous return were 
possible, we would enact it. Even when it does not seem 
possible, we should act as though it were.
38
 Alas, such a 
return, such a marshalling of our energies, is often not 
possible. Much mediation, many words, are frequently 
needed. There is nothing silly or stupid about the confusions 
into which we are thrown. Our bewitchment by language 
and our betrayals of experience are rooted in noble 
aspirations and ignoble fears, not just such fears and 
                                                                       
contends, “to recognize myself as denying another, to 
understand that I carry chaos in myself. Here is the 
scandal of skepticism with respect to the existence of 
others. I am that scandal” (2005, 151). 
38
 This is what James advises in “The Energies of Men.” 
See Essays in Religion and Morality (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), especially, 131-32. 
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anxieties. While an immediate recovery of immediate 
experience is of course possible, a mediated return to 
everyday life is the requisite route for most human beings, 
at least for those who have succumbed to the myriad 
seductions of a transcendent hope (the seeming 
irrepressible hope to transcend the finite world of human 
experience).
39
 Wittgenstein explicitly advises us to go back 
to the rough ground, while the pragmatists at least tacitly 
do so (PI, #107; also see Scheman). There and only there, 
life is to be lived. There and only there, experience is to be 
had. There and only there, is any act an action, rather than 
the pathetic posturing of “parlor soldiers” (Emerson, 194).
40
  
“In the beginning was the deed” (OC, #402; CV, 31). But, 
along the way, the word as deed (CV, 50) is needed to 
recover the world as an arena of action, even simply to 
recollect adequately that the sense in which action stands at 
the origin of our world (cf. Emerson263). The recovery of 
immediacy tends to be circuitous rather than liner or 
immediate. Words as deeds in the service of deeds in other 
senses than words are ordinarily at the center of such 
recovery. “Words, words, words.” There are no words 
without a world and, in turn, there is no world in any 
                                                 
39
 “The demand for a standpoint outside history from 
which to deliver judgements of value is,” Sabina 
Lovibond suggests, “linked with the demand for a 
standpoint outside the body from which to survey 
reality: for an embodied creature necessarily exists in 
time” (143). “The sickness which philosophy sets out to 
treat … has,” she goes on to claim in connection with 
Wittgenstein, “its origins, he implies, in the incomplete 
acceptance of our embodied condition, and in the failure 
to acknowledge the significance of that condition for the 
reflective understanding of such topics as meaning and 
rationality” (206). 
40
 This is an allusion to R. W. Emerson’s “Self-Reliance”: 
“We are parlour soldiers. We shun the rugged battle of 
fact, where strength is born. This passage suggests an 
equally famous one in an essay by William James (“Is Life 
Worth Living?”): “If this life be not a real fight, in which 
something is eternally gained for the universe by 
success, it is,” James emphatically asserts, “no better 
than a game of private theatricals from which we may 
withdraw at will. But it feels like a real fight – as if there 
is something really wild in the universe which we, with 
all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to 
redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from 
atheisms and fears. For such a half-wild, half-saved 
universe our nature is adapted” (WB [Dover], 61). 
recognizably human sense without words and other 
symbols.
41
 Words and world cannot be prised apart. Any 
attempt to bridge an alleged gap between language and 
reality (or mind and world) can only perpetrate and, indeed, 
exacerbate what it is designed to alleviate or eliminate. The 
point is to do philosophy in such a way that the scandal of 
having failed to prove the existence of the external world is 
seen for what it is
42
 – a fool’s errand. However ingenious 
and sophisticated are the thinkers who attempt such a 
proof, the proof itself is doomed not only to fail but also to 
prolong a futile exercise.  
At this juncture, to go on doing philosophy entails, 
among other things, orienting ourselves toward the world in 
ways quite different from some of the theoretical fixations 
of traditional philosophy. Wittgensteinian consideration of 
actual usage and pragmatic clarification provide therapeutic 
and, thereby, emancipatory insights. For the purposes of 
philosophy, as various and indeed heterogeneous as they 
are, there is no need – to get behind or beyond or beneath 
immediate experience. Indeed, there is no possibility of 
                                                 
41
 This is one of the points where we readily observe a 
convergence among distinct philosophical traditions 
(Wittgenstein, pragmatism, and hermeneutics). See Has-
Georg Gadamer’s “The Nature of Things and the Nature 
of Language” in Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976). The position 
sketched in this essay is very close to those of 
Wittgenstein and the pragmatists. 
42
 In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant suggests: “It still 
remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in 
general that the existence of things outside us (from 
which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even 
for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, 
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, 
we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory 
proof” (34). “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ does not 
consist in the fact that this proof is still lacking up to 
now, but,” Martin Heidegger counters in Being and Time, 
“in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted 
again and again” (197). See Dewey’s “The Existence of 
the World as a Logical Problem” (MW 8, 83-97. This 
essay was originally published in Philosophical Review, 
24 (1915) and appeared in revised form in Essays in 
Experimental Logic (1916). “It is not the common-sense 
world which is doubtful … but common sense as a 
complex of beliefs about specific things and relations in 
the world. Hence never in any usual procedure of inquiry 
do we throw the existence of the world into doubt, nor 
can we do so without self-contradiction” (MW 8, 96-97). 
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doing so. At some point, our efforts to do so inevitably fall 
back upon the undoubted deliverances of direct experience. 
If in some respects, for some purposes, we can doubt 
aspects of these deliverances, that is only because there is a 
massive background of undoubted beliefs and, deeper than 
these beliefs, of unacknowledged investments that make 
specific doubts intelligible. Our games of doubting 
inescapably take place against this background. But the 
background itself cannot be doubted since it defines the 
conditions for the intelligibility of our doubts. For this 
reason, it cannot be proven. To continue to seek a ground 
for our certainty in the undoubted commonplaces of 
everyday life (i.e., to seek nothing less than a transcendent 
certainty) betrays either a misunderstanding of what 
grounds are or (more likely) a deeper malady, one 
connected to failures of acknowledgment. We must, 
“Forget this transcendent certainty, which is connected with 
our concept of spirit”
43
 (OC, #47; see Scheman). And we 
must do so as a way toward acknowledging the undoubted 
certainties of everyday life, including the uncontrollable 
judgments forced upon us by our perceptual experience. 
Are there circumstances in which one or another of these 
certainties might be rendered dubitable?
44
 Yes, of course. 
Even so, perceptual experience is experience (and this 
means that during its duration we experience a series of 
alterations). In yet other words, such experience is attuned 
to distinct objects as defining features of the enveloping 
scenes of everyday life, not to objects in abstraction from 
such situations. But, then, it is as attuned to affordances as 
obstacles, at least as much to opportunities to go on as to 
obstructions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 This sentence is slightly modified. In the original, it is: 
“Forget this transcendent certainty, which is connected 
with your concept of spirit.” 
44
 “If you try to doubt everything you would not get,” 
Wittgenstein insists, “as far as doubting anything. The 
game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (OC, 
#115). OC, #343. 
Conclusion 
 
The world directly encountered in our experience, 
“immediately” glimpsed in our perceptions, is first and 
foremost an arena of action.
45
 Our form of life is that of 
an ingenious animal (all too often, all too clever an 
animal!) having a natural history in which “commanding, 
questioning, recounting, charting, are as much a part … 
as walking, eating, drinking, playing” (PI, #25). “What has 
to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms 
of life” (PI, II, p. 226). With any form of life, what is 
always already acknowledged in countless and 
irrevocable ways (if only tacitly acknowledged) is the 
world as an arena of action. Proofs regarding the reality 
of that world are, as much as the doubts to which those 
proofs are response, not so much idle as unintelligible. If 
countless philosophers and indeed others imagine 
otherwise, that is because they profoundly 
misunderstand the conditions of intelligibility. The 
classical pragmatists and the later Wittgenstein were 
devoted to clarifying these conditions and, central to 
their endeavor, the appeal to our practices eclipses the 
appeal to intuitions (Rorty 1961; Colapietro). What 
strikes us immediately as true … is not a kind of seeing 
on our part”: it is rather “our acting” (OC, #204). On this 
account, practical fluency replaces cognitive immediacy. 
Even so, perceptual judgments, at least when they are 
taken to be the uncontrolled result of what is a 
rudimentary human practice,
46
 are among the starting 
                                                 
45
 “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, 
comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ 
striking us as immediately true, i.e., it is not a kind of 
seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the 
bottom of our language game” (OC, #204). I read this as 
an anti-intuitionist stance. See Rorty, “Pragmatism, 
Categories, and Language” in The Philosophical Review, 
70, 2 (April 1961), 197-223; also my “Allowing Our 
Practices to Speak for Themselves” (2011). 
46
 “We do not learn the practice [Praxis] of making 
empirical judgment by learning rules” (emphasis added); 
rather “we are taught judgments and their connexion with 
other judgments” (OC, #140; Colapietro 2011). To learn 
how to make such judgments is to be initiated into the 
practice of looking and seeing. The experience of failing to 
see is critical. See also Wittgenstein’s Investigation, II, p. 
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points of all human endeavors. The piece of wax, 
stripped by Descartes of its sensory qualities and defined 
solely in terms of quantitative dimensions, could not be 
weighed, measured, or subjected to any other procedure 
pertaining to these dimensions, except by perception. 
Perception is truly primordial, even if it is fallible (see 
Buchler 2000). But it does not provide a foundation for 
the edifice for our knowledge; rather it provides not only 
the indispensable means for self-correction but also 
those for identifying the subject matter of experimental 
inquiry. The indexical signs by which immediate 
perception and direct experience are equipped to assist 
self-correction and, at the most basic level, to enable us 
to identify a subject to be investigated are, at once, a 
causal and a semiotic relationship. Nothing less than the 
everyday world is implicated in their ubiquitous force.
47
  
It is the world from which we ineluctably set out and 
that to which we necessarily return, after the illusion of 
having severed ourselves from it. To conclude 
emphatically (or at least to move toward our conclusion 
in this manner), let us recall Peirce’s claim: “we have 
direct experience of things in themselves. Nothing could 
be more completely false than that we can experience 
only our own ideas” (CP, 6.95).
48
 We directly experience 
                                                 
47
 In “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” Dewey 
observes: “if anything seems adequately grounded 
empirically it is the existence of a world which resists the 
characteristic functions of the subject of experience, 
which goes its own way, in some respects, independently 
of these functions, and which frustrates our hopes and 
intentions” (MW 10, 18). 
48
 “One of the curiosities of orthodox empiricism is that its 
outstanding speculative problem is,” Dewey notes, “the 
existence of an ‘external world.’ For in accordance with 
the notion that experience is attached to a private subject 
as its exclusive possession, a world like the one in which 
we appear to live must be ‘external’ to experience instead 
of being its subject-matter. I call it a curiosity, for if 
anything seems adequately grounded empirically it is the 
existence of a world which resists the characteristic 
functions of the subject of experience [i.e., the human 
animal], and which frustrates our hopes and intentions” 
(MW 10, 18). Near the end of his life, he made much the 
same point when he insisted: “Being and having, 
exercising and suffering such things as these [i.e., barriers, 
mountains, rivers, seas, forests, and plains], exist in the 
open and public. As we digest food derived from the 
the world, though experience is itself always a process of 
mediation in which the possibility of error is 
ineliminable. Direct perception cannot be gainsaid, 
though anything directly perceived might, in the light of 
subsequent perceptions, prove itself unreliable for the 
attainment of some purpose. Ultimately, we have no 
recourse but to rely on immediate perception or direct 
experience. There is no inner world except what is an 
offshoot of the external world, no outer world except 
what might disclose itself to us in our “possible practical 
experience.” The limits of intelligibility are defined by 
the range of our practices, but that range extends far 
beyond anything yet established. Within these practices, 
our observations and experiences are tethered to the 
everyday world by the ubiquitous force of indexical 
signs. The significance of the objects and events to which 
such signs so forcefully call our attention is, however, 
more far-reaching and deep-cutting than our most 
reliable theories and efficacious habits have even 
intimated. The world of our experience is, thus, a world 
at once immediately intelligible and inexhaustibly 
knowable (arguably, even mysterious). 
In their refusal even to try proving the existence of 
this world, also in their insistence upon conceiving 
conceivability in reference to our practices (albeit, the 
full range of our shared practices and the possible 
consequences flowing from our fateful engagement in 
these shared practices), and finally in granting, in their 
philosophical accounts, immediate perception and direct 
experience the tremendous weight they have in our 
everyday lives, the writings of the classical pragmatist 
and the later Wittgenstein make this and much more 
manifest. Between the immediate disclosures of our 
                                                                       
extra-personal world long before we study or are aware of 
processes occurring in our own bodily tissue, so we live in 
a world of objective acceptances and compulsions long 
before we are aware of attitudes of our own, and of the 
action of say the nervous system, in bringing us into 
effective relationship with them. The knowledge of our 
own attitudes and of the operation of the nervous system 
is no more a substitute for the direct operation of things 
than metabolic processes are a substitute for food 
materials” (LW 1, 381; emphasis added).  
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direct experience and the boundless mediations 
resulting from the dynamic conjunction of everyday 
experience and philosophical imagination, our lives 
stretch. While these lives are tethered by indexical signs 
to the external world, they are emancipated from the 
tyranny of its brute compulsion by the power of 
linguistic and other symbols.
49
 Our world is one in which 
our transactions overwhelmingly take the form of an 
exchange of signs.
50
 This does nothing to make the world 
a tissue of signs, though it does much to help us see
51
 
                                                 
49
 In “The Poet,” in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, 
edited by Larzer Ziff (NY: Penguin, 1982), Emerson calls 
our attention to the power of symbols to facilitate this 
result: “The use of symbols has a certain power of 
emancipation and exhilaration for all men. We seem to be 
touched by a wand which makes us dance and run about 
happily, like children. We are like persons who come out 
of a cave or cellar into the open air” (276). Language is 
anything but a prison-house, even if certain pictures, 
having their roots in language, can hold us captive 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #). Any prison-
house in which we are sequestered can, in principle, be 
identified as such because of our linguistic resources and, 
beyond this, is one from which we might be able to escape 
only because of these resources. 
50
 “Signs, the only things with which a human being can, 
without derogation, consent to have any transaction, 
being a sign himself, are,” Peirce insists, “triadic” (6.344). 
While our experience is always to some extent a play of 
forces, it is more than this: it is a drama in which that play 
provides opportunities for discovering the most intricate 
networks of intelligible relationships. See Wittgenstein’s 
Blue Book (1958), 6-8. “If we say that thinking is,” 
Wittgenstein notes, “essentially operating with signs, the 
first question you might ask is: ‘What are signs?’ – Instead 
of giving any general kind of answer to this question, I 
propose to you to look closely at particular cases” (1958, 
16). Even so, there are at least implicit generalizations 
derived from his painstaking attention to particular cases, 
just as Peirce’s “broad generalizations” (2.14) are derived 
from attention to particulars. The would have (to say the 
least) severe reservations about a general theory of signs, 
while the latter would have little sympathy with the claim 
that the philosopher should avoid from putting forth 
theses. 
51
 In his Investigations, Wittgenstein objects to himself by 
saying, “You have a new conception [of a familiar object] 
and interpret it as seeing a new object.” “What you have 
primarily discovered is,” he continues, “a new way of 
looking at things” (#401). He appears, here and elsewhere, 
to be disparaging his own pretense to have accomplished 
anything notable. But, in truth, he has hit upon a novel 
way of seeing familiar things. In a very different context, 
animated by largely divergent motives, James announces 
how immediately and intimately, yet elusively significant 
is our everyday world.  
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ABSTRACT: The paper investigates the prospect of dealing 
with “immediate experience” from a pragmatist 
perspective. The issue at stake is the possibility of 
speaking in a deflationary yet tenable way about the 
direct character of our common experiences of the 
world, given that the human environment is profoundly 
characterized by linguistic, inferential and interpretative 
practices.  
The author explores John Dewey’s answers to the 
above-mentioned problem. These can be seen to reflect 
a sort of tension within classic pragmatism between the 
young Peirce's lesson about the semiotic and mediated 
structure of human cognition and James’s mature claim 
for immediate experience.  
Not least by means of a comparison with 
Wittgenstein’s approach, the thesis arising from the 
paper is that Dewey was able to solve the apparent 
divergence by considering experience in close 
connection with life and through a complementary 
understanding of cognition as a specific form of 
experience, as well as by emphasizing the role of the 
qualitative or aesthetic aspect of primary experience. 
Moreover, Dewey’s non-foundational and circular 
conception of the relationships between qualitative and 
reflective experience is identified as a decisive step. 
 
Keywords: immediate experience; qualitative 
experience; classical pragmatism; semiotic turn; 
Wittgenstein 
 
 
Is there any room for immediate experience in the human 
world, namely a world that is profoundly characterized by 
linguistic, inferential and interpretative practices, by 
complex forms of communication and signification, as well 
as by normative issues? Can we still speak in a deflationary 
yet tenable way about the direct character of our common 
experiences of the world after the crucial philosophical 
turns that took place in the previous century – the semiotic 
turn, the hermeneutic turn and the linguistic one? 
It should clearly be stated that this question is not to be 
interpreted as a kind of epistemological problem referring 
to the enduring issue in modern and contemporary 
philosophy of whether and how it is possible to anchor our 
knowledge of allegedly external reality in stable ground. The 
classical pragmatists as well as the later Wittgenstein – not 
to speak of Heidegger’s Being and Time and Merleau-
Ponty’s “Introduction” to his Phenomenology of Perception 
– clearly acknowledged that the world we belong to and 
interact with is already there before we begin any 
epistemological inquiry (see Colapietro’s paper in the 
current issue of this journal). Nonetheless, I fear we run the 
risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, if we do 
not consider the ways in which the world has a direct or 
immediate impact on us, on our lives, notwithstanding the 
linguistic, largely interpretative, inferential and mediated 
character of our practices. 
I think that John Dewey provided a positive answer to 
this question. Hence, we should try to investigate how and 
to what extent there is room in his conception of 
experience for forms of immediate interaction between 
human organisms and their environment, given that he 
assumed that our environment is naturally social and 
culturally configured – in other words, that the human 
world is naturally characterized by intelligent, broadly 
linguistic
1
 and normative practices. 
In the context of the pragmatist tradition, Dewey fully 
accepted Peirce's lesson about the semiotic and mediated 
structure of human cognition. Nonetheless, he perceived 
the claim for immediate experience supported by James in 
his Essays in Radical Empiricism as genuine or legitimate. In 
these papers, William James had freed himself from the 
picture of the individual conscience as something 
characterized by "absolute insularity" and privateness. 
Nonetheless, James had felt the need to give an account of 
the vague and overabundant complexity of life against the 
over-intellectualization of philosophical problems. 
Consequently, he had made a strong case for recognizing 
direct, non-inferential forms of human experience (Gavin 
1992). 
 
                                                 
1
 By “broadly linguistic” I mean properly verbal practices 
as well as what Joseph Margolis calls “lingual” acts and 
behaviours, namely activities that are significant in 
connection to shared forms of life and culture, and 
which depend on the mastering of a common language. 
See Margolis 2017. 
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Dewey was caught between the two – the early 
Peirce on the one hand and the mature James on the 
other one – and, in my opinion, he tried to find a way 
out, even though he did not explicitly pose the problem 
as arising from the two fathers of pragmatism. His 
solution is partly grounded in his conception of human 
behavior as largely based on habits, understood in 
almost physiological and pre-personal terms, and not 
primarily as the result of the repetition of a voluntary or 
conscious action (Dewey 1983). However, I will not 
explore this route in the present paper, because I have 
dealt with it elsewhere (Dreon 2016). Differently, I will 
suggest that an answer to the present question can be 
found by considering Dewey’s conception of experience 
as a primarily living process that is broader and more 
inclusive than knowledge – complementarily, cognition is 
interpreted as an internal phase and extension of 
primarily qualitative, aesthetic or affective experience. 
On the other hand, Dewey’s solution – or dissolution – of 
the problem at stake is connected with an explicit 
acknowledgment of the fact that the relationships 
between reflective inquiries and eminently qualitative 
phases of experience are circular and non-hierarchical, 
because the results of previous inferences and inquiries 
have loop effects on our primarily qualitative everyday 
experience and reshape it. 
This whole problem, as far as I understand it, is not 
at all foreign to the Wittgenstein of the second part of 
the Philosophical Investigations. Although Wittgenstein's 
efforts here are mainly directed at denying or at least 
questioning the possibility of an Erlebnis – namely, an 
interior and immediately lived experience assumed as a 
kind of privileged source of certainty – his path seems to 
be more tortuous, insofar as he obliquely tries to 
consider the often direct character of our practices. I 
think that Wittgenstein gave an affirmative answer to 
the above-mentioned question, but his response only 
partially coincides with the solutions that Dewey offers 
us if we approach his texts in the way I am suggesting 
here. 
Consequently, I will begin my inquiry by focusing on 
Peirce’s criticism of introspection and of any assumed 
primacy of unmediated experience in his so-called anti-
Cartesian essays. Then I will consider some similarities 
with Wittgenstein’s criticism of Erlebnis as a privileged 
internal experience, allegedly immune from doubt. I will 
also sketch out an alternative path leading to different 
ways of seeing experience as unmediated by 
interpretations in the second part of his Philosophical 
Investigations. After this Wittgensteinian excursus, I will 
explore James’s claim in favor of pure experience in his 
Essays in Radical Empiricism – where he does not 
relinquish the notion of immediate experience, but 
definitely rejects any previous dualistic hesitations. The 
last section will focus on Dewey’s answers to the whole 
issue, by following his main lines of thought, as briefly 
outlined above. 
 
1. Peirce on the Pervasiveness of Mediation 
 
As a point of departure, I will consider the very strong 
criticism formulated by the young Peirce of the 
privileged role traditionally attributed to first-hand 
experience, which is usually characterized as being 
immediate and intuitively certain, and hence as 
deserving an epistemological primacy over other types 
of indirect, mediated and discursive cognition. The main 
reference is, of course, to Peirce’s anti-Cartesian essays, 
published in 1868, Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities and Questions Concerning Certain Faculties 
Claimed for Man. In these papers, we can find a negative 
answer to the question I posed at the beginning: very 
briefly, there is no room for immediate experience in a 
world like the human one, which precludes the 
possibility of thinking without signs. More properly, we 
should acknowledge that for Peirce both a specific 
thought, produced at a certain moment, and a specific 
feeling arising out of a particular context in a more or 
less idiosyncratic manner are unique and sui generis 
events that simply happen without any mediation. 
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However, in order for both of them to signify something 
for speakers of the same language or for a limited group 
of individuals involved in a situation (5.289), they must 
be based on the implicit or explicit institution of a 
mediating relationship, which is to say on a complete or 
incomplete inference, on a unifying hypothesis that can 
be more or less anchored in plausible reasons. There is 
neither any immediate self-awareness nor any special 
faculty of introspection of the internal world 
independent of our knowledge of the external world 
(5.244), to which we should attribute a privileged 
certainty in comparison with our mediated knowledge of 
the external world. 
The polemical objective is twofold: first, Peirce tells 
us (against Descartes’s assumption) that self-knowledge 
and introspection are not immediate, direct experiences, 
but are the result of complex inferential processes (1). 
More specifically, Peirce states that the feeling of the 
self in the young child is the result of a network of 
processes involving bodily, social and linguistic practices 
(5.226). For him, the feeling of one’s own self is the 
result of the perception that one’s own body is more 
centrally basic (in terms of the management of one’s 
own space) than other people’s bodies, as well as the 
product of a gradual learning of language by which the 
baby is exposed, step-by-step, to the testimony of others 
about a specific state of facts as convergent or divergent 
from its own. In this way, the young creature would be 
driven to use the first-person pronoun in order to posit a 
seat of ignorance or divergence.
2
 
Secondly, Peirce extends his claim to the point of 
denying that immediate forms of cognition – and 
perhaps of experience – exist at all (2). Peirce states that 
even the perception of two-dimensional and three-
                                                 
2 
As is well known, Mead supported the idea that self-
identity emerges out of the capacity to take the role of 
the other in a conversation of gestures. However, I agree 
with Cook (in Cook 1993: 78 and ff.) that Mead did not 
conceived this process as basically involving any kind of 
interpretation or inference but rather as a kind of 
affectively based tuning (see also Dreon forthcoming). 
dimensional spaces, as well as sound and tactile 
perceptions, rest on comparisons, abstractions, 
selections, and reductions to more or less reasonable 
units as well as on predictions about features that are 
not actually present in perception. According to a 
semiotic approach, perception should be considered to 
be a mediated process, based on implicit inferences or 
interpretations (Paolucci 2016, 29). 
Peirce is here disputing the associationist claim that 
mere perceptive data are the basic ingredients of 
cognitive processes. He is arguing therefore that these 
data cannot be considered privileged cognitive resources 
for laying the foundations of the cognitive building, as 
suggested by classical empiricism. Nevertheless, we 
should note that in these essays Peirce is still thinking of 
perception in eminently cognitive terms, as one of the 
components of a structurally inferential cognitive 
process. 
More radically, he seems to adopt the same 
approach even with regard to emotions and habits, i.e. 
forms of affective and practical experience beyond 
reasoning in the strict sense. As a matter of fact, in this 
essay, Peirce argues that both emotions and habits 
involve inferential processes. 
He tells us that an emotion is a simple predicate that 
replaces a series of different predicates by unifying them 
on the basis of an implicit (and often risky) hypothesis – 
a form of inference that is not grounded on rational 
explanations, as in the case of inferential judgments 
(5.292). Moreover, for Peirce emotions differ from 
intellectual judgments not because of their alleged 
immediacy, but because of their close connection with 
the idiosyncratic circumstances and the particular 
dispositions of a specific individual, as happens with the 
sense of beauty and morality (5.247). Differently, 
intellectual judgments would be more generally related 
to human nature, the human mind or the human 
community. 
On the other hand, Peirce tells us that a habit is a 
form of practical inference which is constituted “when, 
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having had the sensation of performing a certain act, m, 
on several occasions a, b, c, we come to do it upon every 
occurrence of the general event l, of which a, b and c are 
special cases” (5.297).
3
 Even the recognition of a friend 
would be based on some form of reasoning: we would 
not explicitly consider the premises of such an inference 
simply because it works and goes on without hindrances 
insofar as the hypothesis on which the inference is based 
is satisfied (5.223). 
To sum up, here Peirce tells us that perceptions and 
sensations (and clearly judgments) rest on inferential 
processes; not only that, but even affective sensibility, as 
well as habits of actions, are grounded in forms of 
reasoning that can be more or less incomplete. If seen in 
the light of these specific texts, Peirce’s position seems 
to be exposed to the risk of a reduction of human 
experience to cognition or to offer a basis for the thesis 
that cognition pervades every form of human experience 
– thirdness, to use Peirce’s later phenomenological 
categories, seems to reabsorb both firstness and 
secondness.  
Of course, this is a one-sided viewpoint on Peirce’s 
philosophy, whose steps were much more 
multidirectional from the mid-1980s onward 
(Maddalena 2015, 33). More substantially, it could also 
be claimed that Peirce’s development of his three 
phenomenological categories was a (more or less 
successful) attempt to defend the thesis that the origin 
of our knowledge lies in quality (Maddalena 2014: 107). 
Dewey probably recognized this issue in Peirce’s thought 
by stressing the value of Peirce’s theory of quality over 
his semiotics in an essay dating back to 1935 (Dewey, 
1998; on this see Innis 2014).  
                                                 
3 
It should be noted that whereas here Peirce provides a 
rather intellectual picture of habits, the picture he 
provides in other texts is somewhat different – the 
emphasis being not on a deliberate inference provoking 
the fixation of a habit, but on previous habits of action 
and belief as the basis for new habits. This different 
emphasis derived from the influence of Alexander Bain 
on classical pragmatists (see Feodorov 2017) and was 
systematically developed by John Dewey in Dewey 1983. 
Nonetheless, these early essays lay out the issue at 
stake very clearly – an issue that both Dewey and Peirce 
himself had to take seriously into account and possibly 
try to reconcile with the reasons of immediate 
experience. 
 
2. The Two Sides of Wittgenstein 
 
A transition to Wittgenstein seems to be rather 
consequential at this point of the inquiry, because there 
is a profound convergence between the anti-Cartesian 
spirit of Some Consequences of Four Incapacities and 
Wittgenstein’s later texts, as some scholars have noted 
(Hagberg 2016). One of the main polemical targets of 
the second part of the Philosophical Investigations is the 
idea that we first have an immediate and direct 
experience of the meaning of words, which we then use 
in different contexts (see Perissinotto 2002, Perissinotto 
2016 and Morelli in this issue). It is clear that Peirce and 
Wittgenstein converge in their criticism of the picture of 
a secluded mind and self-consciousness as an inward 
depository for private contents, which deserves primacy 
in terms of certainty and undoubted knowledge 
(Hagberg 2016: 36). In the last sections of his 
Philosophical Investigations (and similarly to Peirce and 
Dewey), Wittgenstein endorses an overturning of the 
traditional interpretation of this process: first we learn 
to do something and use words in appropriate contexts 
of shared practices, and only later on can we focus on 
words and their meanings as part of an interior 
discourse. This means that this interior voice should not 
be considered the first means of apprehension of 
meanings; on the contrary, it results from the 
transposition of previous interpersonal exchanges 
between individuals who share the same practices, 
language and form of life. It is only at this (belated) point 
that we have a direct and immediate experience of 
meanings, as we draw them out from our allegedly 
private mental depository – an erroneous notion, 
deriving from the isolation of a particular kind of solitary 
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game from already existing social and linguistic 
practices.  
It is exactly in relation to this issue that Wittgenstein 
makes a polemical reference to the Principles, more 
precisely to the chapter on the stream of thought, where 
William James characterizes consciousness as “absolute 
insularity” and says that the “most absolute fracture in 
nature” is the one dividing our own thoughts from those 
of others. By evoking James’s reference to the strange 
Erlebnis whereby a word is not yet present but seems to 
arise out of an inner experience (whether psychological 
or mental), Wittgenstein offers the famous response: 
 
The words ‘It’s on the tip of my tongue' are no 
more the expression of an experience than ‘Now 
I know to go on!’. We use them in certain 
situations, and they are surrounded by a 
behavior of a special kind, and also by some 
characteristic experiences. In particular, they are 
frequently followed by finding the word. (Ask 
yourself: “What would it be like if human beings 
never found the word that was on the tip of their 
tongue?). (Wittgenstein 1958: 219). 
 
Very briefly, there is no privileged psychological or 
mental access to meanings apart from the common 
contexts in which humans share their practices and 
linguistically interact with one another; there is no 
interior Erlebnis giving rise to or constituting the 
meaning of a word.
4
 
Hence, should we understand Wittgenstein’s 
contribution to our opening question as a complete 
denial of any kind of immediate or direct experience? I 
suspect that this is only one part of the story: 
Wittgenstein was criticizing a certain use (or abuse) of 
experience in philosophical discussions while, on the 
other hand, he was also wondering if there could be 
other ways to consider everyday direct experience from 
a philosophical point of view without over-
                                                 
4 
Although Wittgestein uses James here simply as a 
polemic target (as Goodman points out in Goodman 
2007: 142), the positive importance of the pragmatist’s 
work for Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been clearly 
recognized by many scholars (Boncompagni 2016 and 
Sanfelix Vidarte 2017).  
intellectualizing it. In my opinion, a first clue encouraging 
a more multifaceted reading of Wittgenstein on 
experience is given by his use of the word Erlebnis in this 
part of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein’s 
criticism is directed toward the alleged primacy of 
Erlebnis, understood as the direct experience of 
meanings as mental or psychological contents – 
differently, the term Erfahrung appears only at the 
beginning of paragraph XI, in the second part of the 
Philosophical Investigations. It is well known that 
German philosophy has made extensive use of the two 
German words for experience, Erlebnis, and Erfahrung, 
by assigning them different meanings and different roles 
in various philosophical systems. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
proposed a famous analysis of the philosophical 
meanings of the term “Erlebnis” in the first part of his 
Truth and Method (part I, B, ii and iii) – the 
reconstruction of the history of the word played a 
significant role in his criticism of “aesthetic culture”, 
namely a cultural form, based on the grounding 
assumption that the experience of art and the beautiful 
represented something completely different and 
separate from other ways of perceiving and experiencing 
the ordinary world.
5
 Very briefly, Gadamer points out 
some features in the complex philosophical history of 
the concept of Erlebnis, which are essentially the 
polemical target of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Gadamer 
emphasizes that a distinguishing feature of the 
                                                 
5 
Furthermore, Gadamer’s hermeneutical choice to 
distance himself from the phenomenological approach 
could be detected in this rejection of the concept of 
Erlebnis in favour of the idea of an Erfahrung of art as 
involving a real change in the subject having an 
experience. It has to do with a criticism of the alleged 
decisive primacy conferred by Husserl’s phenomenology 
on the noetic pole of the so-called intentional relation, 
to the detriment of the noematic pole. Roberta 
Lanfredini has highlighted a similar point at the 
beginning of William James’s essay Does Consciousness 
Exist?, where the author criticizes the strong asymmetry 
between the two poles of experience that emerged from 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy onward – and hence 
the position he himself had adopted in the Principles of 
Psychology (Lanfredini 2016). 
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philosophical concept of Erlebnis is the fact that it 
belongs to the inwardness of an individual conscience. 
This feature would guarantee a direct, unmediated 
access to its owner: the first person character of an 
Erlebnis would constitute the first unmediated and 
indisputable given, on which any other knowledge 
should be founded. Intimacy and adherence to one’s 
own inner life as well as certainty and immunity from 
doubt are the two main characteristics defining the 
concept of Erlebnis and lending it a philosophical 
primacy that is criticized and regarded as illegitimate 
both by Wittgenstein and by Gadamer. On the other 
hand, in his further treatment of art Gadamer recalls 
that the German philosophical tradition developed also 
the more inclusive concept of Erfarhung, which extends 
beyond the limitedness of inwardness, inner life, the 
individual conscience and the mind. Differently from 
Erlebnis, the term Erfarhung – at least in its 
philosophical, mainly Hegelian, dimension – tends to 
include everything that happens, involving human 
actions and passions, as well as the historical and 
cultural relations between the so-called experiential 
poles (CFR. Gadamer 1990, part II, 4, 3, B). 
This last point brings us back to Wittgenstein and to our 
thesis that he is inquiring whether there is still room to 
consider other modes of experience (Erfahrung) beyond 
introspection, mental or internal experience, and the like. 
Speaking about the experience (Erfarhrung) of “noticing an 
aspect”, he famously says that his inquiry is focused on the 
“grammar” of the concept, which is to say its use in a 
language (and not on the alleged psychological causes of a 
concept, i.e. a specific Erlebnis which should be investigated 
by psychologists, not philosophers). What has been largely 
overlooked, by contrast, is the fact that Wittgenstein also 
makes an explicit reference to a plurality of 
Erfahrungsbegriffe: “We are interested in the concept and 
its place among the concepts of experience” (Wittgenstein 
1958, 193).  
 
 
A second passage deserving consideration for our 
purposes is the beginning of the second part of the 
Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein famously 
states: 
 
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, 
unhappy, startled. But Hopeful? And why not? 
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he 
also believe his master will come the day after 
tomorrow? – And what can he not do here? – How 
do I do it? – How am I supposed to answer this? 
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those 
who have mastered the use of a language. That is to 
say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this 
complicated form of life.  
(Wittgenstein 1958, 174) 
 
The passage seems to suggest that Wittgenstein was 
interested in understanding whether the fact that humans 
speak with one another – that our forms of life are strictly 
intertwined with exchanged words – has an influence on 
the ways they believe and hope, as well as fear certain 
things and feel pain or see something as a duck or a rabbit. 
In other words, I tend to read this passage as though 
Wittgenstein were posing the question of whether our 
being speaking creatures contributes to re-shaping the 
animal sensibility in which our roots are embedded. More 
specifically, it seems to me that Wittgenstein focused the 
problem whether our everyday seeing, feeling pain, 
shouting, believing or hoping should always be considered 
mediated experiences, always involving inferences and 
interpretations. Wittgenstein resists the idea that our 
ordinary seeing something as a specific thing is grounded on 
an inferential process. Differently, this can be the case when 
we shift from seeing something as a duck to seeing it as a 
rabbit: there could be a reason eliciting a change in my 
perceptual experience and a reasoning – the change is due 
to a non-artificial doubt (to use Peirce’s lexicon) or to 
hesitation about what I can and should do when a situation 
becomes indeterminate (to recall Dewey’s formulation of 
the issue).  
 
 
 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IS  TH E R E  AN Y  RO O M  F O R  I M M E D I A T E  E X P E R I E N C E ?  LO O K I N G  F O R  A N  AN S W E R  I N  DE W E Y   
(A N D  W I T T G E N S T E I N )  V I A  P E I R C E  A N D  JA M E S  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 65 
This is also the case with exclamations and interjections, 
as well as with shouts and human cries. It is even the case 
with words themselves when they are perceived by the 
interlocutors as unmediated behaviors, similar to shouts.
6
 
Most of our seeing something as something as well 
as the functioning of certain words and sentences as 
bodily gestures works immediately because we are 
intimately familiar with a context and a linguistic game, 
we adhere to it by means of an attitude or a ‘belief’ that 
is more primitive than an epistemological assumption. 
According to Moyal-Sharrock, this kind of immediacy is 
connected to our belonging to a form of life that is 
deeply rooted in our animality, consequently preceding 
any epistemological doubt and any inferential process 
(Moyal-Sharrock 2016). 
Wittgenstein’s famous observations on following a 
rule (§§ 197-202) are largely consistent with this view: 
he states that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is 
not an interpretation (Deutung)” (Wittgenstein 1958, 
81). Wittgenstein refers to specific practices and to 
dispositions to act in a certain way, to habits of action 
and behavior that are not the result of the unconscious 
repetition of an originally intentional act. On the 
contrary, they are anchored in a shared form of living 
preceding any individual act as well as any singular word 
utterance (Dreon 2016). 
Considering cases of this kind, Luigi Perissinotto 
argues that such linguistic games should be considered 
extensions of more primitive behaviors. The word 
‘primitive’ in these cases has no reductive 
characterization, but simply refers to what is not the 
result of any reasoning. “From this point of view”, he 
says, “‘primitive’ is not so much a synonym of 
‘elemental’ or ‘simple’ as of ‘immediate’, where 
‘immediate’ means: non mediated by reasoning, 
                                                 
6 
Cf. also § IX (in Wittgenstein 1953), where Wittgenstein 
excludes that an expression such as “I am afraid” is the 
description of an interior state (an Erlebnis). However, 
he emphasizes that a word can be either very far from a 
shout or very close, since there are various degrees and 
nuances between the two extremes. 
calculation, inductive and analogical processes, and so 
on and so forth” (Perissinotto 2002, 107, my translation). 
It is in this sense, according to Wittgenstein’s 
perspective, that we can speak of immediate experience, 
once we have freed ourselves from the myth of 
introspection and the direct intuition of one’s own self. 
 
3. James’s claim for immediate experience 
 
Let’s return to the classical pragmatists and more 
precisely to the way William James poses the whole 
issue in his Essays in Radical Empiricism. I will focus my 
attention on some features of his text which Dewey 
found compelling and further developed in his own way. 
The influence of these essays on Dewey’s Experience and 
Nature is very strong but it is always filtered through 
Deweyan lenses. The first element I wish to emphasize is 
that James, as a radical empiricist, does not abandon his 
preference to consider ‘immediate experience’ an 
important issue but a crucial shift is made with respect 
to the Principles (see Bella in this volume). As has already 
been observed, in the chapter on the stream of thought 
immediateness and immunity from doubts are 
attributed to interior experience in its allegedly 
“absolute insularity”: “the personal self rather than the 
thought might be treated as the immediate datum in 
psychology” (James 1981: cap.IX, § 1).
7
 In Does 
Consciousness Exit?, as well as in A World of Pure 
Experience, it is no longer the strictly personal 
consciousness that is already given but the continuum of 
experience.
8
 Some remarks are important for a better 
                                                 
7 
Nonetheless, James’s Principles are marked by tensions 
and ambiguities also with regard to the issue of 
consciousness, as is interestingly acknowledged by 
Dewey in an essay dating back to 1940, whose eloquent 
title is The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James 
(Dewey 1988 b). 
8 
I owe to Kenneth Stikkers an interesting detail about 
Wilhelm Jerusalem, the Austrian scholar who translated 
James’s Pragmatism into German and worked on the 
project of founding epistemology and logic on social 
psychology. Jerusalem still suggested to use the German 
word “Erlebnis” (rather than “Erfahrung”) for 
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understanding of James’s shift from the stream of 
consciousness to the experiential continuum – without 
denying some problems in James’s theory of neutral 
monism that cannot be the object of this inquiry. 
Negatively, experience is no longer understood as a kind 
of interior dimension; on the contrary, it is everything 
which occurs without the need for an underlying 
foundation – “In radical empiricism there is no bedding; 
it is as the pieces clung together by their edges, the 
transitions experienced between them forming their 
cement” (see the “Conclusion” of A Word of Pure 
Experience).
9
 “There is no general stuff of which 
experience at large is made” (Does Consciousness Exist?, 
section V): experience is made of everything – stuff, 
nature, features – we experience and consequently it is 
genuinely pluralistic. It is the dynamic world, including 
human life, which is not perceived as an exclusive 
property belonging to a personal consciousness; on the 
contrary, it simply is what it is: namely, superabundant, 
chaotic, vague, without sharp edges dividing one part 
from another (see Gavin 1992). I suggest we could 
understand the term ‘radical’ that is attributed to 
empiricism to mean the rich and vague plurality of 
processes that do not need any reference to principles 
transcending them. James wanted to account for this 
immediate experience we adhere to before posing any 
philosophical question and any real or merely artificial 
doubt (see Colapietro in this volume). 
 
                                                                       
“experience” in James’s later works. In my opinion, this 
choice was connected to the strong influence of James’s 
Principles on his readers – the same influence that 
pushed Wittgenstein to consider James as the paradigm 
of a dogmatic conception of introspection. Kenneth 
Stikkers says that Jerusalem’s preference for “Erlebnis” 
was connected to his criticism of James with respect to 
the lack of the social dimension of experience in his 
thought (Stikkers 2009). 
9 
Lanfredini (2017) interprets this change in James’s 
thought in phenomenological terms, by arguing that 
with this new conception of experience James abandons 
any primacy previously attributed to the subjective (or 
noetic) pole of experience at the expenses of the 
objective (or noematic) pole. 
Of course, we could object that James’s insistence on 
pure experience as “plain unqualified actuality, a simple 
that, as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought, and 
only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as 
someone’s opinion about fact” (A World of Pure 
Experience, section V) is the late result of a sophisticated 
philosophical approach.
10
 Nonetheless, it must be 
acknowledged that James clearly does not refer to the 
dogmatic assumption of pure experience as a neutral 
given, assumed as the ground for cognition. On the 
contrary, James alludes to the continuum of dynamic 
processes – both organic and environmental – in which 
we are embedded before we can functionally establish 
whether something is either subjective or objective, 
whether it should be an attribute of things or thoughts, 
of physical reality or the mind. We practically adhere to 
this kind of continuum before specific cognitive relations 
take place between certain parts of experience and 
others. The immediacy of experience, in this broad and 
inclusive sense, is not at all a cognitive feature, because 
it is already there whenever it becomes necessary to 
distinguish a knower from the known, because a real 
doubt (not a paper one) arises from what Dewey will 
later describe as an indeterminate situation. 
As a matter of fact, this reshaping of the role and 
place of knowledge within experience will represent one 
of the strengths of Dewey’s approach to the issue – he 
will later make it much more explicit and develop all its 
consequences.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 
Gavin (in Gavin 1992, 4) claims that James was deeply 
conscious of the impossibility of foregoing any 
theoretical disposition toward the object of philosophy, 
even when it consists in the allegedly “unarticulate” 
tissue of immediate experience: although theories and 
languages are structurally “directional”, they are “not 
dismissable”. His answer, according to Gavin, consisted 
in adopting a method of vigilance, while, at the same 
time, resisting the temptation to “clean up the vague” 
for epistemological reasons. 
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In my opinion, Dewey will also further develop 
another aspect foreshadowed in the Essays in Radical 
Empiricism in his 1925 volume, namely James’s 
reference to so-called “affectional facts”.  
James transformed one of the cruxes of modern 
philosophy into an argument in favor of his anti-dualistic 
conception of experience – his idea of integral and 
practical experience as prior to and exceeding dualistic 
distinctions, such as mind and world, subject and object 
and so on. In a nutshell, the traditional philosophical 
problem is whether appreciations of values – both 
aesthetic and ethical ones – should be considered 
subjective or objective. For example, what is painful? Are 
some objects painful or should the property be 
attributed to the experiences we have of them? Is a 
certain figure fascinating or are we projecting a quality 
of our Erlebnis onto the object at stake? Are morally 
valuable characteristics in res or in the subject who is 
experiencing them? Is beauty an attribute of the object 
(a work of art or a natural landscape) or is it located in 
the eyes of those who appreciate beauty?  
James takes advantage of the “chaotic”, “hybrid”, 
and “ambiguous” character of this class of experiences. 
According to James, the never-ending debate on the 
subjective or objective character of qualities shows that 
it is misleading and inconclusive to attempt to definitely 
regiment them by attributing them either to a res 
cogitans or to a res extensa, which is to say two modes 
of being (psychic and physical, mental and neural) which 
are supposed to be completely discontinuous. 
Alternatively, we can draw functional and contextual 
distinctions, for example, between a pain that is serious 
and in need to be nursed and a pain that is the result of 
hypochondria. Those distinctions are connected to the 
relations we assume as crucial from time to time at the 
expense of other relations we tend to overlook in the 
continuum of experience. In other words, the fact of 
characterizing something as either subjective or 
objective does not depend on the metaphysical stuff or 
nature out of which it is allegedly constituted. By means 
of a deflationary argument, James states that these 
distinctions between the various phases of an 
experience respond to our temporary needs and to an 
ever-changing context.  
Dewey will develop James’s idea that these affective 
qualities of experience (he will also speak of them as 
“esthetic”) exercise an effective role in our experiences, 
by conferring emphasis or enhancing them at the 
expenses of other features, as well as by making them 
more interesting – in more contemporary terms, we 
might say that these qualitative features in experience 
tend to draw salience lines and to control our orienting 
in the environment.  
In any case, this kind of emphasis, salience and the 
like hardly seems to be the last result of an inferential 
process; consequently, a serious tension seems to arise 
between the Peirce of Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities Claimed for Man and James’s radical 
empiricism. Dewey was faced the difficult task of putting 
these two profound yet apparently opposite issues back 
together. On the one hand, he did so by recognizing the 
crucial role and the irreversible change produced in the 
very structures of human experience by the emergence 
of language and semiotic processes; on the other hand, 
by avoiding a kind of philosophical straining, namely the 
attribution of an inferential structure (if only a 
hypothetical and incomplete one) to each and every 
human interaction with the environment.  
  
4. Dewey’s ways out of a philosophical impasse 
 
John Dewey shared Peirce’s and (virtually) 
Wittgenstein’s profound criticism of immediate 
experience understood as the direct perception of one’s 
own mental contents (Dewey 2004: 8-9, 13). He was very 
far from assuming a conception of inwardness as a 
privileged kind of experience that is supposed to be 
given directly and primarily to the subject, who could 
have an unmediated access to it and consequently 
adhere to it as a locus of certainty immune to any doubt. 
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Dewey’s understanding of experience was very remote 
from the Erlebnis model – not only for theoretical 
reasons but also because of the socio-political 
consequences of the misuse of this concept in relation to 
everyday life, as is evident in Individualism Old and 
New.
11
 
On the contrary, Dewey had a very inclusive idea of 
experience, as something unfolding in the natural and 
human world and involving the complex of dynamic and 
historic processes that have to do with human actions in 
the real world. In Experience and Nature, Dewey 
famously stated that 
 
[…] experience is of as well as in nature. It is not 
experience that is experienced, but nature – 
stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, 
temperature, electricity, and so on. Things 
interacting in certain ways are experience; they 
are what is experienced. Linked in certain ways 
with another natural object – the human 
organism – they are how things are experienced 
as well. (Dewey 1981: 12-13). 
 
Dewey insistently highlights that human actions and 
sufferings are as real as natural events because they are 
natural events dynamically contributing to changing and 
shaping the environment to which they belong. As a 
consequence, this picture of experience has a strong 
sense of contingency to it, an awareness of a structural 
lack of clear and complete epistemic transparency, as 
well as an explicit assumption of the hypothetical, risky 
and provisional character of our truth claims – not 
because they are supposed to be merely subjective but 
because both the organic and environmental conditions 
for interaction are always shifting (see Calcaterra, 2011).  
Taking a step back, it is useful to focus on the 
connection between organic life and the environment, 
which constitutes the core of Dewey’s idea of 
                                                 
11 
On this issue see Calcaterra 2013, introducing the 
Italian translation of Dewey’s 1929 volume. On the 
“Pathology of Inwardness” see also Lothstein 1977. See 
Dreon 2015 on Dewey’s criticism of the political and 
economic consequences of an exclusive cultivation of 
one’s own inner life at the expense of real emancipation. 
experience. From his point of view, Darwin’s 
evolutionary biology offers some beneficial feedback on 
philosophical distortions because it definitely abandons 
the traditional modern assumption that human subjects 
are independent entities dealing with an already given 
and complete reality that exists per se. This assumption 
dissolves when considering some “biological 
commonplaces” (Dewey 1989: 20): all living beings, 
including humans, depend on an environment to survive, 
flourish and die; life goes on in and by means of an 
“environmental medium, not in a vacuum” (Dewey 1980: 
7). Furthermore, living beings belong to an environment 
on which they depend and with which they continuously 
interact. Consequently, they constantly contribute to 
changing their environment from within to a more or 
less wide extent.  
At the end of The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, 
Dewey sums up the possible effects of Darwin’s 
evolutionary biology for developing a sounder 
philosophical conception of experience. First of all, “If 
biological development be accepted, the subject of 
experience is at least an animal, continuous with other 
organic forms in a process of more complex 
organization” (Dewey 1980: 26), because different forms 
of life stand out through the greater or lesser degree of 
complexity of their interactions with an environment. 
Moreover (and foreshadowing the more recent idea of 
neural reductionism), “experience is not identical with 
brain action; it is the entire organic agent-patient in all 
its interaction with the environment, natural and social. 
The brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of 
behavior, not of knowing the world” (ibidem). Finally, 
“experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of 
doing and suffering” (ibidem). 
To sum up, experience is constituted by the dynamic 
interactions between human organisms and their natural 
as well as naturally social environment.  
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This kind of approach to experience makes it 
possible to speak plausibly and non-dogmatically of 
immediate experience, by denying that there exist any 
forms of direct, non-inferential knowledge. 
By reading Dewey’s texts as though they were 
mainly aimed at solving the whole issue and by 
simplifying the complexity of his lines of thought, I 
suggest that his answer could be connected to three 
main arguments. (1) Dewey endorses a conception of 
experience as something including vital interactions that 
are not primarily or eminently cognitive relations, by at 
the same time downsizing the role of knowledge in 
experience. (2) Furthermore, he decisively emphasizes 
the aesthetic, qualitative or affective meanings of things, 
persons and situations in primary experience. (3) Finally, 
he adopts a non-foundational, circular conception of the 
relationship between reflective and eminently 
qualitative phases of experience, so that the results of 
previous reflective inquiries are absorbed by primarily 
qualitative experience and react on it, enriching its depth 
and complexity.
12
 
Let’s now consider these lines of thought more 
analytically.  
 
4.1. In Experience and Nature, there is room for 
immediate experience – Dewey seems to favor the 
formula “primary” experience over “immediate” 
experience, even though he does not stick to a fixed 
expression. In the first chapter of the 1925 volume, he 
claims that all forms of unreflective primary experience 
are unquestionable. If we read this statement through a 
Peircian lens, Dewey is supporting the idea that we 
cannot really suspend our belief in “gross, macroscopic, 
crude subject-matters in primary experience” (Dewey 
                                                 
12 
For a different point of view on the opportuneness of 
speaking about immediate experience, see Ryder 
(forthcoming). The core of Ryder’s argument is grounded 
in the development of Justus Buchler’s distinction 
between query and inquiry rather than in Dewey’s 
distinction between primary experience and reflective 
experience.  
1988: 15); if we did, this would be a clear case of a 
“paper doubt”, namely an artificial and derived doubt 
(see Colapietro in this volume). In Dewey’s language, it 
would be a philosophical fallacy, consisting in the 
assumption of the refined outcomes of a reflective 
inquiry as though they were the primary elemental 
features of experience.  
For Dewey, everything happening in the world – 
things and circumstances that hinder us or simply 
happen to us and have an impact on our lives – is not 
primary in the sense of representing the first neutral 
data on which knowledge is based. Rather, these 
elements are primary in the sense that they are already 
there, something which has already happened to us and 
has already conditioned our actions and behaviors 
before a specific cognitive problem arises and elicits a 
process of inquiry. In a formula, it is life that is primarily 
at stake in experience, rather than knowledge. By 
returning to Peirce and his phenomenological categories, 
we could translate Dewey’s distinction between primary, 
“consummatory” experience and more reflective phases 
of experience in terms of relations: primarily dyadic 
relations, which bear the impact – be it favorable or 
unfavorable – of something on our lives, are the more 
inclusive background in which triadic or symbolic 
references can be developed as further chances, 
whenever necessary. When something does not work in 
our largely habitual interactions with the environment, 
the opportunity for inference is opened up – but 
knowledge is a secondary or intermediate phase in the 
temporal development of experience, as Dewey 
emphasizes in his 1916 introduction to his Essays in 
Experimental Logic: 
 
But it is indispensable to note that […] the 
intellectual element is set in a context which is 
noncognitive and which holds within it in 
suspense a vast complex of other qualities and 
things that in the experience itself are objects of 
esteem or aversion, of decision, of use, of 
suffering, of endeavour and revolt, not 
knowledge (Dewey 2004). 
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This does not mean that knowledge enters into 
experience as an alien or transcendent feature. On the 
contrary, if all experience is of nature as well as in 
nature,  
 
[e]xperience thus reaches down into nature; it 
has depth. It also had breadth and to an 
indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That 
stretch constitutes inference (Dewey 1981:13).  
 
Inference is, for Dewey, “the use of what happens, to 
anticipate what will—or at least may—happen” and it 
“makes the difference between directed and undirected 
participation” (Dewey 1980: 16). It is the capacity to see 
something happening now as the sign of some possible 
consequences in the future, it is a more or less risky 
forecast – an abduction – of whether propitious or 
painful events might take place. It is an extremely 
powerful tool in human experience, decisively extending 
– “stretching” – its chances beyond those limits that are 
out of reach for non-human forms of life. Consequently, 
inference is an intrinsic feature in human experience,
13
 
yet it does not exhaust its qualitative complexity. 
Thought and reason are reflective modalities in 
experience which are elicited primarily by practical 
difficulties regarding human actions when we face the 
problem of what to do in new and unexpected 
circumstances. Reason in action is the process of 
returning to an indeterminate situation, by trying to 
analytically discriminate the vague, qualitatively thick 
features of primary experience – where we mostly move 
habitually, without any need for analysis. Inquiries are 
grounded in attempts to draw distinctions in the rich and 
largely continuous fabric of primary experience, by 
means of procedures that are functional to producing a 
                                                 
13 
See The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, where 
Dewey says that experience “is full of inference” (Dewey 
1980: 6) in the sense that, if we abandon the atomistic 
point of view of classical empiricism, we cannot but 
acknowledge that connections and continuities are 
pervasive in our experiences. In this reasoning we can 
perceive Dewey’s capacity to put together Peirce’s and 
James’s different approaches by undoing their 
(sometimes) apparent contrasts. 
hypothesis, i.e. to making inferences – that are more or 
less complete and more or less risky, according to 
Peirce’s lesson – about further consequences.
14
 To sum 
up, this stretching of experience to meet needs 
stemming from experience itself is still an internal 
chance, although an impressive one. 
 
4.2. Dewey’s emphasis on the qualitative or aesthetic 
aspects of primary, unreflective experience represents a 
second important element for developing a non-
dogmatic conception of immediacy. Qualitative, 
aesthetic or affective features are not to be considered 
in eminently cognitive terms, as properties channeled 
through mere sensory perception, which would 
constitute the purely descriptive ground of subsequent 
cognitive processes (be they inferential or 
interpretative). On the contrary, Dewey wanted 
philosophy to acknowledge that in ordinary, everyday 
life, each time something happens to us, things, other 
persons and events are immediately felt as hostile or 
favorable, welcoming or detrimental, sweet or bitter, 
bearing hope or anxiety, as well as boring and 
indifferent. They are “immediately felt” not for any 
metaphysical reason, but simply because there is no 
native separation between an alleged merely sensory 
level of data and a subsequent affective quality which 
would be subjectively superimposed upon them. These 
two alleged levels can be abstracted and distinguished 
only later on for specific reasons and purposes when 
something goes wrong and a process of inquiry must be 
developed. Dewey uses the words felt or had, by 
contrast to known – and this is the reason why he speaks 
of aesthetic qualities or meanings by referring to a kind 
of affectively oriented sensibility, rather than to sense 
perception as a basic feature of an eminently cognitive 
                                                 
14 
In The Philosophy of Gestures, Maddalena emphasizes 
that analysis should be regarded as an intermediate 
phase between two synthetic moments in experience 
and, consequently, that discrimination should be 
considered an internal chance within a basic continuum 
(Maddalena 2015). 
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framework.
15
 Nonetheless, hostility and sympathy, 
bitterness and joy, hope and anxiety should not be 
considered “self-enclosed states of feeling, but [as] 
active attitudes of welcome and wariness” (Dewey 1980: 
10). They are not merely subjective qualities: on the 
contrary, they are real qualities characterizing real 
connections
16
 and interactions taking place between 
organisms and the environment. Moreover, qualitative 
experience is not primarily cognitive because it is 
connected to the biological and anthropological 
dimension of life, which is structurally exposed to an 
environment on which life depends at different levels of 
complexity and which, consequently, always has an 
impact and a basic (biological or existential, not 
cognitive) meaning for life itself. In these cases, 
references are direct, connecting life and its 
environment; they are not inferential because they 
basically assume the impact of an Umwelt on life – which 
deals primarily with existential connections and not with 
logical relations and triadic references, considering 
something that is not actually present as a sign for a 
possible consequence. From this perspective, Dewey 
could be seen to be re-using and re-interpreting Peirce’s 
phenomenological categories of Firstness and 
Secondness (see Dewey 1998) against the more one-
sided young Peirce, who may be regarded as considering 
                                                 
15 
This use of the word “esthetic” is basically consistent 
with James’s and Peirce’s approaches (see Shusterman 
2011, Maddalena 2014 and Innis 2014). Nonetheless, I 
think that Dewey developed and made more coherent a 
claim that was already to be found in the works of 
classical pragmatists. 
Marcuse draws an exemplary distinction of these 
two ways of understanding sensibility in the chapter on 
the aesthetic dimension in his book Eros and Civilization, 
by contrasting an epistemologically oriented conception 
of sensibility with an affective and embodied sensitivity, 
basically animated by desires and refusals – or longings 
and concerns, to speak in more Jamesian and Deweyan 
terms. 
16 
In Dewey 1980, the philosopher suggests that we 
distinguish between connections, which are existential, 
and relations, which can be understood as merely logical 
relationships. He probably introduced this distinction 
because he sought to avoid certain misunderstandings 
that could arise in reading James on “relations”.  
inferential processes pervasive in every form of 
experience.  
I suggest that Dewey expanded and radicalized the 
role of James’s so-called “affective facts” in experience 
(see also Shusterman 2011). First of all, things happen to 
us as pleasant or painful, hateful, tragic or joyful, they 
are nice or ugly, and we welcome or reject them: 
qualitative or aesthetic characterization is pervasive in 
human experience. At the same time, qualities are not 
merely descriptive properties, because they are laden 
with a sort of proto-evaluation that is not based on any 
inference but on the direct impact of a certain situation 
on one’s own life. In Art as Experience (Dewey 1989, 
Chap. XI), Dewey explains that aesthetic qualities (and, 
later on, artistic qualities) should not be interpreted as 
either subjective or objective properties, depending on 
the context and its specific purpose. Partially redirecting 
James’s interpretation of “affective facts”, Dewey says 
that aesthetic qualities concern the specific relations 
taking place between the various components or phases 
of an experience, which are just as real as the things and 
entities involved in an interaction, because they have 
consequences and affect the dynamic configuration of 
the environment. But Dewey is also very careful to avoid 
any hypostatization: qualities are not entities but modes 
of relation, they concern the ways in which interactions 
take place between human organisms and their natural 
as well as social and cultural environment.  
 
4.3. Nonetheless, the most important point in Dewey’s 
approach, in my opinion, is that his distinction between 
primary and reflective experience is not foundational – 
and probably it is for this reason that he avoids James’s 
use of the ambivalent adjective “pure” to characterize 
primarily qualitative experience. The distinction between 
qualitative experience and reflective inquiries cannot be 
a founding element because human beings are animals 
who, from the very beginning, find themselves caught in 
the middle of communicative and linguistic interactions 
as well as inferential processes, which belong to a 
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community more than they do to any individual speaker 
and knower. All of this interferes with and has 
consequences for qualitative experience, which 
incorporates the results of previous inquiries and is 
modified by them, whether it is enriched or 
impoverished. There is a kind of circular process which 
moves from qualitatively thick experience to analysis, 
hypothesis, and inference each time a difficulty arises 
about what can or should be done in a specific context. 
On the other hand, the outputs of reflective experiences 
cannot but return to the primary experience out of 
which the need for them emerged and through which 
their strength will be tested. Consequently, primary 
experience is continuously re-set and re-shaped, in some 
way or other: I correct my disposition to act if a 
particular mode of action works better than another in a 
new context of action. Primary experience checks the 
efficacy of the outputs of previous inquiries and 
appropriates them in largely unconscious ways when 
something unexpected and disrupting happens that 
requires a reassessment.  
From this point of view, the results of knowledge and 
inferences are everywhere in human experience, even in 
primarily qualitative and non-cognitive experiences of 
what ordinarily happens. However – as is clear from 
Dewey’s Rejoinder to some objections presented in the 
volume edited by Schlipp (Dewey 1939) – the American 
philosopher states that we should distinguish between 
knowledge understood as process in actu and the 
outputs of previous inquiries, which are absorbed and 
(collectively) established in primarily qualitative 
experience, and assumed as an integral part of the 
experiential fabric. Qualitative experience can be more 
or less vague, yet it is nonetheless appropriate when 
things unfold normally and there is no hindrance.  
At present in our culture, even the man on the street 
immediately sees the thick brush strokes of a Van Gogh’s 
painting as wheat in the hot summer fields of the 
Mediterranean, rather than as nervous splotches, 
without the need for any inferential process. Differently, 
a Deutung becomes crucial for the art expert who is 
expected to distinguish whether a painting is an 
authentic Van Gogh or a mere daub. Similarly, an 
uneducated elderly woman will say that she is suffering 
from gastritis, while her physician must investigate the 
causes of this and find possible remedies, if the old lady 
asks him for help when she can no longer endure her 
condition. 
 
References 
 
Boncompagni, Anna. 2016. Wittgenstein and 
Pragmatism. On Certainty in the Light of Peirce 
and James. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Calcaterra, Rosa Maria. 2011. Idee concrete. Percorsi 
nella filosofia di John Dewey. Genova-Milano: 
Marietti 1820. 
Calcaterra, Rosa Maria. 2013. “Idee da vivere. Filosofia, 
scienza e democrazia nel pensiero di John 
Dewey”. In Dewey, John, Individualismo vecchio 
e nuovo. Edited by Rosa Maria Calcaterra. Parma: 
Diabasis, 1-28. 
Cook, Gary A. 1993. George Herbert Mead. The Making 
of a Social Pragmatist. Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Dewey, John. 1939. “Experience, Knowledge, and Value. 
A Rejoinder”. In The Philosophy of John Dewey. 
Edited by Paul A. Schlipp, La Salle: Northern 
University and Southern University Illinois 
University Press, 517-608. 
Dewey, John. 1980. The Need for a Recovery of 
Philosophy. In Vol. 10 of The Middle Works, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 3-48. 
Dewey, John. 1981. Experience and Nature. Vol.1 of The 
Later Works. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press. 
Dewey, John. 1983. Human Nature and Conduct. Vol. 14 
of The Middle Works. Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.  
Dewey, John. 1984. “Affective Thought”. In Vol. 2 of The 
Later Works. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 104-115.  
Dewey, John. 1988. “Qualitative Thought”. In Vol.5 of 
The Later Works. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 243-262. 
Dewey, John. 1988 (b). “The Vanishing Subject in the 
Psychology of James”. In Vol.14 of The Later 
Works, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 155-167. 
Dewey, John. 1989. Art as Experience, Vol.10 of The 
Later Works. Carbondale and Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press. 
 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IS  TH E R E  AN Y  RO O M  F O R  I M M E D I A T E  E X P E R I E N C E ?  LO O K I N G  F O R  A N  AN S W E R  I N  DE W E Y   
(A N D  W I T T G E N S T E I N )  V I A  P E I R C E  A N D  JA M E S  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 73 
Dewey, John. 1998. “Peirce’s Theory of Quality”. In Vol. 
21 of The Later Works, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
86-94. 
Dewey, John. 2004. Essays in Experimental Logic. 
Mineola, New York: Dover Publication. 
Dreon, Roberta. 2016. “Understanding Rules as Habits. 
Developing a Pragmatist Anthropological 
Approach”. Paradigmi, XXXIV (3): 103-117. 
Dreon, Roberta. Forthcoming. “Gesti emotivi e gesti 
verbali. L’eredità di George Herbert Mead sulla 
genesi del linguaggio umano”. Sistemi 
Intelligenti, XXXI (1)/2019. 
Feodorov, Aleksandar. 2017. “Habit Beyond Psychology. 
The Evolution of the Concept”. European Journal 
of Pragmatism and American Philosophy. IX/1. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1990. Wahrheit und Methode. 
Grundzűge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. 
Tűbingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Gavin, William Joseph. 1992. William James and the 
Reinstatement of the Vague. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Goodman, Russel B. 2007. Wittgenstein and William 
James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hagberg, L. Garry. 2016. “Peirce, Wittgenstein, and the 
Sense of Pragmatism”. Paradigmi, XXXIV/3: 33-
50. 
Heidegger, Martin. Sein un Zeit. 1986. Tűbingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag. 
Innis, Robert. 2014. “Dewey’s Peircean Aesthetics”. 
Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana, 6: 139-160. 
Lanfredini, Roberta. 2017. “Anti-Psychologism and 
Neutrality. The Radical Empiricism of Husserl and 
James”. European Journal of Pragmatism and 
American Philosophy, IX/1. 
Lothstein, Arthur S. 1977, “The Pathology of Inwardness: 
John Dewey’s Critique of the ‘Inner Life’”. 
Ventures in Research, 6: 11-66. 
James, William. 1976. Essays in Radical Empiricism, in 
The Works of William James. Edited by Fredson 
Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press. 
James, William. 1981. Principles of Psychology, in The 
Works of William James. Edited by Frederick H. 
Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. 
Skrupskelis, Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press. 
Maddalena, Giovanni. 2014. “‘Non far violenza a nessuna 
parte dell’anima umana’. Peirce, l’estetica e la 
sintesi”. Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana, 6: 
103-117. 
Maddalena, Giovanni. 2015. Peirce. Milano: La Scuola 
Editrice. 
Maddalena, Giovanni. 2015 (b). The Philosophy of 
Gestures. Completing Pragmatists’ Incomplete 
Revolution. Montreal & Kingston, London, 
Chicago: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Margolis, Joseph. 2017. Three Paradoxes of Personhood. 
The Venetian Lectures. Edited by Roberta Dreon. 
Milano-Udine: Mimesis International. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. Phénoménologie de la 
perception. Paris: Gallimard. 
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle. 2016. “Can Wittgenstein Be 
Called a Pragmatist?”. Paradigmi, XXXIV (3): 67-
85. 
Paolucci, Claudio. 2016. “Interpretare e sentire: un 
modello semiotico tra fenomenologia e scienze 
cognitive”. Ermeneutica letteraria, XII: 29-42. 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1992. “Questions Concerning 
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man (1868)”. In The 
Essential Peirce. Edited by Nathan Houser and 
Christian Kloesel, Vol.1 (1867-1893). 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 11-27. 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1992. “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities (1868)”. In The Essential Peirce. 
Edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, 
Vol.1 (1867-1893). Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 28-55. 
Perissinotto, Luigi. 2002. Le vie dell’interpretazione nella 
filosofia contemporanea. Roma-Bari: Laterza. 
Perissinotto, Luigi. 2016. “Concept Formation and Facts 
of Nature in Wittgenstein”. Paradigmi, XXXIV/3: 
11-31. 
Ryder, John. Forthcoming. Making our Way. An Outline 
of a Theory of Experience. 
Sanfelix Vidarte, Vincent. 2017. “Psychologism and the 
Self”. European Journal of Pragmatism and 
American Philosophy, IX/1. 
Shusterman, Richard. 2011. “The Pragmatist Aesthetics 
of William James”. British Journal of Aesthetics, 
51: 347-361. 
Stikkers, Kenneth. 2009. “Dialogue between Pragmatism 
and Constructivism in Historical Perspective”. In 
John Dewey Between Pragmatism and 
Constructivism. Edited by Larry Hickman, Stefan 
Neubert and Kersten Reich. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 67-83. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
  
  
 
 
IMMEDIACY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 
WITTGENSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF LIFE  
AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE “PROBLEMATIC” 
Luigi Perissinotto 
University of Venice Ca’ Foscari 
lperissi@unive.it 
 
Here one can only describe and say: 
 this is what human life is 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough)
1
  
 
ABSTRACT: The paper intends to clarify the use that 
Wittgenstein makes, in various moments and contexts, 
of the adjective “problematic” and of the adjective-used-
as-a-noun “the problematic”, as well as to demonstrate 
that this clarification may teach a lot on the aims and 
spirit of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. 
Particularly, the paper drives at exposing (a) that what 
Wittgenstein names “the disappearing of the 
problematic” is, at one and the same time, his primary 
ethical goal and the main purpose of his philosophic 
method; (b) that referring to this purpose, both ethical 
and philosophical, one can better understand some 
peculiar aspects of his philosophical method, in 
particular his repetitive claim of immediacy, which shall 
be identified with the invitation that covers his entire 
philosophy: “to regard what appears so obviously 
incomplete, as something complete”.  
 
Keywords: Wittgenstein; philosophical method; 
problem; ethics; immediacy 
 
 
Premise 
 
The scholarly literature on Wittgenstein rarely points out 
the use that – at different times and places in his 
writings – he makes of the adjective “problematic” 
(problematisch) and of the adjective-used-as-a-noun 
“the problematic” (das Problematische). In this essay, I 
would like to amend this (partial) inattention,
2
 
particularly believing that a clarification of this use can 
teach a lot, both in general and in detail, on the aims and 
spirit of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. 
More in depth, in the first two sections I would like 
to demonstrate that (1) it is exactly the disappearing of 
the problematic which constitutes the principal aim of 
                                                 
1
 Wittgenstein 1993, 121. 
2
 With regard to the Wittgensteinian notion of 
(philosophical) problem see Kuusela 2008. 
(his) philosophical method, while at the same time the 
disappearing of the problematic is (his) principal ethical 
aim too; an aim that – may one be a professional 
philosopher or not – is fulfilled when one is “in 
agreement with the world” (Wittgenstein 1979, 75; 8 
July 1916),
3
 that is, when one lives what another passage 
of the Notebooks 1914-1916 calls “the life of 
knowledge”;
4
 in the last section I shall show (2) that it is 
precisely this aim (the disappearing of the problematic) 
that may clarify why it is philosophically so important to 
Wittgenstein (a) to reject that “contemptuous attitude
5
 
towards the particular case” which, in his analysis, stems 
from the idea that the particular case is incomplete 
(Wittgenstein 1969a, 18-19) and (b) to renounce – as 
difficult as it may be – all theory in order “to regard what 
appears so obviously incomplete, as something 
complete” (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §723).  
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, if regarded from the 
perspective of its method, contains – we may say or 
maintain synthetically – a kind of peculiar call to 
immediacy: immediate is what we look at as complete, 
although incomplete (“obviously incomplete”) it may 
seem, if considered from the perspective of theory (of 
science or of metaphysics; that is, of philosophy as a 
science). To the scientist or the metaphysicist that 
                                                 
3
 “In order to live happily I must be in agreement with 
the world. And that is what ‘being happy’ means” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 75; 8 July 1916). “I am in agreement 
with the world” means, in the language of religion, “I am 
doing the will of God”. (Wittgenstein 1979, 75).  
4
 “The good conscience is the happiness that the life of 
knowledge preserves. / The life of knowledge is the life 
that is happy in spite of the misery of the world. / The 
only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the 
amenities of the world. / To it the amenities of the world 
are so many graces of fate” (Wittgenstein 1979, 81; 13 
August 1916). The knowledge implied in the expression 
“the life of knowledge” isn’t, evidently, scientific 
knowledge. Let’s recall here that, according to the 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, “[p]hilosophy is not one 
of the natural science”; indeed, “[p]hilosophy is not a 
body of doctrine but an activity” whose aim is “the 
logical clarification of thoughts” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
4.111 and 4.112).  
5
 It is by no means irrelevant that, in order to describe 
the philosophical behaviour he wants to resist, 
Wittgenstein makes use of an adjective 
(“contemptuous”) and a noun (“contempt”), which are 
markedly ethical. 
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affirm: If you don’t complete it, you won’t understand it, 
indeed Wittgenstein wants to reply and induces us to 
rebuke: “If you complete it, you falsify it” (Wittgenstein 
1980a, I, §257). Hence, that of Wittgenstein is not a 
philosophy of immediacy, even though a call to 
immediacy is one means of his philosophical method. 
 
Wittgenstein and the problem of life 
 
As far as our aim is concerned, the first occurrence of 
the adjective “problematic” is in the Notebooks 1914-
1916, more precisely in an annotation of July 6, 1916. In 
this context the adjective “problematic”, referred to life 
and its meaning,
6
 appears in a question that is almost 
the Leitmotiv of many annotations in these difficult 
months of Wittgenstein’s life:
7
 “But is it possible for one 
so to live that life stops being problematic?” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 74).
8
 As becomes clear in the 
subsequent annotation, to ask whether it is possible to 
live as if life ceased to be problematic means for 
Wittgenstein to ask if (and how) it may be possible to 
live “in eternity and not in time” (Wittgenstein 1979, 74). 
However, we ourselves could ask, why a life in time 
should be problematic? And in what respect and what 
for a life in eternity would be any different from a life in 
time? And what does it mean to live in eternity? 
                                                 
6
 In this regard, see also the annotation of June 11, 1916: 
“What do I know about God and the purpose of life? / I 
know that this world exists. / […] / That something about 
it is problematic, which we call its meaning (Sinn)” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 72-73).  
7
 We should keep in mind that already in August 1914, 
that is, at the outbreak of World War I, Wittgenstein 
volunteered in the Austrian–Hungarian army and that 
since then he had actively taken part to the warfare on 
the Eastern front, often in difficult and dangerous 
conditions. With regard to Wittgenstein’s war 
experience and the meaning it may hold see McGuinness 
1988, 204-266.  
8
 It deserves to be noted that this question resonates in 
a famous paragraph of the Philosophical Investigations, 
although this time with regard to philosophy and not to 
life: “The real discovery [in philosophy] is the one […] 
that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question” 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §133).  
The answer between the lines of the Notebooks 
1914-1916 is that someone definitely lives in time, when 
oscillating with regard to the meaning of life, between 
“not anymore” and “not yet”, between nostalgia of a 
supposedly lost meaning and hope of a meaning yet to 
be discovered.
9
 In any case, what appears relevant to 
notice is that the solution to the problem of life – both 
for the one who looks back at the origin and for the one 
that observes the future – is (supposing it is) never in the 
life that we are now living. It may be clear, then, why 
living “in eternity” or living “eternally” are the same to 
Wittgenstein as living “in the present”, of course “[i]f by 
eternity is understood non infinite temporal duration 
but non-temporality” (Wittgenstein 1979, 75); but it may 
even be possible to understand how he could write, in 
an annotation a month earlier, that there is only one 
way to become “independent of the world – and so in a 
certain sense master it – by renouncing any influence on 
happenings (auf die Geschehnisse)” (Wittgenstein 1979, 
73; June 1916).
10
 As a matter of fact, those who try to 
influence the events necessarily live in time; that is, 
between the hope that events shall correspond to their 
desires and that they shall serve to fulfil their projects, 
and the fear that these events may miss the former and 
fail the latter. After all, as pointed out by the Tractatus in 
                                                 
9
 Both nostalgia as well as hope are accompanied by 
fear: the fear of a permanent loss of that sense or the 
fear that sense will never be discovered. It is indeed for 
this reason that “[w]hoever lives in the present lives 
without fear and hope” (Wittgenstein 1979, 76; 14 July 
1916).  
10
 This annotation recalls other annotations which date 
back to the late Summer of 1914 and are now published 
in the so-called Geheimene Tagebücher: “Nur eines ist 
nötig: Alles, was einem geschieht, betrachten”; “Habe 
mir gestern Vorgenommen, keinen Widerstand zu 
leisten”; “Mein Vorhaben der vollkommenen Passivität 
habe ich noch nicht recht ausgeführt”; “Zur 
vollkommenen Passivität habe ich mich noch nicht 
entschlossen” [“Just one thing is necessary: To observe 
everything, that happens to someone”; “Obliged myself 
yesterday, not to make any resistance”; “Did not yet 
carry out my plan of absolute passivity”; “I did not yet 
make up my mind to absolute passivity” ] (Wittgenstein 
1991, annotations of August 25, 26 and 29 and of 
September 6, 1914).  
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IM M E D I A C Y  A S  A  P H I L O S O P H I C A L  M E T H O D  W I T T G E N S T E I N ,  T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  L I F E   
A N D  T H E  D I S A P P E A R A N C E  O F  T H E  “P R O B L E M A T I C”  
L u i g i  P e r i s s i n o t t o  
 
 
 76 
one of its most suggestive passages, “[e]ven if all that we 
wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour 
granted by fate, so to speak” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
6.374).
11
 Desires, one should say, are merely prayers. 
A second occurrence of the adjective “problematic” 
as well as of the adjective-used-as-a-noun “the 
problematic” can be found in a remark now published in 
Culture and Value. The first three paragraphs of this 
remark, dated 27 August 1937, read as follows:  
 
Slept a bit better. Vivid dreams. A bit depressed; 
weather & state of health. / The solution of the 
problem you see in life is a way of living which 
makes what is problematic disappear. / The fact 
that life is problematic means that your life does 
not fit life’s shape (die Form des Lebens). So you 
must change your life, & once it fits the shape, 
what is problematic (das Problematische) will 
disappear (Wittgenstein 2006, 31). 
 
As in the Notebooks 1914-1916, here too Wittgenstein 
deals with the problem of life, 
12
 although the diagnosis 
is – at least partially – different:
13
 in 1916, problematic is 
the life of those who live “in time”; in 1931, problematic 
becomes – so it seems – the life that “does not fit life’s 
shape”. However, there is the same belief that life’s 
problem is not of a scientific or cognitive nature
14
 and 
                                                 
11
 Indeed, Wittgenstein continues saying, “there is no 
logical connexion between the will and the world, which 
could guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion 
itself is surely not something that we could will” 
(Wittgenstein 1974, 6.374). Proposition 6.374 is a 
comment on proposition 6.37: “There is no compulsion 
making one thing happen because another has 
happened. The only necessity that exists is logical 
necessity”.  
12
 Obviously the circumstances differed a lot. In 1931 
Wittgenstein was in Cambridge with a fellowship, thus in 
a condition which – at least at an outward look – was 
very different from the one he found himself in 1916. 
With regard to this period of Wittgenstein’s life, see 
Monk 1991, 255-280. 
13
 Even the formulation is slightly different: “the problem 
of life” becomes here “the problem you see in life”.  
14
 “It is certainly not the solution of any problems of 
natural science that is required” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
6.4312). “The facts all contribute only to setting the 
problem, not to its solution” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
6.4321). 
the certainty that its solution does not depend on a 
major or better knowledge of facts, be they physical, 
biological, psychological, historical etc. Hence, life is not 
a problem because we still don’t know enough or 
because we ignore many things yet, about ourselves, 
nature, history etc. Indeed, as can be found in the 
Tractatus, “[h]ow things are in the world is a matter of 
complete indifference for what is higher” (Wittgenstein 
1974, 6.432).
15
 It is thus by no means a chance that in 
these annotations of 1931 Wittgenstein reiterates – 
almost to the letter – what he maintained already in the 
Notebooks 1914-1916 (Wittgenstein 1979, 74) and later 
in the Tractatus, that is that “[t]he solution of the 
problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this 
problem” (Wittgenstein 1974, 6.521).
16
  
One still needs to ask, though, how life should 
change according to Wittgenstein in order for the 
problematic to disappear. At a first glance we may think 
he is recalling – in a slightly Platonic or Platonist manner 
– a sort of conflict between ideal and real, as if he 
intended that such a life is problematic, which is not how 
it should be and, thus, is not entirely or in its deepest 
sense life. However, there are various reasons to hold 
this interpretation implausible. Primarily the reason is 
the divide between ideal and real, as with other divides – 
for instance the one between interior and exterior
17
 – 
always was a main critical target of Wittgenstein. 
Coherently, according to this stance, we shouldn’t say 
life is a problem since it doesn’t correspond to its ideal, 
but rather that those who live life as a problem produce 
                                                 
15
 The continuation of proposition 6.432 (“God does not 
reveal himself in the world”) suggests one should 
consider “what is higher” (das Höhere) and “God” as 
synonyms; however, we must not forget that in the 
Notebooks 1914-1916 Wittgenstein wrote “The meaning 
of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 73; 11 June 1916).  
16
 “Is not this the reason – observes Wittgenstein in 
brackets – why those who have found after a long period 
of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them 
have then been unable to say what constituted that 
sense?” (Wittgenstein 1974, 6.521).  
17
 On Wittgenstein’s attitude toward the inner-outer 
divide see, for instance, ter Hark 2001. 
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– so to speak – the split between real and ideal. Even 
disguised as a discovery or vision, here the ideal is 
nothing but a need or requirement generated by our 
own dissatisfaction towards life; and this dissatisfaction 
eventually and simply grows, as Wittgenstein clearly 
demonstrates in the Philosophical Investigations, when 
addressing that conviction that logic has to do with an 
ideal language “supposed to be something pure and 
clear-cut”, instead of our actual language. (Wittgenstein 
2009, I, §105). Here he writes, thinking also but not 
exclusively of the Tractatus: 
 
The more closely we examine actual language, 
the greater becomes the conflict between it and 
our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of 
logic was, of course, not something I had 
discovered: it was a requirement). The conflict 
becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in 
danger of becoming vacuous” (Wittgenstein 
2009, I, §107).
18
  
 
The life which, through change, fits its shape cannot thus 
be the life which is finally in accordance with the ideal, 
but the life that – so to speak – is in accordance with 
itself; that is, the life which again according to the 
Notebooks 1914-1916 “no longer needs to have any 
purpose except to live” (Wittgenstein 1979, 73; 6 July 
1916). 
With regard to life as well as to language, hence, 
Platonism with its divide between ideal and real is but a 
symptom, perhaps even a cause of the problem, and 
hardly ever (only) the beginning of the solution. It is by 
no means a chance that Wittgenstein thought precisely 
of Socrates when he was trying to understand why; in 
the years of the Tractatus, in addressing the problems of 
logic he was experiencing what Russell felt (as he often 
did in their conversations) when exclaiming “Logic’s 
hell’”, “namely their immense difficulty. Their hardness – 
                                                 
18
 The paragraph continues as follows: "We have got on 
to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a 
certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to 
walk; so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!" 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §107). 
their hard & slippery texture” (Wittgenstein 2006, 35; 1 
October 1937). Wittgenstein seemingly maintains that at 
the origin of their mutual experience was the fact “that 
each new phenomenon of language that they might 
retrospectively think of could show their earlier 
explanation to be unworkable” (Wittgenstein 2006, 35). 
This is precisely the moment when Socrates comes in. 
 
But that – he writes – is the difficulty Socrates 
gets caught up when he tries to give the 
definition of a concept. Again and again an 
application of word emerges that seems not to 
be compatible with the concept to which other 
application have led us. We say but that isn’t 
how it is! – it is like that though! – & all we can 
do is keep repeating these antitheses” 
(Wittgenstein 2006, 35). 
 
It isn’t difficult to imagine the reader’s objections at the 
first few paragraphs of the annotations dated August 27, 
1937, which are being scrutinised. One could object, for 
instance, that the life from which the problematic 
eventually disappears is the life that settles for how it 
always lived or the life of whom, instead of living, is 
being lived. According to political language, this person 
would be a conservative bourgeois; someone who 
substituted “status” with “life” and of whom could be 
said what Wittgenstein observed on Frank Ramsey; that 
is, “[t]he idea that this state might not be the only 
possible one partly disquieted him and partly bored him” 
(Wittgenstein 2006, 24).
19
 Wittgenstein was absolutely 
conscious of this possible or even very predictable 
reaction; a reaction he was not insensitive to, as the two 
questions following the aforementioned paragraphs 
demonstrate: 
 
                                                 
19
 Wittgenstein begins this annotation on November 11, 
1931, defining Ramsey “a bourgeois thinker” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 24). The topic of the relationship 
and reciprocal influence between Ramsey and 
Wittgenstein is such an interesting one, as much as it is a 
complex one which, in any case, goes far beyond our 
brief quote, further involving the more general question 
of Wittgenstein’s relationship to pragmatism. Many 
useful indications may now be found in Misak 2016.  
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IM M E D I A C Y  A S  A  P H I L O S O P H I C A L  M E T H O D  W I T T G E N S T E I N ,  T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  L I F E   
A N D  T H E  D I S A P P E A R A N C E  O F  T H E  “P R O B L E M A T I C”  
L u i g i  P e r i s s i n o t t o  
 
 
 78 
But don’t we have the feeling that someone who 
doesn’t see a problem there [in his or her life] is 
blind to something important, indeed to what is 
most important of all? / Wouldn’t I like to say he 
is living aimlessly – just blindly like a mole as it 
were; & if he could only see, he would see the 
problem? (Wittgenstein 2006, 31).  
 
In reading this passage, it almost appears there is no 
alternative between seeing the problem and living 
“blindly like a mole”. Hence, since no one fancies to be 
blind like a mole, it seems we must accept living life like 
a problem. With due caution,
20
 Wittgenstein attempts 
though to offer an escape that consists in distinguishing 
between two modes of experimenting the problem of 
life; he observes that it can be lived “as sorrow”, as a 
sort of “murky background”, that is “as a problem”, but 
that some may even live it “as joy”, that is “as a bright 
halo round his life”. Only one who “lives rightly”, 
Wittgenstein suggests, experiments the problem as joy 
and, thus, “not after all as a problem” (Wittgenstein 
2006, 31).  
The fact that life is a problem doesn’t implicate that 
it shall also be that it is a problem that life is a problem. 
The problem of life, one could say, is a first order 
problem that needs to be separated from that second 
order problem, which is the problem that life is a 
problem. Only those who are capable to do this – that is, 
not to live as if the problem of life was a problem – live 
the problem as joy, meaning they live it as a part of life 
and not as sorrow, not as something that brings life itself 
into in question.
21
  
An annotation that follows slightly after may help us 
to focus better the point, when Wittgenstein observes 
that today’s situation is such “that ordinary common 
sense no longer suffices to meet the strange demands 
life makes”. Indeed, while in the past (for instance in 
traditional societies) it sufficed “to be able to play the 
game well”, today “the question is again and again: what 
                                                 
20
 This last paragraph begins, in fact, with a cautious “Or 
shouldn’t I say” (Wittgenstein 2006, 31).  
21
 For this formulation, see the passage of the 
Philosophical Investigations quoted in footnote 8.  
sort of game is to be played now anyway?” 
(Wittgenstein 2006, 31). This is the problem we have 
now; living this problem as joy means thus living it as a 
part of the life we are living, acknowledging there is no 
way to live this life and, together, deny the question: 
“what sort of game is to be played now anyway?”. One 
could say that those who live this problem as joy accept 
life and, thus, accept its problem, while those who live it 
as sorrow find in this problem something besetting and 
threatening, like “a murky background”. In a language 
reminiscent of Nietzsche, we could say that the first ones 
say yes to life, while the second ones say no instead. Or 
less emphatically, that one thing are the problems in life 
and another one is life as a problem. 
 
From the problem of life to the method of philosophy 
 
What connects though these observations of 
Wittgenstein on the problem of life to the way of 
intending and practising philosophy? A first hint can be 
found in an annotation of June 29, 1930, which was also 
collected in Culture and Value. The annotation is made 
of two long sentences, the first one being very similar in 
tone and content to the previously scrutinised remarks. 
This is what they maintain, in fact: 
 
If anyone should think he has solved the problem 
of life & feels like telling himself everything is 
quite easy now, he need only tell himself, in order 
to see that he is wrong, that there was a time 
when “this” solution had not been discovered; but 
it must have been possible to live then too & the 
solution which has now been discovered appears 
in relation to how things were then like an 
accident (Wittgenstein 2006, 6).  
 
Here Wittgenstein dispenses a sort of test to anyone 
who thinks he or she eventually found the solution to 
the problem of life; a test that can be easily explained 
with an example. Indeed, we could compare the solution 
to the problem of life to the invention of the car. 
Obviously, before the car was invented, humans did not 
travel by car, although they travelled over lands and sea, 
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and they surely lived before the supposed solution to 
the problem of life was discovered. This demonstrates 
that maintaining that one really lives only once the 
discovery is made, is like asserting that humans really 
travelled only after the car was invented and that before 
their travelling wasn’t a real travel. To whom should 
anyway say so, in fact, it could be pointed out that – as 
far as travelling in the past is concerned – the invention 
of the car appears “like an accident”. In conclusion, in 
order to travel, humans did not wait for the invention of 
the car, although this invention affected and even deeply 
changed their way of travelling. 
I dare say, in Wittgenstein’s eyes those who believe 
they have solved the problem of life are essentially – 
perhaps even unaware – Platonists that reject into 
appearance all life before this discovery and believe that 
they can say anyone who lived before this discovery 
didn’t live or did so only in appearance. 
Then, in the second sentence of this annotation, 
Wittgenstein extends these considerations to logic (to 
philosophy) observing that what he said on the problem 
of life is true even for the idea that there is a “solution to 
the problems of logic (philosophy)” or, to put it 
differently, for the idea that logical (philosophical) 
problems were identical or, at least, similar to those of 
science:  
 
And it is the same for us in logic too. If there were 
a “solution to a problems of logic (philosophy)” we 
should only have to caution ourselves that there 
was a time when they had not been solved (and 
then too it must have been possible to live and 
think) – (Wittgenstein 2006, 6).  
 
Here Wittgenstein is expressing a belief that animates 
his philosophising, from the beginning to the end. For 
instance, in the Philosophical Remarks written in the 
same period there is a passage in which clearly this spirit 
shines through: 
 
 
How strange if logic were concerned with an 
‘ideal’ language and not with ours. / […] Logical 
analysis is the analysis of something we have, 
not of something we don’t have. Therefore it is 
the analysis of propositions as they stand. (It 
would be odd if the human race had been 
speaking all this time without even putting 
together a genuine proposition.) (Wittgenstein 
1975, §3).
22
  
 
Let’s reiterate: the solution to a logical (philosophical) 
problem is not like a scientific discovery or invention. 
Surely, only after the invention of the telephone one 
could communicate to a friend in New York, while being 
at home in Milan; however, we definitely don’t have to 
wait until all problems of logic are solved to finally put a 
genuine proposition together. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that the Philosophical Investigations maintain 
“[t]he name ‘philosophy’ might […] be given to what is 
possible before all new discoveries and inventions” 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §126). 
The last occurrence of the expression “das 
Problematische” that we will analyse is to be found, in 
fact, in the Philosophical Investigations and it belongs to 
an observation not explicitly pertaining to the problem 
of life, but directly to the question of the philosophical 
method. Here it is: 
 
Don’t take it as a matter of course, but as a 
remarkable fact, that pictures and fictitious 
narratives give us pleasure, absorb us. / (“Don’t 
take it as a matter of course”—that means: 
puzzle over this [Wundere dich darüber], as you 
do over some other things which disturb you. 
Then what is problematic [das Problematische] 
will disappear, by your accepting the one fact as 
you do the other.) (Wittgenstein 2009, I, §524). 
 
 
                                                 
22
 In turn, this passage refers to one of the most famous 
propositions of the Tractatus: “In fact, all the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they 
stand, are in perfect logical order. – That utterly simple 
thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness 
of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety. / (Our 
problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most 
concrete that there are.)” (Wittgenstein 1974, 5.5563).  
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Here, taking for instance the fact that pictures (o 
fictitious narratives) give us pleasure and absorb us, 
Wittgenstein is showing two possible attitudes as 
regards facts and invites us to take a stance for the 
second one: “Don’t take it as… but as…”. The first 
attitude consists in taking “as a matter of course” the 
fact that pictures (or fictitious narratives) give us 
pleasure or absorb us. Indeed, who would ever deny 
this?. Don’t we perhaps feel pleasure admiring the View 
of Delft by Johann Vermeer? Or are we not absorbed by 
reading the Great Expectations of Charles Dickens? That 
it is so or that this happens, thus, is no problem; the true 
problem – one might be tempted to say – is why it is so 
or why this happens and (in case) which science may 
give us a convincing explanation: psychology, most 
recent neurosciences or perhaps sociology? What really 
interests here, it seems, is not the fact that pictures give 
us pleasure, but rather why they do, as if in the absence 
of an explanation that pleasure was – so to speak – 
suspended over the void. Here “why?” prevails over 
“that”, so much so that Wittgenstein is led to compare 
those who always ask “why?” to those “tourists, who 
stand in front of building, reading Baedeker [a famous 
German tourist guide], & through reading about the 
history of the building’s construction etc. etc. are 
prevented from seeing it” (Wittgenstein 2006, 46).
23
  
Of course asking “why?” and attempting to answer is 
not wrong in itself. After all, seeking an explanation, 
making a hypothesis and elaborating a theory are a 
constitutional part of that scientific behaviour, which – 
taken as such – Wittgenstein has nothing to blame for. 
What he criticises, in case, is the assumption that this is 
the only legitimate mode to look at facts; and in 
particular the belief that a fact ceases to be 
“remarkable” or “astounding” once it is explained 
scientifically: 
 
 
                                                 
23
 In this regard, see Genova 1995, 65.  
As though today [that is, in a time when we have 
a scientific explanation with regard to lightening] 
lightning were more commonplace or less 
astounding than 2000 years ago (Wittgenstein 
2006, 7).  
 
In any case, it is part of Wittgenstein’s method to induce 
(or persuade) us to consider those facts remarkable, 
which we usually don’t see, either because we take them 
as a matter of course or because we are so occupied 
with explaining them. It is as if, for instance, in wishing 
to explain why pictures give us pleasure, we forgot about 
the fact – taken as obvious or irrelevant – that pictures 
give us pleasure. For this reason, he insistently calls to 
look and surprise oneself: “Let yourself be struck by…”,
24
 
“To repeat: don’t think, but look!” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, 
§66a); and hence suppress this way – at least when 
philosophising – the question “Why?”, convinced as he 
was that “[o]ften it is only when we suppress the 
question ‘Why?’ that we become aware of those 
important facts, which then, in the course of our 
investigation, lead to an answer” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, 
§471). 
It should be noted anyway that Wittgenstein doesn’t 
mean we should leave things unanswered, nor is he 
taking ignorance for the philosopher’s virtue.
25
 This 
would make the philosopher plainly – and sadly – a non-
scientist. The philosopher’s task is rather subtracting 
facts – particularly those he calls “facts of living” 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §630) – from the obviousness 
that conceals them, but without for this reason 
delivering them straight away to that other form of 
concealing that is – for Wittgenstein – the scientific 
explanation. 
Furthermore, it isn’t at all easy to recognise facts, 
such as the often mentioned fact that pictures give us 
pleasure. On the contrary, it is a matter of investigating, 
closely and in detail, the concept of pleasure that is at 
                                                 
24
 “Let yourself be struck by the existence of a such a 
thing as our language-game of confessing the motive of 
my action” (Wittgenstein 2009, II, xi, §334). 
25
 As appears to think Fogelin 1987, 209-210. 
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work here, asking ourselves, for example, what place it 
occupies and how it is incorporated “in all of the 
situations and reactions which constitute human life” 
(Wittgenstein 1980b: II, §16), but also whether it refers 
exclusively to phenomena of human life.
26
 For example, 
what would we say about a puppy that wags its tail in 
front of Vermeer's View of Delft: does it take pleasure? If 
not, why not? Or if so, why so? Or would we say it most 
certainly takes pleasure, but not in the picture. And does 
“in front of” have the same meaning in “the puppy is in 
front of the View of Delft” and in “my friend Paul is in 
front of the View of Delft”? And when Paul tells me 
about the pleasure Vermeer's picture gave him, is he 
using the same concept as when he tells me about his 
pleasure during a swim in the open sea? How can I 
decide? Where should I look? Or should I ask Paul 
himself? Hence, while it is true that the facts of living are 
“[w]hat has to be accepted” or they are – as one could 
also say – “the given” (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §630), it is 
also true that, in order to accept them, it is necessary to 
know how to see them, since they are “hidden because 
of their simplicity and familiarity” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, 
§129).
27
 
 
Completeness and incompleteness  
 
In the Blue Book Wittgenstein devotes a few pages to 
what he calls “our craving for generality” (Wittgenstein 
1969a, 17)
28
 that coincides with what could be also 
named “the contemptuous attitude towards the 
                                                 
26
 “‘Human beings think, grasshoppers don’t.’ This 
means something like: the concept 'thinking' refers to 
human life, not to that of grasshoppers" (Wittgenstein 
1980, II, §23). 
27
 Wittgenstein adds in the same paragraph that “we fail 
to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and 
most powerful” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, §129).  
28
 According to Wittgenstein, among the main sources of 
our craving for generality there is “our preoccupation with 
the method of science […] the method of reducing the 
explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest 
possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in 
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics 
by using a generalization” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 18).  
particular case” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 18); which, as we 
already recalled in the premise, “springs from the idea 
that it [the particular or special or less general case] is 
incomplete” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 19).  
The example he uses to depict this point is 
particularly effective. Let’s consider a treatise on 
pomology. Of such a treatise we can say that it is 
incomplete, if it doesn’t mention this or that type of 
apple; for instance, if it doesn’t mention the fruits of the 
European crab apple (Malus sylvestris).
29
 In the case of a 
treatise on pomology, thus, “we have a standard of 
completeness in nature” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 19). But 
let’s consider now the game of chess and compare it 
with two very similar games: one without pawns and the 
other one with more pieces. Would we be inclined to 
maintain that the first game is an incomplete game (with 
regard to our game) or that the second one is a more 
complete game (than ours)? A game without pawns is 
perhaps like a treatise on pomology that doesn’t 
mention the fruits of the Malus sylvestris? Obviously we 
could always affirm that only the game of chess with 
pawns is complete; and that the first one (that without 
pawns) is incomplete and the second one (that with 
more pieces) is redundant, but we may do this only to 
reiterate that this is our game (the game we are playing 
or that we want to play); or to invoke an ideal of 
completeness that appears clear only because or until it 
is left unexpressed. 
As a matter of fact, why should a game without 
pawns be considered incomplete? Or why would the 
addition of pawns render it complete, making it a game 
eventually? Surely, the game without pawns could be 
treated like an easier game or a more primitive one than 
ours, maybe because there are less pieces to be put on 
the board or perhaps since we noticed it is usually 
quicker to learn how to play. In any case, that game 
without pawns – be it simpler or more primitive than 
ours – “bears no mark of incompleteness” (Wittgenstein 
                                                 
29
 The example of the fruits of Malus sylvestris is mine. 
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1969, 19).
30
 If it is played, it is by all means a game, even 
if it isn’t our game. 
The key point of Wittgenstein’s considerations could 
here be expressed as follows: to say that it isn’t our 
game is not the same as saying that it isn’t yet (or 
completely) a game; or otherwise: that the presence of 
pawns in our game doesn’t make a game without pawn a 
“not–yet–a–game” or an incomplete game. The only 
concession could be that, given the two games, it is very 
likely we might chose the one with pawns. Anyway, the 
game without pawns is so little incomplete as much as 
was our language “before the symbolism of chemistry 
and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were 
incorporated in to it” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, §18); or, 
consequently, so little as much as our actual language 
is.
31
  
“To regard what appears so obviously incomplete, as 
something complete” (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §723), is 
far from easy, as Wittgenstein explains well in an 
annotation from the previously quoted Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology:  
 
[O]ne believes that one needs to fill out the facts 
in order to understand them. It is as if one saw a 
screen with scattered colour-patches, and said: 
the way they are here, that are unintelligible; 
they only make sense when one completes them 
into a shape. – Whereas I want to say: Here is 
the whole. (If you complete it, you falsify it.) 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §257).  
  
Wittgenstein’s variations on this point are a lot and of 
particular interest. For instance, he shows to think it 
little fruitful to look at the “feeble-minded” as to 
incomplete or lacking humans, as becomes clear in a 
                                                 
30
 Here Wittgenstein is thinking especially about the 
tendency “to talk of arithmetic as something special as 
opposed to something more general. Cardinal arithmetic 
bears no mark of incompleteness; nor does an arithmetic 
which is cardinal and finite” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 19).  
31
 Would you be ready to say that our language is 
incomplete, because we surely cannot rule out the 
possibility that in the future new symbolisms and 
calculations may be included? 
little quoted passage, which could well stimulate 
psychologists and psychiatrists: 
 
The feeble-minded are pictured in our 
imagination as degenerate, essentially 
incomplete, as it were in rags. Thus as in a state 
of disorder, rather than more primitive order 
(which would be a far more fruitful way of 
looking at them.) (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §646). 
 
However, he also seems to hold it as misleading or little 
fruitful to look at animals not as animals, but as non–
humans; or as beings that bare in them a mark of 
incompleteness and that will never become humans. Of 
particular interest are in this regard a series of questions 
on children, cats and squirrels, which appear in On 
Certainty:  
 
Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it 
know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a 
mouse exists? (Wittgenstein 1969b, §478).  
 
What Wittgenstein wants to reckon is that it is 
meaningless to maintain that, when it is hungry, the 
child tends towards the maternal breast, because he 
believes or knows that milk exists; the like it makes no 
sense saying the cat hunts the mouse, because the 
thinks or knows the mouse exists; above all, however, he 
wants us to ask, why we are tempted to add that 
“because he believes or knows” and why we are not 
satisfied to ascertain that cats hunt mice and children 
suck milk. Here, though, some may rebut saying that 
matters simply are as follows: children and cats don’t 
know, in fact they are children and cats; the former 
aren’t human yet and the latter never will. Only humans 
(speak adults) know, while children don’t know yet and 
animals will never know: the child sucks milk “without 
thinking” the same as the cat hunts the mouse “without 
thinking”. Wittgenstein’s answer goes that many human 
behaviours – those he calls in fact “instinctive”, “natural” 
or “primitive” (Wittgenstein 1967, §545), – are not 
different from the child’s behaviour who (naturally) 
sucks the maternal milk or from that of the cat which 
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(naturally) hunts the mouse or from that of the squirrel 
which (naturally) hoards food in the Summer it will need 
during the Winter. As “[t]he squirrel does not infer by 
induction that it is going to need stores next winter as 
well”, the like “no more we need a law of induction to 
justify our actions or our predictions” (Wittgenstein 
1969b, §287). In this sense, we are like children, cats and 
squirrels when, for instance, we attempt “without 
thinking” to aid someone hurt:  
 
[I]t is a primitive reaction to take care of, to 
treat, the place that hurts when someone else is 
in pain, and not merely when one is so oneself” 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §915).  
  
An example used by Wittgenstein at least twice, that of 
art and of the Egyptian style, may help us understand 
better what really is at stake here.
32
 Wittgenstein starts 
by observing that we could easily assume the 
prospective representation of humans and of other 
things is correct when “compared with [the] Egyptian 
way of drawing them” (Wittgenstein 1993, 387); and we 
could thus be tempted to conclude that Egyptian art is 
incomplete precisely because it lacks – as became 
evident after the Renaissance invention of prospective – 
the perspective. But would we be right to draw to such a 
conclusion? In order to understand why Wittgenstein’s 
reply is negative, one may further articulate his example 
by comparison with other four cases: an Egyptian 
painting, one by Paolo Uccello, a Cubist work, a drawing 
by an art novice. In the case of Paolo Uccello’s painting 
we may maintain it is fully (perhaps obsessively) 
perspectival; of the novice’s drawing we could say, at a 
glance, that the rules of perspective were not applied 
                                                 
32
 They are the examples on the Egyptian style in the 
Philosophical Investigations: “Compare a concept with a 
style of painting. For is even our style of painting 
arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The 
Egyptian, for instance.) Or is it just a matter of pretty and 
ugly?” (Wittgenstein 2009, II, xii, §367) and in the 
annotations of the years 1937-1938 published with the 
title Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness (Wittgenstein 
1993, 387). 
correctly, while the Cubist work we may affirm did 
deliberately break them. But what should we say of the 
Egyptian painting? As a matter of fact, it appears we 
cannot say anything of what we said respectively of 
Paolo Uccello’s painting, the Cubist work and the 
novice’s drawing. Indeed, Egyptian artists did neither 
apply nor not-apply nor apply in an incorrect way the 
rules of perspective, because perspective was no option 
for that painting style. To blame Egyptian art for lacking 
the perspective is, thus, like reproaching a checkers 
player because she didn’t checkmate the king. 
Still, someone may insist that it is provable that 
Egyptian art is lacking something, that is, by the fact that 
in front of Egyptian paintings we can easily ascertain that 
“after all, people don’t really look like that” 
(Wittgenstein 1993, 287). This would prove we have 
here, nevertheless, a standard “in nature” (remember 
Wittgenstein 1969a, 19). A painting without the 
perspective thus wouldn’t be like a chess game without 
pawns, but rather as a treatise or pomology without the 
European crab apples. According to Wittgenstein, 
however, this cannot at all “count as an argument” as his 
query which concludes this annotation demonstrates: 
“Who says I want people on paper to look the way they 
do in reality?” (Wittgenstein 1987, 387). As is obvious, 
the answer goes that no one is saying this, neither the 
nature of art nor human nature. Hence, why should we 
say this to the Egyptians (and with which right and what 
for)? 
However, we may go on asking, don’t we risk thus 
forgetting what Wittgenstein himself recalled in a 
famous passage of the Philosophical Investigations, 
when he observes that, while it surely happens that 
“new types of language, new language-games, as we 
may say, come into existence”, it also happens that 
“other become obsolete and get forgotten” 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §23)? At least in some cases, 
shouldn’t we be able to say, in fact, that if a game was 
forgotten this happened because it was finally 
discovered it wasn’t a game, for instance because its 
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rules contained a contradiction? Wittgenstein’s mode of 
responding to these questions and puzzlements can be 
illustrated by means of an example from the Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics. Let’s thus imagine a 
game that “is such that whoever begins can always win 
by a particular simple trick”. No one did however notice 
his fact; hence we can say it is a game: it is played and 
anyone who plays tries to win. But “[n]ow someone 
draws our attention to it [the trick it contains]; — and it 
stops being a game”. (Wittgenstein 1978, III, §77). This 
conclusion, as Wittgenstein immediately acknowledges, 
is ambiguous though; indeed, he promptly asks how he 
should turn things around, “to make it clear to myself”. 
As a matter of fact, one may think that, by revealing 
the trick, we discover that what we have been playing 
was not a game at all (it seemed to be a game, but it 
actually wasn't) and that therefore, and properly 
speaking, up to now we have not been playing. But this 
isn’t exactly what Wittgenstein really wants to say: “I 
want to say: ‘and it stops being a game’ — not: ‘and we 
now see that it wasn’t a game’ (Wittgenstein 1978, III, 
§77).
 33
 What I can do, once the trick has been revealed, 
is alter the game so that, when playing, it may be 
possible to win or lose, because if one couldn’t lose, the 
game would miss its point which is winning. However, 
nothing that happens now can make the things that 
previously happened not happen: if one played, trick or 
not, one did play. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 However, we could even imagine that it continues to 
be a game for some. For example, once the trick has 
been discovered someone could react this way: “What a 
great game! And so relaxing! Everyone has the certainty 
that, when it's their turn to begin, they'll win.” 
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ABSTRACT: Though Wittgenstein conceived of forms of life 
as the given that has to be accepted, his analyses are not 
what we might expect: they are not descriptions of 
empirical facts. On the contrary, they are grammatical 
investigations, primarily concerned with the normative 
dimension of our concepts. In this paper I elaborate on 
the notion of the given, trying to show that it includes 
linguistic habits characterized by the immediacy (or 
blindness) of rule following. This allows the philosopher 
to conceive of language-acquired habits as "having 
become nature to us", thus as a constitutive part of the 
given, without eliminating the normative dimension of 
linguistic habits by reducing them to non-linguistic 
entities, whether physical or mental. The last point 
highlights the difference between Wittgenstein’s and 
William James's conception of the role of experience 
(Erlebnis) in concept formation. 
 
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein; forms of life; habit; 
second nature; William James 
 
 
Preface 
 
In this paper, I will be dealing with Wittgenstein’s views 
on the unmediated nature of habit (or of some habits). I 
will try to show how such views affect his conception of 
the given (das Gegebene) as presented in the second 
part of the Philosophical Investigations, e.g. where he 
states that “What has to be accepted, the given, is – one 
might say – forms of life.” (PPF, §345)
1
 This will require 
some preliminary reflections on the notion of a form of 
life. Wittgenstein scholars know that much ink has been 
spilled on the issue of forms of life; I myself have been 
dealing with it on several occasions (e.g. Andronico 
1998). Thus, what I am going to say will not appear 
entirely new. However, I hope it will help to throw some 
light on a vaguely circumscribed notion, which has been 
misunderstood in several ways (though most often in a 
foundationalist way, be it of a naturalistic or of a 
transcendentalist bent).  
                                                 
1
 For abbreviations of titles of Wittgenstein’s works, see 
the Bibliography. 
Forms of life 
 
In the Philosophical Investigations, the phrase form of 
life occurs five times: twice at the beginning (§19 and 
§23), then about midway in the First Part (§241), then 
twice in the Second Part, that is in PPF, §1 and §345. The 
phrase occurs less than 10 times in the whole 
Wittgensteinian corpus. Therefore, one might be led to 
think that this is a somewhat marginal notion, surely not 
as crucial as the repeatedly employed notion of a 
language game. Not so. The first two occurrences belong 
in a sequence of remarks that appear to have a 
programmatic tone: in other words, these are remarks 
by which Wittgenstein introduces the object of his 
reflections, the tools he is going to employ in carrying 
them out, some aspects of the methods he will adopt, 
and some indications concerning the results he hopes to 
achieve. Synthetically, and not without some 
simplification: the object consists of language and the 
activities into which it is woven (PI, §7), or again, 
language understood as a “spatial and temporal 
phenomenon” (PI, §108); the tools are language games 
(PI, §§130-131); methods include the comparative 
method (PI, §130 and §132) as well as the imaginative 
method (PI, §19); the result the philosopher aims to 
achieve is a perspicuous, or clear presentation of the 
state of language (PI, §122), which engenders a 
therapeutic effect, i.e. the dissolution of some 
(individual) philosophical problem and the fading out of 
philosophical disquiet (PI, §124 and, most of all, §133). 
Within such programmatic context, the phrase ‘form of 
life’ shows up to characterize both the object of inquiry 
and the imaginative side of the comparative method: in 
PI, §23, Wittgenstein points out that “The word 
‘language-game’ is used here to emphasize the fact that 
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a 
form of life”, while in PI, §19 he states that “…to imagine 
a language means to imagine a form of life”. 
Again in PI, §23, Wittgenstein explicitly brings in the 
plurality of language games alongside the connection of 
language game and form of life: there is a multiplicity of 
language games, as well as “countless kinds of use of the 
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things we call ‘signs’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this 
diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but 
new types of language, new language-games, as we may 
say, come into existence and others become obsolete 
and get forgotten”. As there are many language games, 
and as “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or 
of a form of life” (Ibid.) to the point that imagining a 
language game amounts to imagining a form of life, we 
can conclude that the notion of a form of life must also 
be understood in the plural: a multiplicity of activities, or 
forms of life, corresponds to the multiplicity of language 
games. 
In general, we can say that when Wittgenstein 
introduces the notion of a form of life in the 
Investigations, he is explicitly presenting the 
anthropological point of view from which he will be 
carrying out his research on language from the 1930s on; 
or rather, his research on the meaning of some linguistic 
expressions. For his research persists in being, in the first 
place, semantic in nature. By taking up the 
anthropological stance, Wittgenstein is forever forsaking 
the viewpoint and style of analysis that had 
characterized Tractatus logico-philosophicus, where, in 
his own words, language had been seen as “a formal 
unity” (PI, §108), or as “a non-spatial, atemporal non-
entity” (PI, §108). That stance consists in looking at the 
meaning of a linguistic expression taking into account, in 
addition to the linguistic context of its occurrence, the 
overall circumstances of its use, including, beside acts of 
language, the material and non-material circumstances 
in which they take place. It is as if Wittgenstein intended 
to give prominence to the fact that human life goes on 
with language and that people live in language: 
“Language – he points out in the Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics – relates to a way of living” 
(RFM, VI §34); our concepts, which take form and body 
in language, “correspond to a particular way of dealing 
with situations” (RFM, VII §67). In the Investigations, just 
next to §23, the anthropological stance is clearly 
presented in §25: 
 
It is sometimes said: animals do not talk because 
they lack the mental abilities. And this means: 
“They do not think, and that is why they do not 
talk.” But - they simply do not talk. Or better: 
they do not use language - if we disregard the 
most primitive forms of language. - Giving 
orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a 
chat, are as much a part of our natural history as 
walking, eating, drinking, playing. (PI, §25) 
 
That language is part of our natural history means that it 
is integral to the human species-specific endowment; 
but it also means that its workings and the practice of it 
are made possible by facts that involve both non-human 
nature and certain features of our psychophysical 
constitution. Thus, Wittgenstein’s writings contain many 
remarks about the relation between language and 
natural history, both human and non-human, i.e. 
features of our natural environment. For example, “if 
our memory functioned differently, we could not 
calculate as we do” (RFM, IV §24); or again, “If we only 
saw one of our primary colours, red say, extremely 
seldom and only in tiny expanses, if we could not 
prepare colours for painting, if red occurred only in 
particular connections with other colours, say at the very 
tips of leaves of certain trees, these tips gradually 
changing from green to red in the autumn, then nothing 
would be more natural than to call red a degenerate 
green” (RPP, I §47), in other words, we would possess a 
different concept of red: not of a primary color. Similarly, 
“if our footrules were made of very soft rubber instead 
of wood and steel … we should not get... that 
measurement which we get with our rigid rulers. [...] It 
can be said: What is here called ‘measuring’ and ‘length’ 
and ‘equal length’, is something different from what we 
call those things.” (RFM, I §5). Such remarks seem to 
suggest that “It is as if our concepts involved a 
scaffolding of facts” (RPP, II §392 – Z §350). However, 
this formulation is in quotes, as if Wittgenstein were not 
entirely happy with it. Instead, he chooses to describe 
his interest in the connection of language, concepts, and 
facts of nature by the following words: “What we are 
supplying are really remarks on the natural history of 
man: not curiosities however, but rather observations on 
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facts which no one has doubted and which have only 
gone unremarked because they are always before our 
eyes” (RFM, I §142).
2
 Indeed, Wittgenstein's 
anthropological stance and interest in forms of life, as 
described so far, can easily lead us to believe that he was 
after the natural causes of our use of language, or even 
that he meant to ground the latter in the former (in its 
“basis in nature”). Such was not his intention. In fact, on 
several occasions he appears to be aware of (and 
worried by) the possibility that his inquiry may look like 
natural science in disguise: 
 
If we can find a ground for the structures of 
concepts among the facts of nature 
(psychological and physical), then isn’t the 
description of the structures of our concepts 
really disguised natural science; ought we not in 
that case to concern ourselves not with 
grammar, but with what lies at the bottom of 
grammar in nature? (RPP, I §46) 
 
and his answer is: 
 
Indeed the correspondence between our 
grammar and general (seldom mentioned) facts 
of nature does concern us. But our interest does 
not fall back on these possible causes. We are 
not pursuing a natural science; our aim is not to 
predict anything. Nor natural history either, for 
we invent facts of natural history for our own 
purposes. (RPP, I §46; Cf. PPF xii §365 and §366)  
 
In order better to understand Wittgenstein’s worry, let 
me emphasize from the beginning a peculiarity of his 
philosophical approach, namely that the anthropological 
stance does not in any way override interest in 
grammar. ‘Grammar’ is here used equivocally for both 
the set of rules that govern the several uses of language 
and the remarks and descriptions the philosopher 
produces concerning such rules. Mentions of facts of 
                                                 
2
 "The facts of human natural history that throw light on 
our problem, are difficult for us to find out, for our talk 
passes them by, it is occupied with other things. (In the 
same way we tell someone: "Go into the shop and 
buy..." - not: "Put your left foot in front of your right foot 
etc. etc., then put coins down on the counter, etc. etc.")" 
(RPP, I §78).  
nature are mostly background with respect to the aims 
of philosophical analysis, i.e. untying the knots, the 
conceptual muddles that arise when “we are entangled 
in our own rules” (PI, §125). This side of Wittgenstein’s 
reflection is undoubtedly hard to grasp and has often 
originated controversial interpretations.
3
 Another way of 
trying to describe it is to insist that for Wittgenstein, 
interest in natural facts affecting our concepts does not 
suppress or replace interest in the rules that constitute 
and shape them. Such rules are alive in language, 
whether they are explicitly formulated or implicitly 
acquired. 
Anyway, only by grasping this side of Wittgenstein’s 
reflection can we come to understand how, among 
language games and the related forms of life, we do not 
just find natural patterns of action but forms of 
behaviour and activities we would not hesitate to 
describe as “cultural”. Relying on a different dichotomy, 
beside forms of behaviour that are innate, or natural 
developments of innate psychophysical properties (e.g. 
walking, eating), other forms of behaviour are 
mentioned that are acquired in social situations thanks 
to education and training:  
 
The behaviour of humans includes of course not 
only what they do without ever having learned 
the behaviour, but also what they do (and so, 
e.g. say) after having received a training. (RPP, I 
§131) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 From Conway (1989) to Moyal-Sharrock (2007), 
Wittgenstein’s interest in forms of life has been read as 
an attempt to ground the meaning of words in certain 
relevant facts of our psychophysical nature (or so I 
believe such contributions can be understood). In a 
recent restatement of her view, Moyal-Sharrock sees 
Wittgenstein's forms of life as conditioning, not 
grounding or justifying world pictures and language 
games (2015, 38). I believe this reading is more in tune 
with Wittgenstein's texts. For a recent survey of 
interpretations of the notion of form of life, see 
Boncompagni (2015). 
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Moreover, 
 
If we teach a human being such-and-such a 
technique by means of examples, - that he then 
proceeds like this and not like that in a particular 
new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and 
thus that this and not that is the ‘natural’ 
continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely 
important fact of nature. (Z, §355) 
 
Now, all or most of this becomes clear if we keep in mind 
that there are two senses, or two uses of the word 
‘nature’ in Wittgenstein: on the one hand, the word is 
used for prelinguistic, instinctual forms of behaviour 
(such as avoiding pain or caring for a suffering person); 
on the other, it refers to forms of behaviour that have 
been acquired in language and by way of language, and 
that “have been turned into nature for us.” In the 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, speaking of 
our classification system, Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
We’re used to a particular classification of things. 
– With language, or languages, it has become 
second nature to us” (RPP, I §678).
4
  
 
And then he adds: 
 
These are the fixed rails along which all our 
thinking runs, and so our judgement and action 
goes according to them too (RPP, II §679; Z, 
§375).  
 
For the sake of presentation, ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ in the 
latter sense could be replaced by the phrase ‘second 
nature’, following the English translators of these 
remarks.
5
 However, Wittgenstein does not use the 
German equivalent (‘zweiter Natur’) nor is it clear to me 
whether doing so would really simplify the presentation 
of his views or might instead complicate it and make it 
misleading.
6
 Leaving the terminological issue aside, what 
                                                 
4
 The original German is as follows: “Sie ist uns mit der 
Sprache, oder den Sprachen, zur Natur geworden.” 
5
 The English translators are C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. 
Aue. 
6
 The phrase ‘second nature’ could hint at a 
philosophical theory of the relationship between "first" 
matters is emphasizing that in these remarks 
Wittgenstein is talking about an activity – classifying – 
which is largely learned (as shown by the fact that 
cultures differ in their types of classification), and he is 
describing it as a habit of speaking and thinking that “has 
become nature to us”, i.e. that shares something with 
prelinguistic, possibly innate forms of behaviour and 
activities.  
 
Rules 
 
I believe that to understand what is shared by both kinds 
of activities we must consider the outcome of 
Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. To begin 
with, the notion of “following a rule” is related to the 
notion of habit or custom: following a rule is a practice 
(PI, §202), i.e. a way of behaving or acting (in a wide 
sense). We properly speak of acting according to a rule 
when one and the same action is performed several 
times (more than once) so that, thanks to repetition, a 
habit is established: 
 
It is not possible that there should have been 
only one occasion on which only one person 
followed a rule. It is not possible that there 
should have been only one occasion on which a 
report was made, an order given or understood, 
and so on. – To follow a rule, to make a report, 
to give an order, to play a game of chess, are 
customs (usages, institutions). (PI, §199)  
 
Now, every custom is a regularity (of behaviour), hence 
to every custom a rule is attached. However, this should 
not be understood to imply that every custom is 
inherently normative. Walking the dog every day, in the 
same park at the same hour, may be someone's custom; 
but there needn't be anything normative about it. It 
would be peculiar to insist that it is “wrong” for that 
person to walk the dog at a different hour, or in a 
                                                                       
nature (or nature stricto sensu) and second nature, such 
as we find in McDowell (1996). However, saddling 
Wittgenstein with an interest in the construction of such 
a theory would be a misunderstanding. 
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different park.
7
 By contrast, linguistic customs have 
normative force. ‘Dog’, ‘park’, and ‘same’ - English words 
that draw their meaning from the practice of using them 
in a certain way - are to be used in that way (i.e., 
according to the rule that is implicit in their regular use): 
it is right to use them so, while using them differently is 
wrong. In contrast with other behavioural routines, what 
I here called “linguistic customs” or habits necessarily 
involve normativity of the rules they induce. 
Secondly, as is well known, following a rule does not 
require any interpretive mediation;
8
 not in the sense 
that accompanying thoughts are somehow precluded, 
but in the sense that no such thoughts are either 
required or sufficient for rule following: 
 
Following a rule is analogous to obeying an 
order. One is trained to do so and one reacts to 
an order in a particular way (PI, §206).  
 
and 
 
When I follow the rule, I do not choose – I follow 
the rule blindly (PI, §219). 
 
What an acquired linguistic habit shares with a natural, 
prelinguistic form of behaviour is just such blindness or 
quasi-instinctiveness; it is the action’s immediacy (or the 
immediacy of application of the rule). As Wittgenstein 
puts it in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, 
§§125-126, even when we want to express a feeling, a 
very peculiar one as the “feeling of unreality”, we 
spontaneously employ a technique of using words such 
as “feeling” and “unreality” in their ordinary meanings. 
That a linguistic technique has been learned is not 
incompatible with spontaneity of its employment. We 
could now accept the English translation of Remarks on 
the Philosophy of Psychology (II, §678) and use the 
                                                 
7
 Hence, while I agree with Roberta Dreon's claim that 
rules, in Wittgenstein, are best understood in terms of 
habits (2015, 103), this should not be taken to imply that 
every habit has normative force. 
8
 I am referring to PI, §201, and the ensuing, vast debate 
in connection with Saul Kripke's reading of it in his 
(1982). 
phrase ‘second nature’, realizing that ‘second’ hints at 
learning and training and whatever in language is 
acquired by following rules, whereas ‘nature’ hints at 
immediacy and the quasi-instinctive application of rules, 
once they have been acquired.
9
  
Now, as this concerns language, it concerns the 
articulation of our conceptual apparatus. Semantic 
habits are conceptual habits. Analysing a concept 
coincides with analysing the application of a word: “We 
do not analyse a phenomenon (for example, thinking) 
but a concept (for example, that of thinking), and hence 
the application of a word” (PI, §383). Thus, the notion of 
second nature extends to the realm of our ordinary 
concepts, what Wittgenstein later called a “picture of 
the world” (OC, §94), “the substratum of all my inquiring 
and asserting” (OC, §162). 
 
The given (das Gegebene)  
 
Perhaps we can now understand why Wittgenstein, 
while accepting (like other philosophers) a distinction 
between the natural and prelinguistic and what is 
acquired by way of education into language – let us say, 
a distinction between nature proper and second nature 
– does not deem useful for his purposes to carry out an 
investigation by which both levels of human life are in 
each case distinguished and kept separate. Inquiries 
aiming to clarify the meanings of linguistic expressions 
(particularly those which tend to originate conceptual 
confusions and philosophical maladies) differ, in his 
mind, from scientific investigations exactly because they 
neither put forth hypotheses to be confirmed or 
disconfirmed nor make predictions; hence, they do not 
aim at determining, for a given conceptual formation 
embedded in language, which part of it is naturally given 
and which is acquired by training or education. 
Investigations of meaning are rather like attempts at 
drawing maps of our uses of words and concepts, 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion of both the "blindness" of rule 
following and its possible limitations, see Boncompagni 
(2016, 175). 
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describing forms of life and language games together as 
they both constitute the given which the description 
applies to. It is, I believe, in this light that we should read 
some remarks we find in the Philosophical Investigations 
and, with some variations, in the Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology. Concerning forms of life as the 
given of analysis, the remark of Investigations Part II: 
“What has to be accepted, the given, is – one might say – 
forms of life” (PPF, §345) is clarified by being read 
alongside the following text from Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology Part I: 
 
Instead of the unanalysable, specific, 
undefinable: the fact that we act in such-and-
such ways, e.g. punish certain actions, establish 
the state of affair thus and so, give orders, 
render accounts, describe colours, take an 
interest in other feelings. What has to be 
accepted, the given – it might be said – are facts 
of living. (RPP, I §630)
10
 
 
Here Wittgenstein invites us to switch from a certain 
conception of the given to another: from the given 
conceived as what is ‘specific’, ‘undefinable’, 
‘unanalysable’ to the given conceived as forms of life or 
facts of living. This should be clarified. We could imagine 
that forms of life, conceived as the given, are to inherit 
the properties usually attached to the entities a 
philosophical theory assumes as given: properties such 
as metaphysical simplicity and absolute impenetrability 
to analysis (e.g., these were some of the properties of 
Tractatus objects). However, with forms of life this is not 
the case: that punishing certain actions, or describing 
colours are “the given that has to be accepted” does not 
mean that they are limits, physical or metaphysical, our 
attitude towards which can only be one of acquiescence. 
It only means that within a certain kind of inquiry they 
play the role of irreducible elements which circumscribe 
the domain of inquiry. As we know, anthropological 
contexts are particularly singled out, in that observing 
and describing them contributes to clarifying the 
                                                 
10
 In a footnote, we find ‘forms of life’(Lebensformen) as 
a variant. 
meaning of certain expressions of language. Concerning 
language games, Wittgenstein puts forth similar claims: 
like forms of life, language games are what is specific,
11
 
what is primary, something we just have to take account 
of (PI, §655) or that has to be accepted (PPF, §161). 
According to him, only by looking at language games in 
this light can we resist the temptation to explain them 
from non-grammatical perspectives. Not that doing so 
would be impossible or forbidden. E.g., we might 
provide evolutionary explanations of our language 
games (in terms of their adaptive value), or we might 
explain them “by means of our experiences [Erlebnisse]”, 
as Wittgenstein critically remarks (PI, §655). In so doing, 
however, we would altogether miss the sense-conferring 
role of language games that is, instead, highlighted by 
taking them as primary. When he claims that the given 
we have to accept are forms of life, or that we should 
look at language games as something primary, 
Wittgenstein is both expressing his antireductionist 
worries and putting forth a radically sui generis notion of 
the given. Antireductionism goes hand in hand with the 
rejection of any conception of philosophical inquiry as 
modeled upon scientific inquiry; more generally, 
Wittgenstein’s antireductionism rejects any explanation 
of something in terms of something else, any reduction 
of an explanandum to an explanans as relevant to 
philosophy. The presentation of the state of our 
language – which aims to show how we get entangled in 
our own rules – draws no benefit from switching from 
one level of reality to another, for problems of meaning 
that involve terms at one level show up again, 
unchanged, as involving terms and concepts at the other 
level. The word ‘cube’ means the picture of a cube, but 
how is the picture to be interpreted, what does it mean? 
(Cf. PI, §139). The word ‘no’ stands for a certain nod of 
our head, but what does that gesture mean? Does it 
mean ‘no’? (Cf. PG, I §5 and PG, IV §46). 
Concerning the sui generis notion of given, or the 
                                                 
11
 For an analysis of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘specific’ as 
meaning 'undefinable' or 'unanalyzable', see Schulte 
(1993, 50-52).  
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given tout court, let me stress again that its being 
regarded as on a par with what is conceived as 
undefinable, specific, and unanalysable does not by itself 
make it purely and simply given, the way we tend to say 
that the data of perception, or of consciousness are pure 
and simple. As the given we have to accept is constituted 
by forms of life and language games, its ingredients are 
both facts of nature and facts that, with language, have 
become nature for us (or in other words, both first and 
second nature come into it). It involves both immediate 
natural reactions and linguistic habits, where the latter, 
though acquired, are so deeply embedded in the texture 
of our experience that they have come to possess the 
same immediacy as the former. As I remarked earlier, 
the philosopher is mostly interested in the latter 
component – linguistic habits – as they bring in the 
normative dimension of rules, which does not reduce to 
facts of extralinguistic nature, whether physical or 
mental.  
As pointed out by Boncompagni (2016), 
Wittgenstein's interest in forms of life motivated 
Goodman's (2002) likening of William James's 
empiricism to Wittgenstein's naturalism. Boncompagni 
challenges such parallelism by emphasizing – as I do – 
that for Wittgenstein references to natural facts include 
“not only biological characteristics of human life, but 
also cultural and historical facts”, so that “the core of his 
investigations is not what exists, but the grammar of 
concepts.” For this reason, she insists, “Wittgenstein's 
approach is not only far from empiricism, but also from 
naturalism (unless one categorizes the latter in a very 
peculiar way)” (2016, 255-257). My suggestion at this 
point is that, having interpreted forms of life as 
anthropological contexts – natural as well as cultural – 
and having identified such contexts with the given to 
which grammatical investigations apply, we are licensed 
to categorize Wittgenstein’s anthropologism as a kind of 
naturalism, namely as naturalism extending to second 
nature. Though the core of Wittgenstein’s investigations 
is the grammar of concepts, and though the methods 
such investigations employ are not those of science, the 
given to which the investigations apply does not 
transcend nature. 
Let me conclude by a qualification concerning the 
notion of experience that is involved in the notion of a 
linguistic (and conceptual) habit that has become nature 
for us. In particular, I would like to focus on the 
irreducibility of the normative not just to facts of nature 
but to the mental realm as well, where ‘mental realm’ is 
understood in a wide sense, including not only thoughts 
and concepts but also the psychological experiences that 
could be associated with them. As is well known, here 
one of Wittgenstein’s targets were William James's 
views concerning our psychological life as presented in 
the Principles of Psychology [henceforth PP]. 
Wittgenstein did appreciate James's insistence on bodily 
processes being an essential ingredient of what we mean 
by an emotion (such as sadness).
12
 What he rejected in 
James was what he saw as conceptual psychologism, i.e. 
the reduction of conceptual content to sensations, or 
emotions, or experiences.
13
 Nor would he have 
countenanced the psychological “sense of sameness” on 
which such reduction is grounded (see PP I, 459-60). 
Sameness, for Wittgenstein, is an inherently normative 
notion: “The use of the word ‘rule’ and the use of the 
word ‘same’ are interwoven” (PI §225). Contrary to what 
James appears to be taking for granted (as in PP I, 459), 
application of the notion of sameness is not (and cannot 
be) reduced to experiencing a sense of sameness, or to a 
portion of the mental stream “knowing” that it means 
the same as another portion: 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Such appreciation is apparent in the Brown Book, 
p.103. On Wittgenstein's reading of James on emotions 
see Schulte (1995, 249-250), among others. 
13
 He may have had in mind texts like the following: 
“New conceptions come from new sensations, new 
movements, new emotions, new associations, new acts 
of attention, and new comparisons of old conceptions, 
and in no other ways.” (PP I, 467) – 
“Conceptions...translate the process of our perceptual 
experience, which is naturally a flux, into a set of 
stagnant and petrified terms.” (PP I, 467-8). 
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"Before I judge that two images which I have are 
the same, surely I must recognize them as the 
same". And when that has happened, how am I 
to know that the word "same" describes what I 
recognize? Only if I can express my recognition in 
some other way, and if it is possible for someone 
else to teach me that "same" is the correct word 
here. (PI §378, it. added)  
 
More generally, as stated in a remark I already quoted,  
 
The point is not to explain a language-game by 
means of our experiences, but to take account of 
a language-game (PI, §655). 
 
Wittgenstein is here trying to describe and clarify what is 
going on when we use such words as ‘intention’, 
‘memory’, or when we use a phrase such as ‘reporting a 
desire or an intention we experienced in the past.’ Even 
in such a context he rules out that bringing in an 
experience (Erlebnis) conceived as something separate 
from, and independent of any language game may help 
us to carry out our analytic task. In fact, according to 
Wittgenstein even this kind of experiences – the 
Erlebnisse - are linguistically articulated and have their 
life and their meaning in the language games they 
belong to:  
 
The concept of experience (Der Begriff des 
Erlebnisses): Like that of happening, of process, 
of state, of something, of fact, of description and 
of report. Here we think we are standing on the 
hard bedrock, deeper than any special methods 
and language-games. But these extremely 
general terms have an extremely blurred 
meaning. They relate in practice to innumerable 
special cases, but that does not make them any 
solider; no, rather it makes them more fluid. 
(RPP, I §648) 
 
Speaking of Erlebnis or experience does not bring us in 
touch with some rock-solid ultimate foundation, 
concerning which agreement is universal. On the 
contrary, in Wittgenstein’s view, what we are faced with 
is the use of a word, and a pretty vague use at that. 
Hence, the kind of philosophical work he recommends 
here will once more consist of looking at a large number 
of special cases: at the different language games where 
the word occurs, with meanings that, though related 
with one another, may still differ in each case, 
depending on the practices and forms of life with which 
the several uses are intertwined.  
A question naturally arises here, and Wittgenstein 
himself is the first to ask it: 
 
But weren’t there all these appearances – of 
pain, of wishing, of intention, of memory, etc., 
before there was any language? (RPP, I §165) 
 
Or again: 
 
“So if someone has not learned a language, is he 
unable to have certain memories?” Of course – 
he cannot have linguistic memories, linguistic 
wishes or fears, and so on. And memories and 
suchlike in language are not mere threadbare 
representations of the real experiences; for is 
what is linguistic not an experience? (PI, §649) 
 
For Wittgenstein, language as a characteristic feature of 
human life, hence of human experience, does not leave 
the other domains of such experience unaltered, in two 
distinct ways: first, it is in language that they take their 
shape, their physiognomy; secondly, it is in language that 
they are expressed – we speak of them in language. This 
is why in philosophy it is impossible – better, it doesn’t 
make sense – to try and keep distinct (e.g.) experience 
proper (say, of a memory) from its verbal articulation 
within a language game (the one it is “at home” in). 
Consequently, philosophical inquiry into experience is 
itself bound to be concerned with the meanings of 
words we use to describe experience and talk about 
experiences.  
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ABSTRACT: The subject of this paper is the notion of 
‘imponderable evidence’, employed on a few occasions 
by the later Wittgenstein. Our perception of others’ 
feelings, thoughts and emotions, Wittgenstein observes, 
is ordinarily guided by an imponderable evidence, which, 
while remaining unmeasurable and ultimately 
ungraspable, gives us access to an immediate – yet 
fallible – form of understanding. This understanding, I 
will argue, is essentially qualitative.  
Section 1 of the paper introduces the issue through 
the examination of some remarks on how our attitude 
towards living beings differs from our attitude towards 
objects. Sections 2 and 3 present the notion of 
imponderable evidence in the framework of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy of psychology 
and his remarks on aesthetic judgment. In section 4, I 
will turn to Dewey’s conception of ‘qualitative thought’ 
as an aid to clarify further the sense of Wittgenstein’s 
terminology. The final section concludes on why 
philosophers should care about the qualitative 
dimension of human existence. 
 
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein; John Dewey, 
imponderable evidence; qualitative thought; immediacy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper investigates a seemingly elusive notion that 
the later Wittgenstein employs only on a few occasions: 
the notion of ‘imponderable evidence’, which he mostly 
associates with the related concept of 
‘Menschenkenntnis’, the knowledge of human beings or 
the knowledge of human nature. Our perception of 
others’ feelings, thoughts and emotions, Wittgenstein 
observes, is ordinarily guided by an imponderable 
evidence, which, while remaining unmeasurable and 
ultimately ungraspable, gives us access to an immediate 
– yet fallible – form of understanding. This 
understanding, I will argue, is essentially qualitative. In 
order to clarify this, I will compare Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on imponderable evidence and 
Menschenkenntnis with John Dewey’s conception of 
‘qualitative thought’. Without claiming that the two 
perspectives overlap, I will more modestly put them side 
by side and point out some affinities, with the aim of 
shedding some light on an important dimension of our 
life, too often neglected in philosophy.  
Section 1 of the paper introduces the issue through 
the examination of some Wittgensteinian remarks 
regarding our attitude towards living beings and how it 
differs from our attitude towards objects. Sections 2 and 
3 present the notion of imponderable evidence in the 
framework of Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy 
of psychology and his remarks on aesthetic judgment. 
We shall see that immediacy and experience are 
intertwined in imponderable evidence. In section 4, I will 
turn to Dewey’s conception of qualitative thought as an 
aid to clarify further the sense of Wittgenstein’s 
terminology. The final section concludes on why 
philosophers should care about the qualitative 
dimension of human existence.  
 
1. Inanimate objects and living beings 
 
The expression ‘imponderable evidence’, unwägbare 
Evidenz, where wägen means ‘to weigh’ or ‘to ponder’, is 
used by Wittgenstein chiefly in some late writings on the 
philosophy of psychology, dealing with our relationship 
with the other(s). As we shall see, in this context 
Wittgenstein is addressing the mixture of immediate 
certainty (‘evidence’) and uncertainty or indeterminacy 
(‘imponderable’) that characterizes our perception and 
understanding of other peoples’ emotions, expressions, 
feelings, reactions, intentions, and thoughts. By paying 
attention to the ordinary practices and exchanges that 
belong to our everyday life, more generally, 
Wittgenstein is engaged in the dissolution of a 
traditional problem of philosophy, namely, the problem 
of skepticism about other minds. The notion of 
imponderable evidence is (also) part of this reflection.  
A good starting point for introducing the issue is 
Wittgenstein’s reasoning concerning the difference 
between our attitude towards living beings and our 
attitude towards objects or minerals, in the Philosophical 
Investigations. This reasoning is strictly connected with 
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the so-called ‘Private Language Argument’, where 
Wittgenstein contests the idea that an absolutely private 
language is possible, or even coherently conceivable. 
Without entering the larger debate on this topic (see 
Candlish & Wrisley 2014 for an overview), let us just 
examine a few passages: 
  
[O]nly of a living human being and what 
resembles (behaves like) a living human being 
can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; 
hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. (PI
1
 § 
281) 
 
Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. 
– One says to oneself: How could one so much as 
get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? 
One might as well ascribe it to a number! – And 
now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these 
difficulties vanish, and pain seems able to get a 
foothold here, where before everything was, so 
to speak, too smooth for it. 
And so, too, a corpse seems to us quite 
inaccessible to pain. – Our attitude to what is 
alive and to what is dead is not the same. All our 
reactions are different. – If someone says, ‘That 
cannot simply come from the fact that living 
beings move in such and such ways and dead 
one’s don’t’, then I want to suggest to him that 
this is a case of the transition ‘from quantity to 
quality’. (PI § 284) 
 
Think of the recognition of facial expressions. Or 
the description of facial expressions – which 
does not consist in giving the measurements of 
the face! Think, too, how one can imitate a 
man’s face without seeing one’s own in a mirror. 
(PI § 285) 
 
Different points are made in these remarks. A general 
one seems to be that there is something strange in the 
idea that we ascribe feelings to others on the basis of 
our knowledge of our own internal states and the 
consideration of the similarity between our own and 
others’ bodily behaviour. In seeing pain in the wriggling 
fly, a much more immediate process seems involved: 
something more akin to perception, maybe, rather than 
‘ascription’ of pain to the fly. More precisely: it is our 
immediate attitude and natural reactions towards that 
                                                 
1
 For abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s works, see the list 
of references. 
living being that are different from the immediate 
attitude and natural reactions we have towards, say, a 
stone or an object. 
This is connected to a second point: Wittgenstein’s 
attention is focused on our attitude (Einstellung), not on 
our knowledge of others and of others’ minds. This shift 
of focus is central to Wittgenstein’s overall strategy in 
the context of the problem of other minds. The skeptical 
challenge regarding other minds, in fact, is an epistemic 
challenge: its core claim is that we are unable to prove 
that we have or can have knowledge of other peoples’ 
mental states (thoughts, emotions etc.). Wittgenstein’s 
claim, by contrast, is not simply that we do have 
knowledge of others’ mental states; rather, he shows 
that talk of knowledge in a strict sense, in this context, is 
inappropriate. Even more radically, he shows that it is 
precisely talk of knowledge that makes the problem 
itself arise. Indeed, once we frame the question in 
epistemic terms, we cannot but give credit to the 
hypothesis that there are some things (others’ mental 
states) waiting to be known. And once in this framework, 
it is a short step to also accept that in our attempt to 
know the other person’s state of mind, we face a 
problem, because we do not have a direct epistemic 
access to her or his state of mind, due to the asymmetry 
between first and third person.
2
 As Wittgenstein puts it 
some years later:  
 
My attitude towards him is the attitude towards 
a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul 
(PPF § 21) 
 
Attitude, in this sense, precedes knowledge, and it is 
attitude rather than knowledge that governs our life 
with others (cf. Gangopadhyay and Pichler 2016). 
A third point that emerges from the quoted passages 
above, has to do with measurement. In recognizing and 
in describing the expressions of a face, we do not 
                                                 
2
 There is a form of scientism in this craving to know: we 
are inclined to shape the problem of other minds as 
science does, that is, as a matter of empirical knowledge. 
See Child (2017). 
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measure: we do not care about how many millimeters 
the lips or the eyebrows of the person raise when she is 
happy or angry, nor do we judge her happiness based on 
the width of her smile – though, of course, the width of a 
smile, just like the number of someone’s tears or the 
frequency of his pulse rate, do have connections with 
the intensity of that person’s emotions. The point is that 
we do not measure these elements in order to know 
how she is feeling. A transition ‘from quantity to quality’, 
says Wittgenstein, is at stake here.  
Let us keep in mind this point: the difference in our 
attitudes when we are concerned with human (and more 
generally, living) beings rather than inanimate objects 
has to do with the difference between quantity and 
quality. This is something Wittgenstein does not linger 
on, but we shall return to it, because one aspect that the 
notion of imponderable evidence helps us to see is 
precisely the qualitative dimension of human life, and 
especially of human life with others.  
 
2. Imponderable evidence and the other minds 
 
I will now proceed to examine the passages in which 
Wittgenstein talks of imponderable evidence. 
We saw that our relationship with living beings is 
different from our relationship with inanimate objects. 
One shape that this difference assumes is that in the 
context of interpersonal relationships, the rules of 
evidence, as well as those of agreement and 
disagreement, are peculiar.  
 
I am sure, sure, that he is not pretending; but 
some third person is not. Can I always convince 
him? And if not, is there some mistake in his 
reasoning or observations? 
‘You don’t understand a thing!’ – this is what 
one says when someone doubts what we 
recognize as clearly genuine – but we cannot 
prove anything. (PPF §§ 353-354) 
 
While the truth of empirical claims about inanimate 
objects is ascertained through observation and 
reasoning, and can be proved or confuted, when it 
comes to the genuineness of a person’s expressions of 
feelings, these methods, so to speak, lose their grip. Yet, 
the impossibility of proving the genuineness or 
authenticity of a person’s expressions does not entail 
that one cannot be sure about them. Certainty and proof 
are disconnected here.  
This aspect shows the distance from the context of 
empirical knowledge, in which if someone knows 
something with certainty, they are normally able to give 
evidence and reasons for their knowledge, and can be 
asked to produce evidence and reasons. It is common to 
disagree in judgments about a person’s sincerity, and 
although in discussion one may be asked to give reasons 
for one’s beliefs (for instance, to recall other situations 
in which the person in question behaved in such and 
such a way and was or was not genuine in her 
expressions), these are not decisive in convincing others. 
To reiterate: the absence of proofs does not disrupt the 
possibility of being legitimately sure about another’s 
sincerity. Quite the opposite, the impossibility of proof is 
part of the ordinary practice of judging the other’s 
feelings, in such a way that without it (without the 
impossibility of proof), the practice itself and the 
patterns of life in which it occurs would be radically and 
unpredictably different. 
Interestingly, this constitutive absence of proof is not 
an absence of criteria for judgment, neither is it an 
absence of ‘expert judgment’ on others’ feelings. ‘Here 
too – Wittgenstein observes (§ 355) – there are those 
with “better” and those with “worse” judgment’, and 
‘[i]n general, predictions arising from judgments from 
those with better knowledge of people [des bessern 
Menschenkenners] will be more correct’ (ibid.). 
Menschenkenntnis, clearly, is not a form of knowledge in 
a strict sense, but rather a sort of sensibility to the 
physiognomy of the human, a capacity in perceiving and 
judging the others’ nature, moods, dispositions, and 
states of mind, which to a certain extent can be learned 
and taught.  
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Can one learn this knowledge 
[Menschenkenntnis]? Yes; some can learn it. Not, 
however, by taking a course of study in it, but 
through ‘experience’ [Erfahrung]. – Can 
someone else be a man’s teacher in this? 
Certainly. From time to time he gives him the 
right tip. – this is what ‘learning’ and ‘teaching’ 
are like here. – What one acquires here is not a 
technique; one learns correct judgments. There 
are also rules, but they do not form a system, 
and only experienced people [Erfahrene] can 
apply them rightly. Unlike calculating rules. (PPF 
§ 355). 
 
Experience, therefore – not in the sense of lived 
experience (Erlebnis), but in the sense of training, 
repetition, ‘varied observation’ (PPF § 357), and learning 
by doing – can provide a person with this special kind of 
skill or familiarity with human nature, an ability or a 
disposition to judge correctly the genuineness of others 
and to predict correctly their future behavior from their 
present actions. This experienced knowledge is perhaps 
more akin to a form of knowing-how than a knowing-
that: it is a capacity, whose rules are not the systematic 
rules of a calculus, but the unwritten, implicit and hardly 
definite rules of experience. 
Although there is no proof here, there is a form of 
evidence – and here we come to the notion of 
imponderable evidence: 
 
One can indeed be convinced by the evidence 
that someone is in such-and-such a state of 
mind: that, for instance, he is not pretending. 
But there is also ‘imponderable’ evidence here. 
(PPF § 358) 
 
The question is: what does imponderable 
evidence accomplish [leistet]? (PPF § 359) 
 
The first thing to underline here is that Wittgenstein is 
not drawing a sharp distinction between (ponderable) 
evidence and imponderable evidence. Both can be at 
work in our judgments concerning someone’s state of 
mind. In distinguishing between the two, Wittgenstein is 
trying to understand what imponderable evidence does, 
performs, accomplishes, provides, or affords; in other 
words, what is its place or role in our life.  
 
The case is compared in the following lines with 
evidence concerning the chemical structure of a 
substance, and the genuineness of a work of art: 
 
Suppose there were imponderable evidence for 
the chemical (internal) structure of a substance; 
still, it would have to prove itself to be evidence 
by certain consequences which are ponderable. 
(Imponderable evidence might convince 
someone that a picture [Bild] was a genuine … But 
this may be proved right by documentation as 
well). (ibid.) 
 
In the case of the chemical structure, imponderable 
evidence has to be also supported by ponderable 
evidence: if for some reasons I were miraculously 
equipped with the capacity to know the internal, invisible 
structure of a substance, this kind of evidence would not 
suffice. Something measurable would also be needed.  
The case of the genuineness of a work of art seems to 
stand midway between human expressions and the 
internal structure of a substance: in judging whether a 
painting is (say) a Titian, an art critic can have 
imponderable evidence for this, but this evidence may 
also be confirmed (or not) by documentation (scientific 
information on the dating of pigments, for instance). 
Notice that the reflection pivots on the 
internal/external distinction: in each case, evidence, be it 
ponderable or imponderable, is supposed to provide 
knowledge or understanding of something that seems to 
be, in some form, inside the object and not in plain view. 
Wittgenstein draws on a range of cases: for inanimate 
objects, even if imponderable evidence were possible, 
ponderable evidence would be necessary; for a work of 
art, both ponderable and imponderable evidence are 
possible and can supplement each other; for human states 
of mind, both forms are possible, and imponderable 
evidence seems to have the most important role. I am 
probably oversimplifying here, but my point is that 
Wittgenstein is comparing various forms of evidence in 
various contexts, making us aware of how our epistemic 
practices and our interactions vary, and at the same time 
how boundaries are not as sharp as we might tend to 
think.  
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Ponderability and imponderability, he seems to 
suggest, are not mutually exclusive, and even in the 
domain of interpersonal relationships ponderable 
evidence is possible. In fact, feelings, emotions, and 
intentions are bound to the external criteria, behavior – 
visible actions that to a certain extent can be evaluated, 
documented, and ‘weighed’. Therefore, if on the one 
hand it would not be satisfactory to negate the role of 
imponderability in our judgments, on the other hand, it 
would equally be unsatisfactory to say that the 
genuineness of an expression can only be ‘felt’ by gifted 
people who can feel it (see PPF § 357). We do not 
measure the width of a smile in order to know ‘how 
much happiness’ someone feels, and yet we do not 
simply ‘feel’ or have an inexplicable private intuition of 
that person’s happiness. We are aware of someone’s 
state of mind because we are acquainted and familiar 
with her behavior and with human behavior in general, 
in all its nuances and complex variability.  
 
Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of 
glance, of gesture, of tone. 
I may recognize a genuine loving look, 
distinguish it from a pretended one (and here 
there can, of course, be a ‘ponderable’ 
confirmation of my judgment). But I may be 
quite incapable of describing the difference. (PPF 
§ 360) 
 
When we recognize the authenticity of another person’s 
expression, something in her way of behaving makes us 
certain of her psychological state; and yet we are not 
able to explain exactly what it is. As ter Hark puts it, 
‘[i]mponderable evidence is evidence which can make us 
certain about someone’s psychological state, without 
our being able to specify what it is in their behaviour 
that makes us so sure’ (ter Hark 2004, 140). This 
immediate and yet expert certainty can be utterly 
impossible to put into words.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Having an ‘eye’ for something 
 
As we saw, Wittgenstein touched on aesthetic judgment 
as a case in which imponderable evidence has a role, 
though it may also be supported by ponderable 
elements. I would like now to expand a little on 
imponderable evidence and aesthetics. Aesthetic 
creation, instead of judgment, is also called for in the 
second part of PPF § 360, immediately following the 
quoted passage above. After stating that by 
imponderable evidence it is possible to distinguish 
between a genuine and a pretended loving look, but we 
‘may be quite incapable of describing the difference’, 
Wittgenstein continues:  
 
[T]his is not because the languages I know have 
no words for it. Why don’t I simply introduce 
new words? – If I were a very talented painter, I 
might conceivably represent the genuine and the 
dissembled glance in pictures. (ibid.) 
 
While words would not help us in describing what it is in 
that look that makes us certain of its sincerity, we may – 
talent permitting – represent a genuine look, and others 
would recognize in the representation sincerity or 
insincerity. The internal state, so to speak, is displayed in 
the look and can be displayed in a represented look, if 
the artist is good enough in capturing and rendering the 
expression. Notice that the representation need not be 
an exact portrayal: the talented artist is able to 
represent ‘the’ genuine glance, not this particular one. 
The good painter knows how a genuine loving glance 
looks like, and how it is embedded in and connected 
with bodily movements, gestures, and attitudes.  
How does the painter know? Not only does he or she 
develop the capacity to depict the genuine glance; first 
and foremost, the artist develops the capacity to see and 
recognize the genuine glance in people around him or 
her, and to see in the glance the feeling, emotion, or 
state of mind of the person. To a greater or lesser 
degree, this capacity is naturally developed by human 
beings in general as they grow up. But there are also 
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many specific contexts, most notably aesthetic ones, in 
which some people develop a particular ‘eye’ for 
something, a marked sensibility or ability to perceive 
subtle nuances, differences, and tones. This is what 
enables them to fully appreciate the overall quality of a 
performance, or a work of art, for instance. 
 
Ask yourself: How does a man learn to get an 
‘eye’ [Blick] for something? And how can this eye 
be used? (PPF § 361) 
 
The ‘eye’ for something can be trained and refined 
through experience and practice; more specifically, 
through the kind of experience and practice that a 
master can teach to an apprentice.  
 
An important fact here is that we learn certain 
things only through long experience and not 
from a course in school. How, for instance, does 
one develop the eye of a connoisseur? Someone 
says, for example: ‘This picture was not painted 
by such-and-such a master’--the statement he 
makes is thus not an aesthetic judgment, but one 
that can be proved by documentation. He may 
not be able to give good reasons for his verdict.--
How did he learn it? Could someone have taught 
him? Quite.--Not in the same way as one learns 
to calculate. A great deal of experience was 
necessary. (LS I § 925). 
 
The continuous immersion in a context and involvement 
in its practices, with the imitation of more trained 
participants and sometimes the explicit guide of experts, 
progressively sharpens the capacity to perceive nuances, 
as well as to respond appropriately when a response is 
expected. As time passes, what initially had to be made 
explicitly conscious, is acquired as part of a Bildung and 
begins to work in the background, becoming ‘natural’. 
Aesthetic reactions are therefore, at the very same time, 
immediate and experienced, in the sense of trained or 
made expert. Immediacy, we might say, is the expression 
of experience. 
The affinity between the aesthetic eye and the 
perception of human emotions and states of mind is also 
touched on by Wittgenstein in his lectures on aesthetics. 
In discussing our use of words like ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’ 
in aesthetic reactions and judgments, he points out that 
these words themselves are unimportant, while what 
matters is the ‘enormously complicated situation in 
which the aesthetic expression has a place’ (LC, 2). Other 
adjectives, not strictly descriptive, can be used more 
efficaciously by an art critic or a music expert: a melody, 
for instance, could be called ‘youthful’, ‘springly’, 
‘stately’, or ‘pompous’ (ibid, 3). But notice: 
 
If I were a good draughtsman, I could convey an 
innumerable number of expressions by four 
strokes [omitted: sketches of faces] 
Such words as ‘pompous’ and ‘stately’ could 
be expressed by faces. Doing this, our 
descriptions would be much more flexible and 
various than they are as expressed by adjectives. 
If I say of a piece of Schubert’s that it is 
melancholy, that is like giving it a face (I don’t 
express approval or disapproval). I could instead 
use gestures or [Rhees] dancing. In fact, if we 
want to be exact, we do use a gesture or a facial 
expression. (ibid, 4). 
 
Even when we can find words to express the impression 
that a melody or a painting produces on us and what we 
think of it, a facial expression – including a drawn facial 
expression, like the sketches proposed by Wittgenstein, 
oddly similar to smileys – would be more exact. This is 
the exactness of an appropriate expression, not the 
exactness of a measurement: it is a sort of 
‘imponderable exactness’, we might say, that belongs to 
the person who has an ‘eye’ for something.  
All we have seen thus far indicates that 
imponderable evidence is inextricably interwoven with 
the variability and indeterminateness of the phenomena 
of human life. A selection of passages from 
Wittgenstein’s later remarks on the philosophy of 
psychology can help us to consolidate this theme.  
 
Sufficient evidence passes over into insufficient 
without a borderline. A natural foundation for 
the way this concept is formed is the complex 
nature and the variety of human contingencies.  
 
A facial expression that was completely fixed 
couldn't be a friendly one. Variability and 
irregularity are essential to a friendly expression. 
Irregularity is part of its physiognomy. 
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The importance we attach to the subtle shades 
of behaviour. 
 
That the evidence makes someone else's feelings 
merely probable is not what matters to us; what 
we are looking at is the fact that this is taken as 
evidence for something; that we construct a 
statement on this involved sort of evidence, and 
hence that such evidence has a special 
importance in our lives […]. (RPP II §§ 614, 615, 
616, 709) 
 
The last remark makes clear Wittgenstein’s general 
point: rather than focusing on the fact that shades of 
behavior give us only a probable evidence of the other’s 
state of mind, we should consider that this is the kind of 
evidence we normally go by: this is how we act; 
imponderable evidence is part of our form of life (see 
also LS II, 89). Neither imponderability nor the 
imperfection of this form of evidence should worry us. 
Absolute epistemic certainty is neither what we need, 
nor what we actually look for when we interact with one 
another. As he puts it in LS (II, 81), ‘That our evidence 
makes someone else's experience only probable doesn't 
take us far; but that this pattern of our experience that is 
hard to describe is an important piece of evidence for us 
does. That this fluctuation is an important part of our 
life’.  
Acquiring an ‘eye’ for something, just like acquiring 
Menschenkenntnis, is only possible in virtue of our 
belonging to a form of life in which fluctuations in the 
pattern of experience and imponderable evidence are 
important, so important that they contribute in an 
essential way to its characterization. In fact, we would 
not really even be able to imagine how our life would be, 
without imponderable evidence. Convinced by the 
skeptic, we might wish to eliminate imponderable 
evidence from our life, in favour of an alternative 
scenario in which we could always know with 
ponderable and verifiable evidence what is in another 
person’s mind. Notice that this scenario is ultimately 
what is called for in the commonsensical, yet scientistic 
urge to ‘read’ another’s mind, or to know via scientific 
instruments what the other’s thoughts and desires really 
are (cf. Child 2017). A similar outlook is tacitly at work in 
the dispute between ‘Theory Theory’ and ‘Simulation 
Theory’ characterizing the debate of the last decades in 
cognitive science
3
. Suppose we took this urge seriously, 
and built a portable mechanical ‘lie-detector’ that would 
reveal, 100% accurately, any lies in our interpersonal 
exchanges. ‘Lie’ would be redefined as ‘that which 
causes a deflection on the lie detector’. Now, 
Wittgenstein asks: 
 
Would we change our way of living if this or that 
were provided for us?--And how could I answer 
that? (LS II, 95) 
 
The reason why the question remains open, if my 
reading is correct, is that in such a scenario our life 
would be so profoundly different, that we cannot really 
imagine it. Some of our most fundamental concepts 
would be involved in the change, such as those of 
evidence, prove, truth, and lie. The point is that 
imponderable evidence is conceptually bound to our 
form of life, and to suppose that our lack of knowledge 
of other minds is a defect, something that we might 
overcome, amounts to not being able to see how central 
this imponderability is in our way of living. Thinking that 
it is possible to turn this qualitative aspect into 
something measurable, is not merely making an 
empirical hypothesis: it is an attempt compelled by a 
misleading picture, which betrays, in the end, a 
conceptual confusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Both approaches indeed aim at explaining how one 
acquires the capacity to ‘mind-read’ an agent’s 
intentions by acquiring knowledge of her or his internal 
mental states (be it thorugh a system of concepts, as in 
‘Theory Theory’, or by using one’s own mind as a model, 
as in ‘Simulation Theory’). For a survey of this literature, 
see Marraffa (2011). 
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4. Dewey’s qualitative thought 
 
With the aim of clarifying the qualitative nature of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of imponderable evidence and 
possibly extending its purport beyond Wittgensteinian 
literature, I will now make use of another thinker’s 
perspective, which shows interesting affinities with this 
Wittgensteinian reflection: John Dewey’s. Yet, I will 
approach Dewey only with respect to some aspects of 
his conception of ‘qualitative thought’, without claiming 
either to offer a full description of this conception, or to 
draw a general comparison with Wittgenstein.
4
 For the 
sake of remaining focused on the theme of quality, I will 
also leave aside Dewey’s reflections on the expression 
and understanding of emotions, on which other parallels 
with Wittgenstein’s approach would undoubtedly be 
interesting, but would require a much more extensive 
work
5
. My use of Dewey’s perspective is therefore 
admittedly instrumental.  
Dewey defends the qualitative dimension of 
experience on a number of occasions. In Experience and 
Nature, for instance, against the typical philosophical 
fallacy of reifying those features of reality which appear 
most stable and permanent into ontological entities, he 
vindicates the ineffable and qualitative character of 
events as they are immediately enjoyed or suffered (see 
in particular Chapters 3, 4, and 7). ‘Empirically,’ he says, 
‘things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, 
disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, 
consoling, splendid, fearful […]’ (Dewey 1925, 96
6
). Form 
an empirical point of view, he claims, aesthetic quality, 
                                                 
4
 Although I’m inclined to think that there are significant 
affinities between Wittgenstein and the pragmatist 
tradition in general (Boncompagni 2016), and although 
many thinkers (most notably, but also contentiously, 
Rorty 1979) have claimed that Wittgenstein and Dewey 
have a similar outlook and similar objectives in their 
conception of philosophy, I would not underestimate the 
differences between the two; see Volber 2012 on this. 
5
 Besides Dewey (1925), see in particular Dewey (1894), 
(1895) and (1934, chapters 3 and 4). 
6
 Notice the similarity here with William James’ (1976) 
characterization of affectional facts in his Essays on 
Radical Empiricism. 
in a broad sense, characterizes situations and events as 
they occur in the world, and in the end science, even 
quantitative science, must recognize that it has its basis 
in qualitative events (p. 86). 
In his 1930 article titled ‘Qualitative Thought’ Dewey 
puts forth some ideas which are particularly illuminating 
for our purposes. The world in which we live, he claims, 
is primarily qualitative, and thinking itself, including 
logic, is shaped and informed by an intrinsic qualitative 
background. The very beginning of the article is 
straightforward: 
 
The world in which we immediately live, that in 
which we strive, succeed, and are defeated is 
preeminently a qualitative world. What we act 
for, suffer, and enjoy are things in their 
qualitative determinations. This world forms the 
field of characteristic modes of thinking, 
characteristic in that thought is definitely 
regulated by qualitative considerations. (Dewey 
1930, 243) 
 
It is a fundamental mistake, Dewey argues, to exclude 
the qualitative dimension from logic. In fact, this ‘leaves 
thought in certain subjects [e.g. aesthetic matters, 
morals and politics] without any logical status’ (245). 
Conversely, taking aesthetics as the exemplary case, the 
quality of a work of art (but the same holds for a person 
or an historical event) is what internally ‘pervades, 
colors, tones, and weights every detail’ of it, and 
externally demarcates it from other entities (ibid.). Such 
underlying and pervasive qualitative dimensions need to 
be acknowledged. The core of Dewey’s argumentation is 
the following, based on the distinction between 
‘situation’ and ‘object’: 
 
By the term ‘situation’ in this connection is 
signified the fact that the subject-matter 
ultimately referred to in existential propositions 
is a complex existence that is held together, in 
spite of its internal complexity, by the fact that it 
is dominated and characterized throughout by a 
single quality. By ‘object’ is meant some element 
in the complex whole that is defined in 
abstraction from the whole of which it is a 
distinction. The special point made is that the 
selective determination and relation of objects in 
thought is controlled by reference to a situation--
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to that which is constituted by a pervasive and 
internally integrating quality, so that failure to 
acknowledge the situation leaves, in the end, the 
logical force of objects and their relations 
inexplicable. (Dewey 1930, 246) 
 
The qualitative situation, therefore, is the implicit and 
tacit background that underlies any propositional 
symbolization and regulates its pertinence, relevancy, 
and force (248). Logic selects its objects with reference 
to a situation, and excluding the situation from logic 
would be nonsense. A situation is grasped by ‘intuition’, 
where intuition is taken in its everyday sense, without 
any mystical implication (249): intuition is what precedes 
reflection and rational elaboration, catching the 
pervasive quality of the situation. 
Now, what is especially interesting and has relevance 
in respect to the Wittgensteinian reflection above, is 
that the immediate grasping of a situation is not 
conceived of by Dewey as a kind of unmediated 
perception of elements in reality: rather, it is an intuition 
essentially shaped by habit and training. Immediacy is 
mediated by a complex system of meanings, ultimately 
grounded in human practices and their history
7
. This is 
evident in Dewey’s treatment of ejaculations and 
interjections and of aesthetic judgments. 
Some ejaculations, he observes, have an intellectual 
import. For instance, expressions like ‘Alas,’ ‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ 
‘Oh’ may be ‘the symbol of an integrated attitude 
toward the quality of a situation as a whole’, and an 
expression like ‘Good!’ may ‘mark a deep apprehension 
of the quality of a piece of acting on the stage, of a deed 
performed, or of a picture in its wealth of content’, in a 
way that is not adequately replaceable by more 
complicated words and long disquisitions (250). These 
ejaculations are meaningful because they carry with 
them habits, past experiences, and past reflections, 
unifying them in a single reaction. In Dewey’s words:  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Ryan 1994 and Colapietro, this issue (2018). 
Such ejaculatory judgments supply perhaps the 
simplest example of qualitative thought in its 
purity. While they are primitive, it does not 
follow that they are always superficial and 
immature. Sometimes, indeed, they express an 
infantile mode of intellectual response. But they 
may also sum up and integrate prolonged 
previous experience and training, and bring to a 
unified head the results of severe and 
consecutive reflection. (ibid.) 
 
Notice that Wittgenstein too underlined that words are 
unimportant and may be not the best way of expressing 
a global and exact aesthetic judgment, while facial 
expressions and gestures may accomplish the task 
better. Moreover, just like Wittgenstein, Dewey invokes 
the example of recognizing immediately the author of a 
work of art, before analytically examining the picture: 
 
A man sees a picture and says at first sight that it 
is by Goya or by some one influenced by him. He 
passes the judgment long before he has made 
any analysis or any explicit identification of 
elements. It is the quality of the picture as a 
whole that operates (259).  
 
Again, like Wittgenstein, Dewey notes that it is also 
possible to accomplish a more technical and detailed 
analysis of the painting, which will prove the initial 
intuition right or wrong; nevertheless, the ‘basic 
appreciation of quality as a whole’ is already a reliable 
ground for such an analysis, more dependable than the 
judgments of a critic ‘who knows history and mechanical 
points of brushwork but who is lacking in sensitiveness 
to pervasive quality’ (ibid.).  
Although aesthetic judgment is Dewey’s 
paradigmatic case of the qualitative dimension, his other 
examples in the introductory lines of his article were a 
person and a historical fact: in these cases too, quality is 
grasped as a whole. Concerning the person, in particular, 
his or her character or personality, including the ethical 
aspects, forms his or her ‘quality’. In other words, quality 
is not an attribute to be added to the person; the 
qualitative dimension is, in the end, the person, and we 
are able to see and recognize it thanks to our 
acquaintance with a complex net of social habits, rules, 
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and customs. Dewey also makes the example of a 
person’s expression, where the expression itself is not a 
single feature among his or her traits but ‘a total effect 
of all elements in their relation to one another’ (260). He 
also mentions family resemblances, which, he observes, 
we are often able to detected immediately in two faces 
or in two people in spite of our inability to specify where 
exactly these resemblances are.  
 I hope it is clear from putting Wittgenstein’s and 
Dewey’s quotes side by side, the former with his notion 
of imponderable evidence and the latter with his notion 
of qualitative thought, that despite the differences that 
there may be in their overall perspectives, the two 
philosophers seem to be pointing in the same direction: 
for both, especially in some contexts (chiefly, 
interpersonal relationships and aesthetic judgment), 
there is a form of understanding which is at the same 
time immediate and experienced, and cannot be 
accounted for in strictly epistemic or cognitive terms, 
that is, as a form of knowledge. Both highlight that this is 
not marginal: rather, it is what deeply characterizes our 
life and the everyday exchanges we have with each 
other and the world. We live primarily in a qualitative 
dimension, in which immediacy and experience are 
bound together. Our immediate reactions are 
experienced reactions, and they are so in virtue of our 
upbringing in and belonging to a form of life. This 
dimension, at once complex and immediate, is for both 
what must be acknowledged as ‘the given’.  
 
[T]he original datum is always such qualitative 
whole. […] What is ‘given’ is not an object by 
itself nor a term having a meaning of its own. 
The ‘given’, that is to say the existent, is precisely 
an undetermined and dominant complex quality. 
(Dewey 1930, 253) 
 
What has to be accepted, the given, is – one 
might say – forms of life. (Wittgenstein, PPF § 
345) 
 
It goes without saying that there are differences 
between the two approaches. Most notably, in Dewey’s 
view, since quality is the substratum of cognitive 
processes overall, it is a pervasive aspect characterizing 
all experiences, while Wittgenstein deals with 
imponderable evidence with the primary aim of 
highlighting some features of our experience with living 
beings, and of aesthetics. Yet, within the domain of 
human life and its social and cultural practices, Dewey’s 
‘qualitative whole’ is not distant from Wittgenstein’s 
‘forms of life’, in that both perspectives, to a certain 
extent, stem from the refusal to reduce the ‘given’ to 
sense data or similar postulated entities. Both thinkers 
show themselves to be interested, instead, in catching 
the immediacy of human life in its complex and 
qualitative dimension.  
 
5. Imponderable evidence  
    and the qualitative dimension of human life 
 
The comparison with Dewey’s conception of 
qualitative thought helps us to see Wittgenstein’s notion 
of imponderable evidence in a wider framework. We 
might consider it as one example of a way of doing 
philosophy centered (or re-centered) on the qualitative 
dimension of human life and of human forms of life, that 
is, on what usually is either neglected or taken for 
granted (or neglected because taken for granted) in 
philosophy. Paying attention to imponderable evidence 
is a way of turning the direction of the gaze, as far as 
possible, to this tacit and immediate background of 
everyday practices, exchanges, and thoughts, which is, in 
the end, what gives them meaning and sense.  
Grasping this ‘whole hurly-burly, […] the background 
[which] determines our judgment, our concepts, and our 
reactions’ (in Wittgenstein’s words, RPP II § 629), or ‘the 
immediate existence of quality [as] the background, the 
point of departure, and the regulative principle of all 
thinking’ (in Dewey’s, 1930, 261) is an unusual task for 
philosophers: a background cannot be put in the 
foreground without losing its nature. The background is, 
so to speak, the shadow cone of phenomena, and 
deciding to investigate the background implies accepting 
the inevitable vagueness and blurredness of its 
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boundaries. This vagueness characterizes in particular 
the imponderable evidence regulating the expression 
and understanding of feelings and emotions, which 
varies in flexible, continuous, and irregular ways. 
Importantly, this indeterminacy is not a defect, but 
rather a constitutive feature of imponderable evidence. 
As ter Hark has it, ‘the absence of conclusive criteria is 
not a shortcoming in the evidence, but is akin to the 
impossibility of scoring a goal in tennis’ (ter Hark 2004, 
128), that is to say: indeterminacy belongs to the very 
grammar of imponderable evidence, to its rules. 
Wittgenstein explains this point by highlighting that: 
 
A sharper concept would not be the same 
concept. That is: the sharper concept wouldn't 
have the value for us that the blurred one does. 
Precisely because we would not understand 
people who act with total certainty when we are 
in doubt and uncertain (LW I § 267) 
 
Attention to the intrinsically vague ‘hurly-burly’ of 
everyday life allows us to see that epistemic certainty 
with regard to others’ feelings and emotions not only is 
impossible: more radically, it is neither attained nor 
needed, because it has no role in our life. I am not 
claiming that one does not want to be sure about others’ 
feelings: this is in fact something that happens quite 
often. Rather, the point is that this sureness (and 
unsureness) has different criteria and rules than the 
criteria and rules of justified true belief about empirical 
facts. The evidence one has of the other’s feelings is 
imponderable: it cannot be weighed according to 
quantitative standards. This is part of our life with 
others, and it is an important part of it.  
Dewey warns that losing sight of the qualitative 
dimension leaves us vulnerable to ‘a large part of the 
artificial problems and fallacies that infects our theory of 
knowledge and our metaphysics, or theories of 
existence’ (1930, 261). One of these artificial problems, 
Wittgenstein teaches us, is the urge to know, with 
quantitative methods, what is ‘inside’ a person’s head. If 
this were really achieved, as we saw in respect to the ‘lie 
detector’ example above, our form of life would not be 
better: it would be an utterly different form of life, one 
we are hardly able to conceive. A related artificial 
problem in the philosophy of mind is the idea that there 
is an ontological divide between brain and mind and a 
consequent explanatory gap that waits to be filled 
(Boncompagni 2013). Conversely, attention to 
imponderable evidence shows that ‘psychological 
indeterminacy has nothing to do with either 
unbridgeable ontological divides or epistemological 
defects, and everything with the enormous variety and 
flexibility of human life’ (ter Hark 2004, 142). The depth, 
complexity, and thickness of psychological concepts is 
saved, together with the naturalness and immediateness 
with which we ordinarily live and use them. This 
perspective more generally suggests that 
‘intersubjectivity is first and foremost based on a special, 
practical attitude of responding that precedes 
epistemological discussions of knowledge, beliefs, 
justifications, and doubts’ (Gangopadhyay and Pichler 
2016, 1318). This also makes room for a novel strategy 
that avoids skepticism with regard to other minds by 
recognizing that knowledge, as epistemology has it (i.e. 
justified true belief), is not at stake in interpersonal 
relationships. Stanley Cavell would put it this way: there 
is a truth in skepticism, namely, the truth that our 
relationship with the world and with the others is not 
primarily epistemic in character; this relationship is not 
one of knowing (Cavell 197, 45)
8
. 
Finally, there is an ethical aspect in all this. By 
returning to the imponderable evidence of the everyday 
practices with others, and claiming that this is what is 
important in our form of life, philosophy advocates for 
itself the task of educating, or re-educating, our 
sensibility towards what matters in human phenomena. 
                                                 
8
 According to Volber (2012, 110-11), reading 
Wittgenstein through these Cavellian lenses highlights a 
contrast between his philosophy and Dewey’s, a contrast 
that has to do precisely with knowledge. Though I agree 
that this is generally true, I also think that with respect 
to the topics we are dealing with, Dewey too insists that 
our relationship with quality is not one of knowing; see 
for instance Dewey 1925, 86. 
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Indeed, not being able to see and perceive the complex 
and qualitative dimension of life not only results in 
theoretical failures: what is worse in this neglectful 
attitude is that it fosters inattention and indifference in 
our relationships themselves. Not being able to see pain, 
joy, curiosity, suffering in the other’s expressions and 
gestures, or to capture subtle nuances of behavior and 
appreciate the complexity of the person in front of us, is 
the first step towards insensibility. If it ignores these 
immediate aspects of understanding in favour of 
discussions on the unknowableness of the other’s mind, 
philosophy facilitates this amnesia. If conversely it 
ceases these discussions in favour of the reappraisal of 
the everyday, immediate and yet experienced sensibility 
with regard to others’ feelings and emotions, it can help 
to focus the attention on these aspects and can enrich 
our capacity for understanding others and attuning 
ourselves to situations of interaction. 
To borrow a line of argument that Floyd (2017, 371) 
applies to the concept of acquaintance, but that (in my 
view) fits perfectly well with our topic: 
 
[Wittgenstein] returned ‘acquaintance’ to our 
everyday sense of the word: the sort of 
acquaintance, or experience, we may have with 
an object or a person or animal. This sense of 
‘acquaintance’ requires comportment, 
discernment, attunement, response, experience, 
sensitivity to context, some elements of 
convention (handshaking, nodding, smiling) and, 
in the case of a person or animal, at least some 
shared sense of interests and instincts. It 
involves looking and response, 
acknowledgement of another who is expected to 
respond back with a look. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have argued that the Wittgensteinian 
notion of imponderable evidence is an example of how 
philosophy can investigate the qualitative dimension of 
human life, a dimension in which immediacy and 
experience are interwoven in an inextricable way. After 
introducing the topic through the examination of how 
Wittgenstein accounts for the difference in our attitudes 
towards inanimate objects and living beings, I have 
considered the notion of imponderable evidence as it 
appears in his notes on the philosophy of psychology and 
in some remarks on aesthetic judgment. In order to 
clarify this notion further and to interpret it in a wider 
framework, I have invoked John Dewey’s conception of 
qualitative thought, pointing out some affinities with the 
Wittgensteinian outlook that helped to elucidate some 
aspects of it. Though the two philosophers have 
different perspectives overall, an interesting point of 
contact is that both emphasize the importance for 
philosophy of acknowledging the interplay of immediacy 
and experience in our ordinary practices and exchanges 
with the world and others. For both, the aim here is to 
‘come to understand better what is already within the 
common experience of mankind’ (Dewey 1925, 36-7), a 
task that philosophy can accomplish by paying attention 
to the pervasiveness and importance of qualitative 
elements in our existence (and co-existence).  
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ABSTRACT: Modern accounts of knowledge do not make 
much of the fact that we are bodily beings. First, 
Cartesianism assigned cognitive functions exclusively to 
the mental. Then the linguistic and the pragmatic turns 
in philosophy moved away from mind-centred 
approaches to these functions and focused on meanings 
and discursive practices, but these were also seen as 
somehow independent of the physical/material reality of 
speakers and of signs themselves. In this context, 
classical pragmatism stood as an alternative account that 
stressed corporeality as essential to knowledge 
processes. An illustration of it is John Dewey’s appeal to 
“immediate experience,” which I interpret in this 
connection as a statement about the epistemological 
significance of the somatic. 
The first section of this paper summarizes some 
traditional sources of the philosophical neglect of the 
body. In the second section I argue for an alternative 
starting point that takes the “lived body” as a sort of 
philosophical premise —a contention suggested by some 
Wittgensteinian remarks together with some interesting 
findings by the neuropsychiatrist Oliver Sacks. The third 
section discloses the affinities between such view and 
the notion of “immediate experience,” and why the 
latter is not necessarily committed to a dichotomy 
between language and experience. In the last two 
sections I face two objections that linguistic pragmatists 
typically rise against immediate experience —i.e. its 
alleged commitments to prelingualism and to 
foundationalism— and try to show that they miss the 
target. 
 
Keywords: epistemology; immediate experience; lived 
body; (neo)pragmatism; (non)discursive practices 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(*)
 This work is sponsored by the research program 
FFI2017-84781-P, co-funded by the Spanish Research 
Council and the European Regional Development Fund. 
A first version of this paper appeared in Spanish in Pablo 
Rychter (ed.), Realismo y experiencia, Valencia, Pre-
Textos, 2016, pp. 73-90. The English version appears 
here, with slight modifications, with permission of the 
Spanish editors. I wish to thank Sierra Nilsson for her 
corrections to the English manuscript. I am also grateful 
to two anonymous referees for their useful 
commentaries. 
In an ordinary sense of the terms “experience” and 
“reality,” both our experience and our sense of reality 
persuade us that we are bodily beings. If someone 
believes that she can walk through a wall, materialize 
and dematerialize at will, transport herself to a distant 
place leaving her body behind, and things of the like, we 
say that she is a half-wit and does not live in the real 
world. And if she insists that she has experienced such 
things, we conclude that her senses are somehow 
disturbed. Even those who believe that they will live 
after death as disembodied souls place that way of 
existence in a reality that transcends ours, and make 
their belief rest on faith, not on human experience. 
However, philosophical discussions of these very terms, 
“experience” and “reality,” tend to pay little attention to 
the human body. One can understand that 
“metaphysical revisionists” —as Peter Strawson (1959) 
called the philosophers who try to replace the structure 
of our ordinary general concepts with an allegedly better 
one— depict reality in a way that, when deprived of its 
philosophical justification, resembles that of the 
deranged person. One can also understand that 
philosophers who do not credit experience as a means to 
assess the real indulge themselves with statements that 
experience would easily revoke.
1
 But it is cause for 
surprise that philosophers who oppose such revisionisms 
and try to dismiss them have not taken more advantage 
of the connection amongst the body, the real, and the 
experienced, that our common speech so clearly 
embraces. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 But one can share at the same time Paul Feyerabend’s 
perplexity regarding these philosophical efforts: “Why 
are so many people dissatisfied with what they can see 
and feel? Why do they look for surprises behind events? 
Why do they believe that, taken together, these 
surprises form an entire world, and why, most strangely, 
do they take it for granted that this hidden world is more 
solid, more trustworthy, more ‘real’ than the world from 
which they started?” (1999: vii). 
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1. The lost body 
 
The neglect of the human body within the mainstream 
of Western philosophy goes back to Plato, whose 
influence pervaded Neoplatonist doctrines and then was 
rapidly subsumed in the early philosophical systems of 
the Middle Ages. The influence was so strong that it 
eclipsed other Ancient schools, like the Cyrenaics, the 
Stoics, or the Cynics, where concern with the body was 
taken as a central issue. As a matter of fact, Plato’s 
influence was so determinative that it cast a shadow 
even over Socrates’s opinion, phrased by Xenophon in 
the following terms: 
 
The body is valuable for all human activities, and 
in all its uses it is very important that it should be 
as fit as possible. Even in the act of thinking, 
which is supposed to require least assistance 
from the body, everyone knows that serious 
mistakes often happen through physical ill-
health (quoted in Shusterman 2000: 267-8). 
 
In Modern philosophy, Descartes admittedly 
consolidated the isolation of thought activities from 
bodily processes by construing the relationship between 
them as that of a (problematic) communication between 
two different, self-sufficient entities. Thus a 
“metaphysical problem” emerged —and we all know 
that the adjective “metaphysical” evokes as pessimistic 
prognoses when applied to problems, as the adjective 
“lethal” does when applied to diseases. Descartes, 
however, did not ignore that an ill condition of the body 
can cause serious mistakes in judgment. This was 
precisely one of the reasons for him to distrust the 
senses as a reliable source of knowledge —like the 
Ancient skeptics did before him. But he did not draw the 
seemingly obvious conclusion that a good condition of 
the body should count therefore as a necessary, though 
probably not a sufficient, condition of reliable judgment. 
Descartes acknowledged that without sense experience 
we would not be able to complete our scientific picture 
of the world in all its particularities (1998: 249), but he 
firmly believed that the first principles of the world order 
revealed themselves to pure reason only, “pure” 
meaning a faculty that does not depend upon bodily 
operations. 
Most contemporary epistemology is —or purports to 
be— anti-Cartesian in two important respects: it 
condemns foundationalist views of knowledge as well as 
vocabularies that refer ultimately to “the mental.” The 
latter, however, is not accompanied in the least by the 
conjugate vindication of the corporeal as an 
indispensable constituent of knowledge. It is quite true 
that the so-called “strong program” in naturalized 
epistemology strives to redirect philosophers’ attention 
to the study of the organic processes underlying 
cognitive functions. But it is hard to see, for those who 
do not commit to that program, how a better 
understanding, say, of brain activity would shed any light 
by itself on such epistemological questions as 
justification, objectivity, or realism, which in fact are 
begged in the very use of brain science as a source of 
relevant answers. On the other hand, and more to my 
point here, the program does not account for the 
inherent relationship (if there is any) between 
knowledge and the body. The latter is, I think, the 
conceptual challenge that Cartesian metaphysics left us 
to cope with, not the empirical challenge of finding out 
physical counterparts for mental operations.
2
 
 
2. “Here is one leg” 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the contemporary 
philosophers who can help in coping with the 
aforementioned challenge; even though his philosophy 
                                                 
2
 Descartes did not deny that such correlations exist, and 
he himself looked hard for them. It is a common mistake 
to think that Descartes held that the self is just a mind or 
spirit and not, de facto, also flesh and blood; this is 
already evident from the full argument of Meditations 
on First Philosophy and even more so from his work as a 
whole. Nevertheless, that mind and body are 
“numerically the same” did not mean for Descartes that 
they are “essentially” or conceptually one. See footnote 
4 bellow —and, for a full discussion of this point, Ors & 
Sanfélix 2014. 
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is not directly concerned with epistemology, it still 
suggests reasons to think that epistemologists’ 
inattentiveness to the corporeal dimension of human 
beings has misled them in important ways. 
When Wittgenstein states that one cannot doubt 
whether one has a body (1979: §257), his statement 
should strike not only Cartesians but also 
“neurophilosophers.” For one thing, if I think of my body 
as an observable object among others, or as a mere 
“material thing,” it does not seem that the proposition “I 
am a material thing” has a privileged epistemic status, 
for the question “What is a material thing?” has not an 
evident answer. If I take “matter” to mean what physics 
says about such entities as fields and particles, or such 
magnitudes as mass, force, or movement, I must accept 
that my own material nature is no more transparent to 
me than is the material nature, say, of Mars. In this 
respect, my being a piece of matter, according to 
whatever description of matter provided by physical 
theory, is known to me indirectly and only as far as I 
commit to that theory. Hence, it is not indubitable 
knowledge. 
Certainly, the notion of matter admits of 
descriptions that are independent of our present 
scientific framework, though not independent of any 
framework of thought whatsoever. A cursory historical 
survey would show that the meaning of the term 
“matter” has shifted many times; or, more properly, that 
to read Aristotle’s “hylé,” Descartes’ “res extensa,” and 
Popper’s “first world” (just to mention some 
representative cases) as if they all referred 
interchangeably to “matter” is a convenient expedient 
but not a rigorous view. Now, what is significant about 
Wittgenstein’s above statement is precisely that it does 
not seem to depend on any particular framework of 
thought concerning material entities in general. 
On the contrary, this statement brings to the 
foreground the discontinuity existing between what we 
know about things like Mars, particles, or what science 
generically calls “bodies”, on one hand, and the 
awareness that we ourselves are corporeal, on the 
other. According to Wittgenstein, what I know is that 
about which I can give or ask for reasons, produce or 
demand proofs, rise or resolve doubts, etc. In a word, 
knowledge is discursive. Then, the statement that one 
cannot doubt whether one has a body amounts to say 
that the awareness of our own bodies is not discursive, 
in this sense. This is the reason why we cannot make 
sense of doubting or proving that we have a body; nor 
can we use such awareness —as G. E. Moore (1993a) 
wrongly thought— as a premise in order to prove the 
existence of “bodies” in general. The question is, then: 
how that body that we indubitably have —not the one 
that we tentatively know to need oxygen in order to live 
and neurons in order to think— intervenes in 
knowledge? 
The first thing to be noticed in this connection is that 
one experiences that body. This may sound vaguely 
esoteric, for this experience is not of the same sort as 
the one that a physicist, a physician, or a neurologist 
may have of a human body as an “observable object,” 
and this fact seems to suggest that the kind of 
experience involved here is out of reach for science. 
However, some scientists think that the converse is true: 
it is the reductionism exerted by science when it comes 
to think of the human body —in what the neuroscientist 
Alexander Luria labelled as the “veterinary approach”
3
— 
that impedes a scientific outlook on the subject. Oliver 
Sacks, one of Luria’s followers, points at the Cartesian 
bias of this reductionism: 
 
It is clear, first and foremost, that our bodies are 
personal —that they are the first definers of ego 
or self. (“The ego is first and foremost a body-
ego,” as Freud writes.) But none of this has really 
entered neurology. Neurology still bases itself on 
a mechanical model [...]. The mechanical model 
goes back to Descartes, to his dichotomous 
division of body and soul, his notion of the body 
as an automaton, with a knowing-willing “I” 
somehow floating above it. 
But clinical and personal experience —an 
experience such as I relate in this book— is 
totally incompatible with such a duality; it shows 
                                                 
3
 See Sacks 2012: 202. 
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the bankruptcy of the classical model (2012: 
203). 
 
The appeal to “clinical and personal experience,” coming 
from a scientist, should catch the attention of 
epistemologists with a naturalistic disposition. On the 
other hand, it is telling that Sacks thought of 
Wittgenstein when he underwent the astonishing 
experience that he recollects in his book: the temporary 
“loss” of one of his legs as a result of an operation after a 
mountain accident. His left leg was still there after the 
operation, but not only was he unable to feel it and 
unable to move it, but he did not even recognize it as his, 
that it was an integral part of his body, or as belonging to 
him. To all empirical effects, that inert limb had ceased 
to be a part of his personal, corporeal reality, and seeing 
it stuck to his body was revolting and terrifying for him. 
This syndrome had been described earlier in psychiatry 
books as a mere hysteric disorder, but now Sacks had 
found out that it had a neurologic basis —it was a 
mistake in judgment caused by an illness of the body, so 
to say. Going through that experience in the first person 
made him understand in what relationship his personal 
self stood to his body in an entirely new way. In 
describing the struggle that took place inside him while 
lying in bed and trying to assimilate intellectually what 
he was living, Sacks writes: 
 
I heard, in Wittgenstein’s voice, the opening 
words of his last work, On Certainty: “If you can 
say, Here is one leg, we’ll grant you all the rest... 
The question is, whether it can make sense to 
doubt it.” (And only later did I realize that my 
memory, or imagination, had interposed “leg” 
for “hand.”) “Certainty,” for Wittgenstein, was 
grounded in the certainty of the body. But the 
certainty of the body was grounded in action 
(2012: 65). 
 
The kind of experience described by Sacks (the loss of 
certainty regarding a part of his observable body) and 
Wittgenstein’s statement both invalidate the analysis 
according to which the proposition “I am a body” is the 
inclusion of an individual term within a general concept, 
as, for instance, in “Mars is a body.” My corporeity and 
that that I can attribute to any other observable thing 
apart from me are “categorially” different, for I 
experience other things as being corporeal, while my 
experiencing things (including my experiencing myself) is 
somatic in itself. A way to stress the difference I am 
pointing at would be to distinguish between “the 
observed body” and “the lived (or personal) body.”
4
 
During his episode, Sacks still could observe his left leg, 
but he did not live (in) that part of his body any more. 
Complementary to this, the remark that one cannot 
doubt whether one has a body conveys our sense that 
we do not know what it would be like to live a 
disembodied life.
5
 Now, in adding that the certainty of 
our own body is grounded in action, Sacks is expressing 
an insight that leads to an alternative analysis of the 
proposition “I am a body:” namely, the experience of 
being a body is not a conceptual apprehension, it is 
immediate, because it is primarily practical. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 It is fair to acknowledge that this distinction did not 
escape Descartes, who differentiated the body as 
“united to the soul” from the body as “a determinate 
part of matter” in one of his letters (February 9, 1645) to 
Mesland: “First of all, I consider what exactly is the body 
of a man, and I find that this word ‘body’ is very 
ambiguous. When we speak of a body in general, we 
mean a determinate part of matter, a part of the 
quantity of which the universe is composed. In this 
sense, if the smallest amount of that quantity were 
removed, we would judge without more ado that the 
body was smaller and no longer complete; and if any 
particle of the matter were changed, we would at once 
think that the body was no longer quite the same, no 
longer numerically the same. But when we speak of the 
body of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of 
matter, or one that has a determinate size; we mean 
simply the whole of the matter which is united with the 
soul of that man. And so, even though that matter 
changes, and its quantity increases or decreases, we still 
believe that it is the same body, numerically the same 
body, so long as it remains joined and substantially 
united with the same soul” (1991: 242-243). I thank 
Vicente Sanfélix for calling my attention to this passage. 
5
 Maybe for this reason most Christians believe in a 
material resurrection with a restored human body, not 
just in the resurrection of the individual soul. The 
restoration of the material body is needed to make 
sense of the idea of immortality as eternal personal life. 
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3. The practical character of immediate experience 
 
Sacks quotes from a letter that Alexander Luria 
addressed to him: “The body is a unity of actions, and if 
a part of the body is split off from action, it becomes 
‘alien’ and not felt as part of the body” (2012: 166). 
These words could have well been written by William 
James —to whom Sacks also refers several times in his 
book. As a matter of fact, classical pragmatists conceived 
the practical character of experience precisely in the 
sense that having an experience is an inherently somatic 
affaire. For instance, when John Dewey spoke of 
“immediate qualitative experience”
6
 he did not mean a 
pre-conceptual content presumably given in experience, 
but the specific way in which each situation, as it is 
experienced by the subject, evokes an active response —
a sensory-motor reaction in the first place— to the 
contents there presented.
7
 Pragmatically considered, 
every experience is, so to say, an awareness of the 
potentialities of the active body within the situation 
given at that moment. 
The most outstanding feature of this pragmatic 
concept of experience is that it is radically non-
solipsistic. Dewey used to remind William James’ remark 
that the term “experience” is “double-barreled,” for it 
points in two directions simultaneously: 
                                                 
6
 See Dewey 1971: 73-74 and Dewey 1991a and 1991b. 
7
 According to Dewey, the fact that experienced 
situations are invested with a specific quality is also at 
the basis of the intellectual operations that the subject 
makes with “ideas” referring to those experiences: 
“When I think of a nest why does a bird come into my 
mind? As a matter of contiguity, there are multitudinous 
leaves and twigs which are more frequently and more 
obviously juxtaposed than is a bird. When I think of a 
hammer, why is the idea of nail so likely to follow? Such 
questions suggest, I hope, that even in seemingly casual 
cases of association, there is an underlying quality which 
operates to control the connection of objects thought of. 
It takes something else than contiguity to effect 
association; there must be relevancy of both ideas to a 
situation defined by unity of quality” (Dewey 1991a: 
257-258). That unity of quality lies not within the 
situation itself but in the subject’s active disposition to 
that situation, as the example of the hammer clearly 
illustrates. 
Like its congeners, life and history, it includes 
what men do and suffer, what they strive for, 
love, believe and endure, and also how men act 
and are acted upon, the ways in which they do 
and suffer [...], in short, processes of 
experiencing. [...] It is “double-barrelled” in that 
it recognizes in its primary integrity no division 
between act and material, subject and object, 
but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality. 
“Thing” and “thought,” as James says in the 
same connection, are single-barrelled; they refer 
to products discriminated by reflection out of 
primary experience (1971: 10-11). 
 
That is to say, primary (i.e. immediate, qualitative, 
unanalyzed, non-discursive, practical) experience does 
not confront us “solipsistically” with our own body, if 
this means that it does not comprise also the shakes, 
pressures, and resistances coming from what is not our 
body. It is not accidental that Dewey links “experience,” 
“life,” and “history,” because “I am a body” entails my 
being immersed in a temporal course of events, my 
feeling impacts from the environment as well as my 
having a sense of traction on it. Could I not doubt that I 
am a body but do doubt that it is alive and has a 
history?
8
 Thus, primary experience, far from committing 
us to subjectivism, reveals subjectivism to be a 
misrepresentation of experience itself where the 
abstract dialectic of concepts overlooks the functional 
inseparability of single-barreled terms like “subject” and 
“object,” “act” and “material,” “thought” and “thing,” 
thus concealing the fact that what is experienced and 
the act of experiencing it entail each other, just as what 
is lived entails the process of living it, or the happening 
of some event entails the fact that it happens to 
somebody —i.e. to some body. 
It is not hazardous to presume that such 
epistemological problems as realism, objectivity, or 
skepticism, would have had a different discussion if their 
                                                 
8
 Moore himself, when he produced his “list of truisms,” 
already implicitly linked the existence of a human body 
with its being a living thing existing in time: “There exists 
at present a living human body, which is my body. This 
body was born at a certain time in the past, and has 
existed continuously ever since, though not without 
undergoing changes” (1993b: 107). 
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departing point would have been a “somatic experience” 
of the type sketched here. Next, I will consider two 
reasons why this trail was not, in fact, followed. In a 
somewhat paradoxical fashion, both have to do with the 
anti-Cartesian spirit of contemporary epistemology, for 
in its laudable effort to evade foundationalism and mind-
centered approaches to knowledge, it, however, fell prey 
to the same oblivion of the body as the Cartesian view 
did. 
 
4. Body and language 
 
The first reason seems rather obvious: the linguistic turn 
in philosophy would have precluded the vindication of 
anything that may present itself as “non-discursive” and, 
to that extent, extra-linguistic. However, I use the 
conditional tense because the case is not that simple. 
Nelson Goodman once summarized the evolution of 
mainstream contemporary epistemology in the following 
sequence: 
 
[It] began when Kant exchanged the structure of 
the world for the structure of the mind, 
continued when C. I. Lewis exchanged the 
structure of the mind for the structure of 
concepts, and [...] now proceeds to exchange the 
structure of concepts for the structure of the 
several symbol systems of the sciences, 
philosophy, the arts, perception, and everyday 
discourse (1978: x). 
 
According to this narrative, the linguistic turn redirected 
philosophical scrutiny from the Cartesian mind, 
formalized later by Kant as a rigid structure of 
possibilities impressed a priori upon our subjectivity, to 
the languages that codify the symbol systems that make 
thought possible in the first place. This way, the 
mind/body opposition seems no longer fundamental 
inasmuch as languages are not seen as primary mental 
realities. Therefore, the linguistic turn did not imply by 
itself that the old view in which the body was left out of 
the picture should subsist, but something else is needed 
to explain why a philosophy that redirects scrutiny to the 
linguistic remains indifferent to the body. In other 
words, the dualism that concerns us now is not that 
between mind and body, but that between body and 
language. 
This “something else” is the view that language is 
essentially a vehicle for discourse, that is, a view that 
equates linguistic competence with the ability to 
connect meanings in terms of truth-functional relations. 
The most recent and explicit expression of this view is 
Robert Brandom’s “semantic inferentialism,” which 
defines language users as individuals that get into 
normative commitments within the practice of giving 
and asking for reasons (see 2000); but it has an old 
ancestry, for it descends from that Modern tradition that 
made the term “experience” to mean a repository of 
“impressions” whose whole function and use were to 
validate “ideas” or “concepts,” that is, a tradition to 
which experience was philosophically relevant only 
because of its justificatory relationship to knowledge. 
Thus, when the structure of concepts was exchanged by 
linguistic structures, to use Goodman’s phrase, there 
remained the habit of thinking of the latter as nothing 
more than a scaffolding for reasoning —a habit, by the 
way, that Goodman himself avoids, for the symbol 
systems that he mentions above include systems that 
are not inferentially articulated, like perception or the 
arts, along with others that indeed have this articulation, 
like philosophy or the sciences. 
To a philosophy of language that understands the 
linguistic only as a manifestation of discursive reasoning, 
the body remains as irrelevant to the comprehension of 
linguistic practices as it was, before the linguistic turn, to 
the comprehension of the activities of the mind. 
However, not everything in language is reasoning, as 
true as not everything in experience is cognition. As 
indicated earlier, Wittgenstein remarked that our 
experience of being a body cannot be conjugated with 
epistemologically-laden verbs such as “know,” “believe,” 
“doubt,” or “justify.” For Goodman, on the other hand, 
the range of language extends to non-inferentially 
articulated symbol systems like the arts. From the 
standpoint of these philosophers, thus, the 
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abandonment of mind-centered approaches imposed by 
the linguistic turn does not commit us per force to a new 
dualism between (discursive) language and (non-
discursive) bodies. 
Moreover, such dualism seems explicitly precluded 
in Wittgenstein’s case by his peculiar way of relating 
linguistic to non-linguistic behaviour —i.e. to bodily 
movements— within “language-games.” His 
Philosophical Investigations opens with a paragraph of 
Augustine’s Confessions where different movements of 
the body are mentioned at least five times in scarcely 
ten lines —“corpus ad aliquid movebant,” “ostendere,” 
“ex motu corporis,” “vultu et nutu oculorum,” 
“membrorum actu”— as necessarily accompanying the 
utterances of words (1981: I, §1). And, in the “primitive 
language” that Wittgenstein imagines in the subsequent 
paragraph in order to criticize Augustine’s concept of 
meaning, communication between a builder and her 
assistant consists of a sort of choreography where 
utterances —“block,” “pillar,” “slab,” “beam”— are 
combined with the movement of their arms passing the 
stones from one to the other (I, §2).
9
 Brandom argues 
(2011: 31), consistently enough with his own theoretical 
assumptions, that the latter is not in fact a case of 
linguistic communication, provided that the rules that 
both participants follow in using words do not involve 
inferential commitments. However, Brandom’s 
contention that the participants are not saying, i.e. that 
their behaviour is “vocal” but not “verbal,” seems to me 
a mere stipulation in order to preserve his own 
restrictive definition of what should count as 
“language.”
10
 
 
                                                 
9
 As Wittgenstein‘s “counterexample” reveals, it is not 
the intervention of bodily movements what he thinks 
mistaken in Augustine’s picture of the acquisition of 
language. 
10
 Wittgenstein, in contrast, limits himself to observe 
that this would be only “a language more primitive than 
ours” (ibid.). I have developed more fully this criticism of 
Brandom’s narrow concept of “linguistic practice” 
elsewhere (see Faerna 2014). 
Earlier than Wittgenstein, John Dewey (1987: 67 ff.) 
had already conceived meaning as inseparable from non-
linguistic behaviour, not by imagining more primitive 
forms of language but simply by observing how linguistic 
abilities emerge in real contexts of psychological 
development. Before they are able to speak, children 
learn how to say what they need or want by crying. They 
say it because their cries are intended to evoke a certain 
response; that is, these cries are already speech-acts,
11
 
in contrast to the involuntary cries that the baby effects 
as mere vocal counterparts of its organic condition. In 
these rudimentary utterances, the primary use of 
language as a signal-system for human communication 
reveals itself —a function that could by no means be 
accomplished without a parallel display of motions, 
gestures, grimaces, glances, and other forms of body 
expression. In a substantial sense, therefore, we learn —
and teach— to talk with and from our bodies within 
practical contexts or situations that involve physical 
action; it is only as a part of such practical situations that 
“language-games” can take place. 
This explains Wittgenstein’s dictum that “language 
did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination” (1979, 
§ 475). Anyway, Dewey and Wittgenstein were not 
thinking from scratch. Dewey, for instance, quotes the 
Danish linguist Otto Jespersen in support of the idea that 
language emerged in connection with such physical 
activities as dancing and singing, where playful 
dimensions overtake intellectual reasoning.
12
 Situations 
                                                 
11
 Let me note in passing that not only the approach to 
language inspired by “the second Wittgenstein,” but also 
that stemming from John Austin’s theory of speech-acts, 
challenges inferentialist semantics and pays attention to 
non-discursive dimensions of linguistic behaviour. 
12
 “Language originated as play, and the organs of 
speech where first trained in this singing sport of idle 
hours” (Jespersen 1894: 355). Dewey’s quotation from 
Jespersen in Experience and Nature (where the author’s 
name is misspelled as “Jesperson”) comes from pages 
356-357 of the same work: “[Jespersen] says that many 
linguistic philosophers appear to ‘imagine our primitive 
ancestors after their own image as serious and well 
meaning men, endowed with a large share of common 
sense ... They leave you with the impression that these 
first framers of speech were sedate citizens with a strong 
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as those described by Jespersen, Wittgenstein or Dewey, 
in spite of being pre-discursive —or maybe because of 
this fact— disclose the original use of language tools, 
namely, to serve as symbolic systems that channel and 
shape shared practices within human communities.
13
 
The philosophers of the linguistic turn proceeded in 
due course to a “pragmatic turn” that gave pre-
eminence to language as practice, but this second turn 
was not of the type advocated by Dewey or 
Wittgenstein, where the practice involved was not 
linguistic through-and-through. Had it been of that type, 
epistemological inquiries would have been likely 
readdressed toward problems less concerned with 
justification and much more involved in what can be 
loosely called “philosophy of culture.” The naturalization 
of epistemology would have then turned an eye to 
disciplines like anthropology, history, sociology, or 
psychology, instead of plunging into neurophysiology —
that “quaint favorite child of the analytic philosophers,” 
as Jürgen Habermas calls it (1990: 15).
14
 This would have 
been so because the rationale of the practice that 
supports language as a whole refers ultimately to 
                                                                       
interest in the purely business and matter of fact aspects 
of life.’ [...] He concludes that the ‘genesis of language is 
found ... in the poetic side of life; the source of speech is 
not gloomy seriousness, but merry play and youthful 
hilarity’” (Dewey 1971: 71). It is not unlikely that 
Jespersen had also partially inspired Wittgenstein’s 
association of language with games. I thank Nicolás 
Sánchez Durá for pinpointing the exact reference to 
Jespersen’s work, which is missing in Dewey’s book. 
13
 Dewey stressed the difference between language 
considered as a means for communication, this being its 
primary function as a cultural device, and language 
considered as a means for inquiry, or as ordered 
discourse, which appeared later as a result of cultural 
evolution and intellectual maturation (see Faerna 2014: 
365-368). 
14
 This shift toward cultural naturalism is being 
demanded by philosophers nowadays like Thomas 
Alexander: “It is high time we started thinking about 
‘philosophy of culture’ rather than ‘philosophy of mind’ 
and turned toward anthropology and semiotics rather 
than physics, neurology, or information theory. One 
could even speak of reviving the idea of a philosophy of 
symbolic forms” (2014: 67). Alexander does not see this 
as a turn within epistemology, but rather as a move 
away from it (79-80), but I take this to be a verbal 
question mainly. 
experience in the pragmatic, double-barreled sense: i.e. 
to situations in which speakers find themselves, to 
existing needs and ends in view —in a word, to the 
experience, life, and history of human bodies. This 
means that linguistic experience and somatic experience 
are not only merged in origin, but they remain 
inseparable all the way down. Linguistic meaning and 
“the lived body” cannot be severed apart. When 
Wittgenstein anchors language games to “forms of life,” 
he is thinking of the bodies that we human beings live in 
no less than of the social habits that we incorporate. For 
this reason, when he wants to illustrate a situation 
where linguistic communication is entirely hopeless, he 
does not ask us to imagine the talk of an alien or a 
barbarian, but the talk of a lion (1981 II xi: 223).
15
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 In the same paragraph, just before saying that “if a 
lion could talk, we could not understand him,” 
Wittgenstein admits that “one human being can be a 
complete enigma to another. We learn this when we 
come into a strange country with entirely strange 
traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of 
the country’s language. We do not understand the 
people.” He contrasts this with our feeling that “some 
people [...] are transparent to us,” in the sense that we 
do not think that there is something “internal [in them 
that] is hidden from us.” For example, “if I see someone 
writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the 
same, his feelings are hidden from me.” The second 
example qualifies, I think, the statement that one person 
can be “a complete enigma” to another person; note 
that, if the woman writhing in pain is from a strange 
country, this does not affect in the least my feeling that I 
understand her. The fact that writhing in pain is a case of 
body expression supports the point I am trying to make, 
for it is her being a human body that convinces me that 
she and I share a form of life. It is wholly different with 
animals; even if we learn to interpret their movements 
—as intimidating, submissive, attentive, distrusting, 
menacing, and so on— we cannot know what it is for 
them to have the corresponding experience, even if we 
avoid conceiving it in solipsistic terms. We cannot say 
what it would be like to be a lion or a bat, they are not 
transparent to us (unless we decide to think so; see 
Faerna 2002 for more on this). 
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5. Experience and the Given 
 
Let us proceed now to the second reason that explains 
why epistemology after the linguistic turn still remains 
unconcerned with our bodily dimension. The first 
reason, I have argued, had to do with the wrong idea 
that the non-discursive character of bodily experience 
separates it from public language and confines it to the 
private sphere of “mental states”. The second one 
alleges that, even if the language/body dichotomy is 
somehow overcome by following Dewey’s or 
Wittgenstein’s account of language, an appeal to 
experience in any of its forms will take us back to the 
second mortal sin of Cartesianism: foundationalism. 
The concept of experience has been surely the 
foremost victim of the epistemology inspired by the 
linguistic turn, ironic as this may be for a tradition that 
originated in logical empiricism. A second irony is that 
the strongest efforts to obliterate the term “experience” 
came from philosophers as fond of pragmatism as 
Richard Rorty or the above-mentioned Brandom, 
provided that it is hard to pick a single page from James’ 
or Dewey’s works that does not contain the term several 
times —not to mention titles like Experience and Nature 
or Essay in Radical Empiricism—.
16
 
Rorty’s version of the argument
17
 contends that the 
use of “experience” in epistemological contexts always 
involves an attempt to make knowledge rest upon 
something outside language, which means something 
that transcends the contingency of our vocabularies and 
reveals how the world really is —or how it can be 
univocally known. Any attempt of this sort —the 
argument proceeds— falls prey to what Wilfrid Sellars 
called “the myth of the Given:” i.e. the idea that 
something that is pre-conceptually given can provide 
                                                 
16
 The most recent summary of the present pragmatist 
debate on experience is Hildebrand 2014. 
17
 Rorty combats the appeal to experience by 
philosophers prior to the linguistic turn, like Dewey 
(Rorty 1982a), as well as subsequent to it, like McDowell 
(Rorty 1998). 
evidence for or against propositional (therefore 
conceptualized) assertions. 
It is true that what Dewey or James termed 
“experience” (or what Wittgenstein called “certainties”) 
should be taken as something given, for it is not a 
conceptual elaboration, it is not attained by inference, 
and it is not the propositional content of a belief. Now, 
to affirm that there can be something given in this sense 
is not in itself to commit “the myth of the Given,” for the 
affirmation does not entail that the given element serves 
as an independent instance to assess the truth-value of 
judgments, or as a foundation of knowledge.
18
 As stated 
earlier, to see every experience as conveying knowledge 
is reductionist, and Rorty incurs this sort of reductionism 
in assuming that if experience cannot have the role of a 
foundation in epistemological contexts, then it cannot 
have any role whatsoever. 
To say that experience is something “given” amounts 
to say only that it is something “had,” as opposed to 
something that we do or produce.
19
 But etymologically 
the term “given” evokes the Latin word “datum” and so 
the given seems to refer to a collection of “data.” The 
dictionary defines “datum” as “something known or 
assumed; information from which conclusions can be 
inferred,”
20
 and this semantic resonance makes Rorty’s 
argument appear plausible enough. But the precedent 
discussion should have made clear that experience in the 
pragmatic sense has little to do with the artificial, 
atomistic notion of a “repository of data” for justificatory 
                                                 
18
 “It does not follow [from the argument based on the 
myth of the Given] that philosophy should never concern 
itself with the nondiscursive. Drawing this conclusion 
means assuming that philosophy’s only possible use for 
nondiscursive experience is in justificational 
epistemology, and that assumption is neither self-
evident nor argued for” (Shusterman 1997: 171-172). 
19
 Thomas Alexander has noted that, although 
pragmatism is generally associated with the primacy of 
action or “doing”, Dewey considered that “undergoing” 
is prior: “Undergoing is what Dewey also calls ‘having,” 
the qualitative, determinate immediacy of existence as 
the outcome of a history of events” (2014: 75, see also n. 
31). 
20
 Quoted from Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third 
College Edition; emphases added. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IN  SE A R C H  O F  L O S T  BO D Y :  ON  PR A G M A T I S M ,  E X P E R I E N C E ,  A N D  LA N G U A G E   
Á n g e l  M .  F a e r n a  
 
 
 116
purposes, i.e. the concept of experience that Modern 
philosophy coined in order to foster its foundationalist 
epistemological agenda.
21
 Thus, this line of argument 
moves in a vicious circle. In order to break it, we should 
ask first, not what particular role experience can play 
within knowledge, but whether it is at all possible to 
make sense of knowledge pragmatically without that 
“minimal empiricism” that takes into account what is 
“given” to us, or what we immediately “have” in the 
form of situations, needs, and purposes in which our 
language-games take place. If everything in discursive 
knowledge reduces itself to a negotiation over 
meanings, what can account for the existence of 
discursive knowledge itself as a practice? One can dodge 
this question if one is ready to say that there exists no 
practice other than linguistic practice. Although some 
philosophers seem ready to say that, their move does 
not take us away from the pitfalls of Modern 
epistemology, but rather takes us back to the long 
shadow casted by Plato. As Richard Shusterman 
persuasively puts it: 
 
Textualist ideology has been extremely helpful in 
dissuading philosophy from misguided quests for 
absolute foundations outside our contingent 
linguistic and social practices. But in making this 
therapeutic point, [...] textualism also 
encourages an unhealthy idealism that identifies 
human-being-in-the-world with linguistic activity 
and so tends to neglect or overly textualize 
nondiscursive somatic experience. As “the 
contemporary counterpart of [nineteenth 
century] idealism,” textualism displays idealism’s 
disdain for materiality, hence for the corporeal. 
[...] The whole project of policing the borders 
between “the logical space of reasons” and the 
realm of “physical causes” so as to confine 
philosophy to the former is just one more 
assertion of the old dualism of separating the 
concerns of the superior soul from the 
corruption of the material body (1997: 173-174; 
the terms between quotation marks are from 
Rorty 1982b). 
                                                 
21
 As a matter of fact, it was Peirce who, as early as 1868, 
gave the foundationalist agenda the deathblow with his 
criticism of the faculty of “intuition” (i.e. a cognition not 
determined by previous cognitions) in “Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (Peirce 
1992) 
The distinction between reasons and causes is one of 
those conceptual tools that are useful as long as they are 
not construed as a philosophical dichotomy. It shows its 
limitations when one tries to take the abandonment of 
the Cartesian dualism seriously. For if we adopt the 
pragmatist definition of belief as habit
22
 and admit that 
habits belong, per se, to the body, it will be difficult for 
us to see the reasons that support our beliefs 
(discursively) as totally independent of the causes that 
make our bodies acquire their habits (physically).
23
 
Rorty’s target is the idea that experience is a source 
of “data” to render the exact, univocal depiction of 
things, but his argument, in fact, deprives language of 
the capacity that he himself claims for it when he invites 
us to create new vocabularies that allow for better forms 
of life.
24
 If transforming our ways of speaking can 
diminish the existing violence and suffering, how can we 
deny, then, that there is a connection between the 
meanings we use and the somatic experience that is 
expressed and reinforced through them? Although the 
foundationalist ideal of a “tribunal of experience” must 
be dismissed, the ulterior dismissal of experience at 
large in accounting for our linguistic practices seems to 
take things definitely too far.
25
 Rorty’s and Brandom’s 
                                                 
22
 According to Alexander Bain’s famous definition, of 
which “pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary” 
(Peirce 1998: 399). 
23
 This insight was anticipated by Spinoza, the Modern 
philosopher that made most to escape the Cartesian 
dualism of mind and body: “Human affairs, of course, 
would be conducted far more happily if it were equally 
in man’s power to be silent and to speak. But experience 
teaches all too plainly that men have nothing less in their 
power than their tongue, and can do nothing less than 
moderate their appetites. [...] The decisions of the Mind 
are nothing but the appetites themselves, which 
therefore vary as the disposition of the Body varies” 
(1988: 496-497). 
24
 I follow Shusterman (1997: 172-173) on this point. 
Shusterman observes in the same place that Rorty 
admitted (in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity) that the 
distinction between reasons and causes loses utility once 
we abandon the idea that language “represents” the 
world. 
25
 I suspect that Rorty’s criticism of McDowell is biased 
by the fact that the latter slips the term “tribunal” in his 
characterization of “minimal empiricism,” i.e. “the idea 
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mistake is not so much to have despised experience than 
to have assumed that whoever uses this term is enlisted 
in doing bad epistemology. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Those symbolic systems that Nelson Goodman talked 
about are generally understood nowadays as aggregates 
of socially regulated practices, not as mere linguistic 
objectifications of what previous theories of knowledge 
had put inside the subject’s mind. If one is not willing to 
repeat the old dualism of mind and body, or the more 
recent one of language and body, in the form of a third 
dichotomy between linguistic and non-linguistic games 
—let me remind that “non-linguistic games” are what 
really matters if philosophy is to be of any human 
interest, for they are the arena in which happiness and 
unhappiness, life and death are decided—, the 
assessment of such practices should involve something 
that, in the absence of a better word, can only be 
described as “experience.” This experience does not 
reside in mind nor vanish in language; it does not supply 
us with “data” to adjudicate truth-values among 
propositions taken one by one; it cannot put us in touch 
with a univocal reality placed beyond the contingency of 
our vocabularies; but it is the experience enjoyed and 
suffered by our material bodies, one that links the 
                                                                       
that experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating 
the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as 
it must be if we are to make sense of it as thinking at all” 
(McDowell 1996: xii). “Mediate” is a function that admits 
of non-foundationalist interpretations, but Rorty’s reply 
turns again, all the same, to the distinction between 
reasons and causes: “One of the ways in which we 
interact with [things and persons] is through their effects 
on our sensory organs and other parts of our bodies. 
[We should] be content with an account of the world as 
exerting control on our inquiries in a merely causal way, 
rather than as exerting what McDowell calls ‘rational 
control’” (1998: 140). I insist that a philosophical 
dichotomy between reasons and causes is an 
unnecessarily high price to pay for the rejection of 
foundationalism, for it renders all the interactions that 
our bodies have with persons and things completely 
irrelevant to epistemology, as nineteenth century 
idealism did. 
discourse of knowledge to specific existential conditions, 
that does not sever justificatory practices from the 
activity of evaluating, reproducing, and transforming 
forms of life. This experience links together the space of 
reasons and the space of causes, without confusing 
them but also without making of them something too 
close to the Kantian distinction between “phenomena” 
and “noumena.” 
Experience in the pragmatic sense not only defies 
traditional and recent dichotomies in epistemology, it 
also fights cultural divisions as those decried by John 
Dewey: 
 
Traditional theories in philosophy and 
psychology have accustomed us to sharp 
separations between physiological and organic 
processes on the one hand and the higher 
manifestations of culture in science and art on 
the other. The separations are summed up in the 
common division made between mind and body. 
These theories have also accustomed us to draw 
rigid separations between the logical, strictly 
intellectual, operations which terminate in 
science, the emotional and imaginative 
processes which dominate poetry, music and to 
a lesser degree the plastic arts, and the practical 
doings which rule our daily life and which result 
in industry, business and political affairs (1991b: 
104). 
 
Particularly, the parallelism that Dewey established 
between science and the arts becomes more apparent 
when their respective experiential subject-matters are 
connected to our bodily existence. If we stop thinking 
that epistemology and aesthetics are inquiries into 
something incorporeal (Propositions, Forms), we will 
start seeing cognitive and artistic activities as parts of 
one and the same “existential economy” of the lived 
body, i.e. as forms of organizing the energies of the body 
in the direction of an enhanced, more meaningful 
experience.
26
 
To say that epistemological inquiries should 
acknowledge the tribunal of pragmatic experience is not 
to say that this is the bedrock where the spade is turned, 
it is rather a proposal to change the tool, or at least to 
                                                 
26
 See Dewey 1987, and also Shusterman 2000. 
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start digging somewhere else. If we are to be naturalistic 
and anti-dualistic philosophers, or even simply realistic 
persons, we must admit that no one mind ever achieved 
anything without a body, least of all truth and 
knowledge and a language to express them. The overly 
intellectualized outlook bequeathed by Plato not only 
encouraged metaphysical revisionism —a relatively 
innocuous consequence—, it also legitimized an 
undesirable division of labour between those who think 
and those who act. As Dewey wrote in an almost 
Foucaultian mood, “Prestige goes to those who use their 
minds without participation of the body and who act 
vicariously through control of the bodies and labor of 
others” (1987: 27). This issue cannot be pursued within 
the limits of conventional epistemology, and this very 
fact proves that those limits were drawn too narrowly. 
Pragmatists should persevere today in the task of 
pushing them down. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Alexander, Thomas M. 2014. “Linguistic Pragmatism and 
Cultural Naturalism: Noncognitive Experience, 
Culture, and the Human Eros.” In D. L. 
Hildebrand (ed.), Symposium “Language or 
Experience: Charting Pragmatism’s Course for 
the 21
st
 Century,” European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (2): 64-
90. 
Brandom, Robert. 2000. Articulating Reasons. An 
Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
---------- 2011. Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, 
Recent, & Contemporary. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Descartes, René. 1991. The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Volume III, The Correspondence, 
translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. 
Murdoch and A. Kenny. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
---------- 1998. Principles of Philosophy, The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, Volume I, translated by J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 177-
291. 
Dewey, John. 1971. Experience and Nature. Second 
Edition. LaSalle (Ill.): The Open Court Publishing 
Company. 
 
 
---------- 1987. Art as Experience, The Later Works of John 
Dewey (1925-1953), vol. 10. Carbondale & 
Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
---------- 1991a. “Qualitative thought.” In The Later Works 
of John Dewey (1925-1953), vol. 5. Carbondale & 
Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 243-262. 
---------- 1991b. “Affective thought.” In The Later Works 
of John Dewey (1925-1953), vol. 2. Carbondale & 
Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 104-110. 
Faerna, Ángel M. 2002. “Problemas de comunicación: del 
Menón a los Encuentros en la Tercera Fase.” 
Daímon, Revista de Filosofía 25: 131-144. 
---------- 2014. “On norms and social practices: Brandom, 
Dewey, and the demarcation question.” 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. A 
Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy 50 (3): 
360-372. 
Feyerabend, Paul K. 1999. Conquest of Abundance. A 
Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. 
Chicago & London: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Goodman, Nelson. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. 
 
 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018  
IN  SE A R C H  O F  L O S T  BO D Y :  ON  PR A G M A T I S M ,  E X P E R I E N C E ,  A N D  LA N G U A G E   
Á n g e l  M .  F a e r n a  
 
 
 119 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. “Philosophy as Stand-in and 
Interpreter.” In Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, translated by Christian 
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1-20. 
Hildebrand, David L. Ed. 2014. Symposium “Language or 
Experience: Charting Pragmatism’s Course for 
the 21
st
 Century”. European Journal of 
Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (2). 
Jespersen, Otto. 1894. Progress in Language, with 
Special Reference to English. London: Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co. / New York: Macmillan & Co. 
McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Moore, George E. 1993a. “Proof of an External World.” 
In Selected Writings, edited by Th. Baldwin. 
London & New York: Routledge, 147-170. 
---------- 1993b. “A Defence of Common Sense.” In 
Selected Writings, edited by Th. Baldwin. London 
& New York: Routledge, 106-133. 
Ors, Carmen & Sanfélix, Vicente. 2014. “Esprit détaché. 
El yo en las Meditaciones.” In François Jaran 
(ed.), De la metafísica a la antropología: 
reinterpretando el dualismo de Descartes. 
Valencia: Pre-Textos, 53-68. 
Peirce, Charles S. (1992). “Questions Concerning Certain 
Faculties Claimed for Men”. In The Essential 
Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 
(1867-1893). Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 11-27. 
---------- 1998. “Pragmatism.” In The Essential Peirce. 
Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893-
1913). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 398-433. 
Rorty, Richard. 1982a. “Dewey’s Metaphysics.” In 
Consequences of Pragmatism. Essays, 1972-
1980. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 72-89. 
---------- 1982b. “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and 
Twentieth-Century Textualism.” Ibid, 139-159. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
---------- 1998. “The Very Idea of Human Answerability to 
the World: John McDowell’s Version of 
Empiricism.” In Truth and Progress. Philosophical 
Papers, Volume 3. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 138-152. 
Sacks, Oliver 2012. A Leg to Stand On. London: Picador. 
Shusterman, Richard. 1997. Practicing Philosophy. 
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life. New York 
& London: Routledge. 
---------- 2000. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, 
Rethinking Art. Second Edition. Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Spinoza, Baruch. 1988. Ethics, The Collected Works of 
Spinoza, Volume I, edited and translated by E. 
Curley. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University 
Press, 408-617. 
Strawson, Peter F. 1959. Individuals. An Essay in 
Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Routledge. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1979. On Certainty, translated by 
D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
---------- 1981. Philosophical Investigations, translated by 
G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
  
  
 
 
GESTURES AND EXPRESSIONS:  
THE OVERFLOW OF IMMEDIATE QUALITIES 
Barbara Formis  
University Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, Institute ACTE, 
France 
barbaraformis@free.fr 
 
ABSTRACT: The aim of the present study is to indicate the 
features of those gestures that can contribute to an 
immediate experience. If gestures share some sort of 
indexicality with signs, they do not seem to carry the 
kind of symbolic meaning required in formalized 
language. How can an immediate experience arise from 
an interaction between human gestures? How can we 
make sense of a gesture without interpreting it?  
My first enquiry into the link between gestures and 
immediate experience makes use of Dewey's critique of 
Darwinian evolutionism. I then develop a pragmatist 
reading of the later Wittgenstein with whom Dewey 
shares a number of ideas. The result of these enquiries is 
the finding that the immediate quality of a gesture does 
not express itself directly, but it does so by an act that 
over-flows its organic mode of existence. 
 
Keywords: gesture; meaning; expression; emotion; 
language; indexicality 
 
 
A Scene as a (Non)Premise 
 
Imagine yourself in a specific situation. You are at a train 
station, and because you arrived a little bit too early, you 
decide to sit at a table and order a coffee. You watch the 
people passing by. Two women in colourful clothes are 
carrying heavy baggage, two young men come running 
from the staircase searching anxiously for the departures 
board. A young couple seem to be quarrelling and a 
group of kids, all wearing the same red hat, are standing 
on the left corner, chatting. At a certain moment, you 
observe two young women who appear to be waiting for 
somebody to arrive at the end of platform 23. You 
imagine who that person could be: the girls look alike, 
could they be sisters? Maybe they are waiting for their 
parents? The train that they are waiting for gets into the 
station; a lot of people get off it and flow down into the 
hall.  
The two girls wave in excitement towards a 
particular point into the crowd, they smile and talk to 
each other, they walk towards the crowd. You are very 
curious to see whom they came to pick up. And here the 
person comes, an elderly woman with a silver suitcase. 
The girls hug her and greet her, she smiles back at them 
but seems to be worried about something, or maybe 
she’s just tired, one of the girls takes her suitcase, the 
other one gives her a bottle of water; she immediately 
drinks from it. The three women appear to know each 
other well, but there does not seem to be any intimacy 
between them, you would not bet that the elderly lady 
was the girls’ grand-mother, there is something friendly 
but rather too respectful, and even slightly formal, in the 
way they relate to her. Is she maybe somebody with 
whom they work? Now, the three of them turn back and 
walk towards the exit, you follow them with your gaze, 
they become more and more distant and disappear 
behind a family with a stroller. They are gone. 
This rather ordinary event may have lasted from five 
to ten minutes. It’s a scene. Something that you have 
witnessed as a spectator benefitting from anonymity, 
like a prince wandering in the streets in incognito, as 
Baudelaire says about the anonymous C.G., The Painter 
of Modern Life. Now, think about the fact that in order 
for you to imagine this scene from the lines that I have 
written above, you not only had to have had 
experienced similar scenes in similar situations, but you 
had to imagine in your mind a lot more than what is 
written in the above paragraph. You had imagined 
smiling mouths, frowning foreheads, hands moving, feet 
stepping on the floor, elbows bending, necks turning and 
shoulders turning. You had to imagine all of these 
gestures in a specific sequence in order to adapt them to 
the written text and, most of all, you must have given 
the imaginary movements a certain quality for them to 
adjust to the emotions and interactions that are 
described.  
There appears to be a qualitative overflow that 
allows a body to express sympathy rather than love, 
anxiety rather than haste, respect rather than intimacy, 
concern rather than fatigue. That quality is seemingly 
expressed in an immediate way through the body. You 
can make sense of it without being able to hear what 
people are saying and without knowing them. This 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
GE S T U R E S  A N D  E X P R E S S I O N S :  TH E  OV E R F L O W  O F  I M M E D I A T E  QU A L I T I E S  
B a r b a r a  F o r m i s  
 
 
 121 
immediate quality appears to exceed the body by 
expressing more than a simple physical input or 
movement. But how does it do this? How can a bodily 
quality become expressive and be immediately 
understood? How can we “make sense” of a specific 
situation without passing by a verifiable structure of 
references and premises? One answer could be: past 
experience. It is only because we already had similar 
encounters in the past that we can relate a specific 
emotion to a gesture. We construct an imaginary 
situation insofar as it sets the scene up as a perfect 
mirror of our daily lives, we invent it insofar as it 
corresponds to our own prior observations of people, 
gestures, faces, and human interactions. From this 
perspective, the interpretation of the present situation is 
not immediate but built upon multiple previous 
empirical experiences that serve as premises, and even 
as truth propositions. It is these experiences that are the 
source of the psychological and sociological coherency of 
the situations you have imagined. 
Hence, the supposedly “immediacy” of the sense 
that we make of a situation could in reality be a 
mediated interpretation based on habits (See Dreon 
2016). The immediate and the habitual are so entangled 
that we could conclude that it seems there is no space 
for direct experience in a world where language, signs 
and words shape the meaning of what we think. 
However, following the pragmatist path, one way to 
extrapolate and untangle habits from immediate 
experience is to go back and relate our present 
experience to the primary empirical situation which acts 
as the beginning and the first step from which all the rest 
results.  
If pragmatists agree in the idea that knowledge is not 
the fundamental and primary way we experience the 
world, they do not limit this primary experience to a 
supposedly “given” world as an immovable set of 
sensory data. It is a qualitative background that does not 
function as habit nor as knowledge but rather as a pre-
scientific and pre-semiotic sensory mode of acting and 
living. But the problem with this primary experience, as 
the pragmatist method teaches us, is that it is too 
connected with the particular disposition and contexts in 
which it takes place and cannot be reduced to a purely 
first action with no links to the environment. In other 
words, it does not function as a premise.  
That is why a pragmatist premise is a contradiction in 
terms insofar as, from a pragmatist point of view, sense 
and meaning are systematically to be found in medias 
res, in the middle of the action, at a train station, in a 
context that is neither primary nor given but rather 
secondary, as part of a sequence of living actions and 
reactions showing that the immediate experience could 
be direct without necessarily being generative. Making 
sense of a scene, or situation, implies making sense from 
a scene, because we are not dissociated from that scene, 
but we are part of it. We do not even need to interpret 
it. We are passengers, waiting at a train station, 
observing a reality that is not simply “around” us, but 
that includes us, a reality that is the world in which we 
are anchored (and this is where pragmatism and 
phenomenology, especially in its Merleau-Pontian 
version, can meet).  
Inside this scene, which acts as a (non)premise, what 
counts above all are gestures: waving in a certain way, 
dragging a baggage or climbing up the stairs, smiling in a 
certain way, moving one’s shoulders, turning one’s head, 
in a certain way. Neither primary actions nor simple 
habits, these ways (or modes of behaviour) give the 
bodily movement a distinctive tint, a quality that comes 
across as natural, and that is often immediately 
understood. This is possible, mostly because gestures 
possess a feature of “mediality” (Agamben, 1996), they 
are always “in between”: between communication and 
production, between actions and reactions, between 
intention and interpretation, between words and real 
things. And it is because of their mediality that gestures 
can serve as research field for what we can name an 
“immediate experience”, that experience lying in 
between the biological and the sociological, the 
mechanical and the organic, the intentional and the 
spontaneous.  
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The aim of the present study is not to define and 
analyse the general concept of gesture, a task that 
would lead this enquiry into the fields of communication 
sciences, semiotics and linguistics, going beyond the 
limit of this text. The aim is to indicate the features of 
those gestures that can contribute to a supposedly 
immediate experience. How can an immediate 
experience arise from an interaction between human 
gestures? What kind of meaning does a gesture need to 
bear in order to provoke an effect of immediacy?  
 
Gesture and immediate experience 
 
The English word "gesture" derives from the Latin term 
gestum which is the noun derived from the verb gero, 
gerere which means to carry, to administer, to 
represent, to produce, to accomplish, to carry on, to 
continue and to behave. A gesture usually designates a 
particular bodily activity of a person and her habits, it 
indicates the specific aspect of this person, her way of 
moving in space, her way of using her hands when she 
speaks, her way of sitting. Following ordinary language, I 
am limiting the study to bodily gestures, excluding other 
possible types of gestures, like highly complex 
intellectual meditations or mathematical proofs. Usually, 
a gesture is interpreted as a somatic movement that on 
a physical level doubles a psychological experience, since 
it alone signifies a message, a feeling, a judgment. 
(Kendon 2004) The polysemy of the verb gerere shows 
the different facets of the noun gestum. On the one 
hand, a gesture is understood as management, on the 
other hand as attitude and behaviour. This Latin root is 
evident in the French word “gestion” or the Italian word 
“gestione”, which mean administration or management. 
This aspect is important; in his essay “Notes on Gesture” 
Giorgio Agamben claims that gesture includes a 
supportive and managing structure which is precisely 
what secures its independency from production and 
action, thus opening up an ontological interval between 
the Aristotelian dualism of poiesis and praxis (Agamben 
1996), highlighting the medial quality of the gesture.  
The conceptual possibilities and disruptive qualities 
of the idea of “gesture” lie in the interstice between two 
supposedly distinctive fields such as creative production 
and political action, aesthetics and ethics, art and life, 
body and mind. But above all, the idea of gesture can 
help to reorganize, rethink and readjust the definitions, 
borders and principles of the relationship between 
knowledge and experience. Thereby the concepts and 
phenomena related to the idea of “gesture” are truly 
fecund and directly related to pragmatism, as Giovanni 
Maddalena’s work has shown (Maddalena 2015 and 
2016). 
Maddalena suggests that a gesture “is any 
performed act with a beginning and an end that carries a 
meaning (from gero = I carry on)” (Maddalena 2015, 69-
70). If I can agree with the idea of «performance» and 
the idea of «carrying», I have some reservations about 
the closed temporality (beginning and end) and with the 
idea of meaning. The analysis of the temporality that 
underlies the performance of a gesture would go beyond 
the purpose of this article
1
, but I will address here the 
question of meaning: why would a gesture necessarily 
carry a meaning? And if it does, how would this meaning 
be carried and expressed? Finally, what definition could 
we give to the term “meaning”? If a meaning is 
necessarily something that has a relationship to 
knowledge and consciousness, then the attribution of 
meaning to gestures would entail a separation between 
habitual behaviour, unconscious acts on one side and 
intentional acts and willing responses on the other, 
recreating the same hierarchy between knowing and not 
knowing that pragmatism attempts to overcome. In this 
                                                 
1
 The studies that I have accomplished in this field, 
mainly by collaborating with performers and artists 
through the Laboratoire du Geste 
(www.laboratoiredugeste.com) at the Sorbonne 
University, have confirmed for me the idea that the 
temporality of a gesture is highly loose and cannot be 
extracted from a continuum of living as an action can be. 
This questions have been central for our two years 
seminar leading to a symposium in 2014 on Art, Time 
and Performance opening up the question of repetition 
and originality that are highly investigated in the field of 
performance studies. 
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separation there would be some gestures that are 
meaningful (and legitimate for analyses) and other 
activities that are not meaningful (and that can be 
disregarded).  
However, one can find some definitions of meaning 
in pragmatism which cannot be reduced to such a 
mentalistic definition; pragmatism contests the primacy 
of consciousness and intentionality as in Mead’s 
definition of meaning as the response prompted by a 
gesture. In Mead’s perspective – even though this issue 
is the object of a longstanding discussion –, the idea that 
every gesture has a meaning entails that every gesture 
tends to prompt a response. The problem lies then in the 
interpretation: what if, as we will see later through 
Wittgenstein, we can respond to a meaning carried by a 
gesture not only without being able to explain this 
meaning but also to fully interpret it? This possibility, 
which is very recurrent in ordinary life, suggests that 
there is something that can be carried out by a gesture 
that is not yet meaning, even in the minimalistic 
definition of meaning proposed by pragmatism.  
Reshaping Maddalena’s definition, I would propose a 
more restricted, but at the same time more open and 
vague, definition of gesture as “any performed act that 
carries a quality”. This definition can be understood not 
only from Wittgenstein (associating gestures to language 
games) but also from a Deweyen point of view: we 
“make sense” of a gesture when we can grasp its quality, 
the latter being a singular quality of the performed act 
that exists with no relationship to anything else than 
itself. It is, we may suggest, what Dewey calls an 
immediate quality. But what is difficult to grasp in this 
situation, is that the immediate quality is not always 
immediately perceived, as we will see in the next section 
on Wittgenstein.  
In Experience and Nature, the expression 
“immediate experience” occurs only once, in the chapter 
“On Nature and Communication” where Dewey writes: “ 
The part of wisdom is not to deny the causal fact 
because of the intrinsic value of the immediate 
experience. It is to make the immediately satisfactory 
object the object which will also be most fertile.” (Dewey 
1929, 204). Dewey points out that an “immediate” 
experience cannot be closed in itself or univocal, it needs 
to give rise to other possibilities of meanings and values, 
it needs to be “fertile”. But if the expression “immediate 
experience” is rare, the adjective “immediate” is used 
frequently by Dewey in Experience and Nature, often as 
a synonym of “direct” and many times in a link with 
“enjoyment” (Dewey 1929, 79 and sq; but also in 
Chapter 9 on art). Above all, Dewey uses the adjective 
“immediate” to designate a certain type of “quality”: 
immediate qualities are empirical and non relational: 
“Quality is quality, direct, immediate and undefinable.” 
(Dewey 1929, 110). And, in Chapter “Nature, Ends and 
Histories”, he clearly defines immediacy as a non-
relational quality: 
 
In every event there is something obdurate, self-
sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation 
nor an element in a relational whole, but 
terminal and exclusive. Here, as in so many other 
matters, materialists and idealists agree in an 
underlying metaphysics which ignores in behalf 
of relations and relational systems, those 
irreducible, infinitely plural, undefinable and 
indescribable qualities which a thing must have 
in order to be, and in order to be capable of 
becoming, the subject of relations and a theme 
of discourse. (Dewey 1929, 85) 
 
Knowledge cannot be primary
2
, “no knowledge is ever 
merely immediate.” (Dewey 1929, 322), it is something 
that is added in a dialectical way to a situation that is 
necessarily vague, open and uncertain
3
. It is precisely 
                                                 
2
 “It is impossible to tell what immediate consciousness 
is – not because there is some mystery in or behind it, 
but for the same reason that we cannot tell just what 
sweet or red immediately is; it is something had, not 
communicated and known.” (Dewey 1929, 307). This 
immediate relationship of natural things to a person, can 
exist as a form of “animism” and “its legitimate and 
constant form is poetry” (Dewey 1929, 181). This 
consciousness cannot be identified with knowledge 
because “the belief, assertion, cognitive reference is 
something additive, never merely immediate” (Dewey, 
1929, 321).  
3
 “When philosophers have insisted upon the certainty 
of the immediately and focally present or ‘given’ and 
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because the immediate qualities of the supposedly 
“given” are vague that they are more fertile and open, 
because “‘This’, whatever this maybe, always implies a 
system of meanings focussed at a point of stress, 
uncertainty, and need of regulation” (Dewey 1929, 352). 
Hence, the immediate quality of a gesture, its way of 
unfolding in time and space, needs also to be unclear, 
open, and ambiguous so to liberate itself from a given 
meaning and a truthful and decisive interpretation 
because the openness and the uncertainty of the 
immediate allows the experience to become a process. 
This is similar to Dewey’s suggestion in Chapter 9 
(“Experience, Nature and Art”), where he associates the 
intellectual journey of the mind with the process of a 
work of art: 
 
To be conscious of meanings or to have an idea, 
marks a fruition, and enjoyed or suffered arrest 
of the flux of event. (…) It marks the conclusion 
of long continued endeavor; of patient and 
indefatigable search and test. The idea is, in 
short, art and a work of art. As a work of art, it 
directly liberates subsequent action and makes it 
more fruitful in a creation of more meanings and 
more perceptions. (Dewey 1929, 371) 
 
Here the process of art making and the emergence of 
the aesthetic experience join the unfolding of a 
consciousness that is not yet knowledge but a premise, 
or rather a (non)premise of knowledge. This unfolding 
consciousness shows the continuity between art and life, 
between aesthetic qualities and empirical ones: “the 
origin of the art-process lay in emotional responses 
spontaneously called out by a situation occurring 
without any reference to art, and without “esthetic” 
quality save in the sense in which all immediate 
                                                                       
have sought indubitable immediate existential data upon 
which to build, they have always unwittingly passed 
from the existential to the dialectical; they have 
substituted a general character for an immediate this. 
For the immediately given is always the dubious; it is 
always a matter of subsequent events to determine, or 
assign character to. It a cry for something not given, a 
request addressed to fortune, with the pathos of a plea 
or the imperiousness of a command.” (Dewey 1929, 
349). 
enjoyment and suffering is esthetic.” (Dewey 1929, 391).  
On this subject, in Art as Experience, in Chapter 3 
(“Having an Experience”), Dewey describes a scene of a 
job interview with a variety of details relating the 
meeting between two men, and he explains that as the 
interview continues, the primary or general emotion of 
the candidate is transformed by the secondary emotions 
providing an aesthetic quality to the meeting. Dewey 
writes:  
 
(…) secondary emotions are evolved as variations 
of the primary underlying one. It is even possible 
for each attitude and gesture, each sentence, 
almost every word, to produce more than a 
fluctuation in the intensity of the basic emotion; 
to produce, that is, a change of shade and tint in 
its quality. (Dewey 1929, 43) 
 
These gestures, tones of voice, ways of holding oneself, 
which can at first be considered secondary, in reality not 
only reveal a series of real emotions, but possess the 
power to change the overall quality of the primary or 
basic impression. In other words, the detail of the 
gesture surpasses and exceeds its small scale to the 
point of transforming the appearance of the subject 
herself in her singularity. This capacity “to produce a 
change of shade” and to give more than it seems to 
possess, makes the gesture something important though 
often neglected. This excess is why a gesture designates 
something more than a simple mechanical automatic act 
or a technique.  
Unlike the Greek concept of techne, a gesture is not 
predictable. In a very pragmatist sense, the gesture is 
first of all a relationship, or even an interaction, it only 
emerges where it can potentially establish a response or 
a reaction. However, if we suppose this relationship to 
be a natural circumstance, a difficulty immediately 
emerges. If we think of gestures as natural, primitive, or 
animal-like bodily occurrences, it becomes difficult to 
envisage and conceptualize the possibility of an ordinary 
language rooted in the sociability of our shared habits. 
Naturalized gesture would lose the practical and 
acquired scope of our daily interactions. Hence, in 
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Dewey’s analysis of the job interview, first of all the 
relationship between the interviewee and the employer 
is regulated by standard social behaviour and the 
conventional habits of the workplace. Then, for the 
interview to actually unfold, what is required is a whole 
series of secondary emotions which allow each 
participant’s “presence and behavior…[to] either 
harmonize with [their] own attitudes and desires or 
to…conflict and jar” (Dewey 1929, 43).  
More generally, the immediate or primary quality 
can come across as secondary, even if it is central to the 
meaning of the experience. The primary, singular, non-
relational quality of a gesture is perceived as long as the 
experience evolves in the duration and temporal 
development of the experience as an interaction. The 
primary quality is perceived, paradoxically, as secondary 
mainly because of the length of the process of the 
experience and the unpredictability of it. Dewey does 
not hesitate to associate this encounter to drama and 
theater because the scene, as a theatrical stage upon 
which characters act, makes sense when the singular 
quality of a gesture is perceived and irradiates the whole 
scene. Dewey terms these emotions “secondary” 
because they are often hidden and felt in a second phase 
of the unfolding of the experience, and not because they 
are second in degree or in value. As the relation between 
the two people unfolds, the non-relational quality 
appears secondarily even if it is an immediate quality. 
Pragmatism offers ways of overcoming the dualisms 
between nature and culture, immediate and mediated 
experience, art and science, spontaneity and 
intentionality, bodies and words. But, as far as our 
inquiry into gestures goes, the continuity between these 
dualisms reappears mutely, as we will see, in the 
separation between emotion and gesture, between a 
supposedly inner state or disposition and a manifestly 
sensitive externalization of it. In order to clarify this 
point we need to understand the process of expression 
that a gesture uses in order to manifest its immediate 
and singular quality. If a gesture carries a quality, how 
can this quality be perceptible?  
Emotion and Expression: Dewey and Darwin 
 
If a quality is immediate – in the sense of being non-
relational and singular – does that necessarily imply that 
its method of expression is immediate too? Or does it 
need an interpretation, a filter, or at least a relation? 
And more specifically, how can a gesture express its 
immediate quality? Following Dewey, one would say that 
a gesture is not a vague expression but an "act of 
expression", to use the title of Chapter 4 of Art as 
Experience. But what does Dewey mean by “act” of 
expression, how does it unfold? Dewey starts his analysis 
from the etymology of the word “expression”, and 
emphasizes the “act” that is already present in that 
etymology; the action of (ex-) extracting the usually 
liquid matter from a body by the application of pressure. 
An expression is an act of elimination or expulsion by 
compression. In a very pragmatist perspective, Dewey 
underlines in this act the need for an interaction with 
something outside the body (for example with “the wine 
press” for the grape, Dewey 1934, 64). This interaction 
produces a transformation within the material itself so 
that it passes from “raw” or “primitive material” to 
“product of art” (ibidem). 
Dewey finds in the act of expression a type of 
transformation that echoes the continuity between 
immediate experience and knowledge, as far as 
knowledge also involves a kind of art process, as we saw 
in the section above where he identifies the formation of 
an idea with a work of art. The “work” is visible in the 
“act” of expression: just as primitive material is not 
enough to produce an expression and needs an external 
force to transform itself into an artistic or artificial 
product, so emotion alone is not enough: it needs an 
external environment that resists it and gives it the 
impulse to express itself. Thus the action of expressing, 
or expressing oneself, needs two competing forces that 
meet and interact to be able to make an emotion 
manifest, and these two forces cannot simply be placed 
one on the inner side, supposedly spiritual, and the 
other on the outer side, supposedly physical. The two 
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forces meet as they blend into a single ontological 
continuity.  
Expression becomes self-expression and a form of 
language without there having been any rupture 
between the primary material and the expressed one. 
According to Dewey in each act of expression there is a 
transformation of matter from “raw” or “primitive” to 
“artificial”, and this transformation is accomplished via a 
continuity. This transformation is similar, we can argue, 
to the one that occurs between the immediate quality 
and its manifestation in a gesture. But how does 
something actually change while remaining the same? 
And how can this idea of a transformation of oneself 
avoid the risks of naturalism without incurring the 
opposite and equally dangerous trap of idealization by 
which transformation would require conforming to a 
model? There is a deeply pragmatist solution and it lies 
in the well-known continuity between the biological and 
the sociological; this continuity is the same that arises, in 
Dewey, between a primary experience and any kind of 
meaningful experience (principally ethical or 
aesthetical).  
This continuity, which is not identification, could be 
explained by the fact that if Dewey does not limit the act 
of expression to an organic reaction, nor does he over-
emphasize the importance of intention. Thus in Art as 
Experience he explains that crying and smiling are not 
true acts of expression because at an organic level, 
“emotional discharge is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of expression” (Dewey 1934, 61). That is to 
say, a simple physical reaction alone is not an 
expression. But Dewey does not encourage, on the other 
hand, a cognitive or simply conscious definition of the 
act of expression, rather he defines expression as “the 
clarification of turbid emotion” (Dewey 1934, 77). This 
clarification is neither intentional nor theoretical and nor 
is it carried out externally; rather, it is a question of 
social interaction because, as Dewey says in the chapter 
entitled “The Expressive Object”, “expression, like 
construction, signifies both an action and its results” 
(Dewey 1934, 82). There is no true naturalness in 
expression, since it is a social construction, but there is a 
continuity at the level of its existence: expression 
accomplishes the form of emotion and brings it to its 
fulfilment through the interaction with others.  
Accordingly, in the chapter “The Natural History of 
Form” of Art as Experience, Dewey quotes Charles 
Darwin's book Expression of Emotions and clearly 
distinguishes between the natural expression as 
“discharge” and the pragmatist expression as “rhythm” 
(Dewey 1934, 155). The former would be immediate and 
would end in a loss of energy, while only the latter 
succeeds in creating a “tension, and thereby a periodic 
accumulation and release”. Darwin's book, according to 
Dewey, “is full of examples of what happens when an 
emotion is simply an organic state let loose on the 
environment in direct overt action” (Dewey 1934, 156). 
Contrary to this “pure” organic state, Dewey proposes a 
sort of rhythm in energy which is the condition of 
possibility of an aesthetic experience. Evolutionist theory 
is constantly seeking a residual form of natural qualities 
in the opposite of will, namely reflex reactions. Although 
this attempt is laudable and important to the extent that 
it opposes cognitivism, it does not offer the advantage of 
pragmatism, namely the attention paid to the practical 
function of gestures in their social context.  
Instead of thinking of gestures as organic expressions 
or direct discharges of emotion, Dewey encourages us to 
see them as overflows of meaning that are used and 
shared within a community, where the immediacy of the 
experience is not merely “a direct and overt action”. As 
he says in Experience and Nature: 
 
Gestures and cries are not primarily expressive 
and communicative. They are modes of organic 
behavior as much as are locomotion, seizing and 
crunching. Language, signs and significance, 
come into existence not by intent and mind but 
by over-flow, by-products, in gestures and sound. 
The story of language is the story of the use 
made of these occurrences; a use that is 
eventual as well as eventful. (Dewey 1934, 175. 
My italics) 
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We seem to have here a response to our question: the 
immediate quality (of a gesture) does not express itself 
immediately, but it does so by an act that over-flows its 
organic mode of existence. The difference with a simple 
naturalistic approach consists in the fact that during the 
achievement of language, there can be an overflow, a 
typically gestural surplus which gives meaning to the 
expressive act itself and may even contribute to a 
meaningful experience without limiting the gesture to an 
organic discharge and without transforming the gesture 
into a formalized and logical form. A gesture suggests a 
bridge and a link between two – or more – entities and 
by doing so it uses neither the power of cognitive 
clarification nor of bodily force. In this overflow of 
meaning lies the difference between evolutionism and 
pragmatism, between a purely physiological approach to 
expression and another approach that imbibes the 
biological with a social nuance.  
A gesture is not merely biological but not yet 
intellectualized, and it possesses a sociological aspect. 
When emotion overflows its physical manifestation, 
then it finds an additional meaning to organic discharge, 
it finds a social, aesthetic, cultural meaning by freeing 
itself from the strictly physiological domain. In this 
overflowing, meaning does not end up dispersed, but it 
gives form to the history of language. Following Dewey, 
language is formed and developed according to the way 
in which this over-flow of gestures and sounds is used. In 
this manner, gestures and sounds are not by-products 
that end up lost, but rather they form the very 
foundation of language since it is in their excess of 
meaning that a possible (“eventual”) use can see the 
light of day, one that is also full of meaning (“eventful”).  
There is therefore a certain amount of serendipity in 
the fabric of the meaning, since it is in the fortuitous use 
of an excess that the event of language takes place. 
Unlike Darwin who sees in the gesture a simple external 
expression of a pre-existing psychic state, Dewey sees in 
emotion the site of the production of a sense, of the 
transformation of an organic matter into a social 
material. Similarly to Peircean signs, gestures cannot be 
reduced to a purely symbolic definition in so far as they 
are opposed to arbitrariness. However, if those gestures 
which carry an immediate quality share with signs some 
Peircean features, such as indexicality and firstness (as 
we will see in the next section), they seem to be 
dissociated from iconicity in so far as their forms do not 
always correspond to the meanings that they express by 
overflow. 
 
Grasping the Gesture:  
a pragmatist reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
 
The first part of the title for this section begins from one 
of Giovanni Maddalena’s articles (Maddalena 2016). 
Maddalena inspires us to ask: how can we grasp the 
quality of a gesture? What type of intellectual process 
correspond to the grasping of its meaning
4
? In order to 
proceed, I can now render more complex the initial 
simplistic definition of gesture given at the beginning. If 
the simpler definition is: “a gesture is a performed act 
that carries a quality”, the more detailed definition could 
be now “a gesture is a performed act that carries an 
immediate quality that is expressed by overflow”. It is 
this overflow that needs to be grasped and, it is because 
of this overflow (or “by-product”, as Dewey says), that it 
is quite possible, and even very recurrent, to perfectly 
understand a gesture without being able to explain its 
meaning.  
 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Vincent Colapietro: “Gestures are commonplace. In 
fact, they are ubiquitous. Not only are they 
commonplace, but our understanding of them is as well. 
For the most part, however, this understanding is tacit 
and situated, not explicit and abstract. Moreover, it is 
practical, not theoretical. There is nonetheless also such 
an understanding of gestures in general. That is, we 
immediately grasp the significance of someone 
extending a hand upon being introduced to us or the 
significance of a friend upon leaving turning around and 
waving an arm. But we also immediately grasp what 
such acts in general are. Quite apart from being able to 
define words or ideas in a formal, abstract manner, we 
often have an effective and, in many instances, a 
nuanced and subtle comprehension of their meaning” 
(Colapietro 2015, my italics).  
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Concerning this “grasping”, Maddalena rightly 
indicates, following the heart of his book The Philosophy 
of Gesture, that there “is the need for a rationale of a 
synthetic and a vague part of our reasoning” (Maddalena 
2016, 7). The difference between a definition of gestures 
as “carrying a meaning” (as for Giovanni Maddalena) and 
my definition of gestures as “carrying a quality” implies 
that for the first case the meaning is proper to the 
gesture (and associates gestures with signs, in particular 
Peircean signs) but in the second case the meaning is 
indirectly expressed by the gesture as a surplus of a 
quality (and this dissociates gestures from signs). This 
has also to do with the “ordinary” nature of gestures 
(Formis 2010) and the immediate comprehension of 
them. We can “make sense” of a gesture without being 
able to explain fully its meaning.  
This is the case, for example, of a Neapolitan gesture 
whose semantic value seems to have been at the origin 
of the philosophical rupture between the first part of 
Wittgenstein's work and the second. Wittgenstein came 
to know this gesture through his friend Piero Sraffa, an 
Italian Marxist economist exiled in Cambridge during the 
fascist period. The gesture consists in passing the top of 
the hand under the chin as if to indicate a state of 
boredom and disapproval. The supposedly illogical and 
at the same time understandable nature of the gesture 
provides Wittgenstein with the main argument for his 
abrupt transition from a linguistic and logical system to a 
social anthropology. The meaning of the gesture would 
thus have a deeply illogical foundation and a nature that 
cannot be modelled, which invites Wittgenstein to break 
with the logical philosophy and the idea of an ideal 
language. What appears obvious, as the later 
Wittgenstein will say, is that the gesture is the 
expression, just as the grimace is anger, since the whole 
meaning lies in the use, namely its capacity to be 
understood without having to go through a formalized 
interpretation.  
 
 
 
The question would be: how can we grasp the 
meaning of a gesture without interpreting it? Gestures 
seem to suspend the conventional structure of language 
since they show without saying. There is an essential 
difference here between “show” and “say”, and 
Wittgenstein points out that in German these two verbs 
are close in sound: zeigen and sagen. The gesture 
(Gebärde
5
) is the element that reveals, shows (zeigen) the 
condition of possibility not only of the word and of saying 
(sagen), but more generally of the meaning as a 
relationship between the body and the sound of the voice. 
The ostensive character of language, presented by the 
German verb zeigen, gives primacy to gestures. The father 
who shows his daughter an apple by pointing his finger 
and saying the word “apple”, shows that the word is the 
sign of a reality, while the gesture acts as a vector, as an 
element of connection between this word and this same 
reality. Similarly to Dewey's idea of overflow, for the later 
Wittgenstein gestures are like links, or somatic arrows that 
associate a sound with an intention, a word whose 
meaning is often not understood with a tangible and 
visible reality. Similarly to vagueness which seems to 
belong to the Peircean phenomenological category of 
firstness, gestures need to remain open and unclear in 
order to provoke an immediate experience.  
Moreover for Wittgenstein, similarly to pragmatism, 
especially that of Peirce, the ostensive or demonstrative 
quality of gestures must remain imprecise, embryonic and 
vague, otherwise they risk being constrained within a 
formalized proposition. Their indexicality needs to be non-
referential and their meaning functions via secondary 
indices. Thus, in §71 of the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein insists, in a very Peircean tone, on the 
fundamentally “vague” aspect of the gesture, which 
retains its dimension of “approximately” and 
indeterminacy, since it is precisely in indeterminacy that 
its openness lies and its ability to designate, without 
expressing, “the common element” between different 
                                                 
5
 For a detailed account of the occurrences of the term 
Gebärde (gesture) see Gorlée 2012, 285 et sq.  
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examples (§ 72). And the simplicity of the gesture is also 
summed up in its “spontaneity” (§ 75) which allows one to 
say “I am almost sure”, I can reconstruct my experience, 
while describing it in its simplicity and spontaneity.  
The feature of mediality that appears in gestures has a 
specific sustainable form. In Wittgenstein as in Dewey 
there is a kind of encouraging and stammering quality of 
gesture, that is to say, a way in which gesture presses 
forward, we can use words through gestures. Gestures 
allow a simple carrying on (from gero). Wittgenstein notes 
that there is a sort of precedence of the gesture in taking 
shape: “The gesture tries to prefigure – we would like to 
say – but it cannot.” (§ 434) In German: Die “Gebärde 
versucht vorzubilden - möchte man sagen - aber kann es 
nicht.” The incise möchte man sagen “We would like to 
say” is not anecdotal, there is a desire of the language to 
say what the gesture cannot say, there is an attempt to 
visualize and show in the form of figure something that 
cannot be determined in a figure. Versuchen means to try, 
to attempt, while vorzubilden means to “perform” or 
“model”. The gesture is thus given in a stammering that 
shows the desire and the possibility of regulating 
understanding, that is to say, giving a place to meaning 
within reality and at the same time the real being 
understood as an elusive and unformed kind of meaning, 
a sort of possibility of meaning. So in its demonstrative 
and ostensive power the gesture does not say (sagen), but 
it shows, and it does so without becoming a sign (Zeichen) 
understood as a clear mark.  
Unlike signs, which can still possess a referential 
indexicality, gestures represent nothing: they cannot be 
the representatives of something else and they are 
difficult to translate. It is through gestures that we can 
“carry on” into language, and maybe more generally into 
ordinary life: gestures are the ostensive characters of the 
meaning of reality insofar as they act as vectors placing 
and rearranging the meaning of words in reality. As 
Wittgenstein says in § 208, “the gesture of continuing so”, 
and “so on”, has an indexical function comparable to that 
of designating an object or a place. Thus, there is in the 
process of understanding a way of seeing that 
Wittgenstein relates to a certain temporality, and an 
untimely discovery: one says “now it is right”.  
This temporality requires an adjustment, “I see it that 
way”. There's the idea of going “together” between two 
examples, or between two different entities: “Now take 
these two things together!” or “Now these go together”. 
This “grasp” is to be understood as a phenomenon of 
understanding that could encompass several 
“organizational aspects”. This discovery concerns rather 
the arrangement of the visible, the audible and the 
exterior in such a way that one can say “now I see it like 
that”. It is the way of seeing that changes and not the 
vision per se. “Now I see it as...”, “Now I know how it fits 
together!” (p. 355). Now I can carry on, I can manage (in 
French, “je gère”, in Italian “gestisco” from Lat., gero).  
In this reorganizational “grasping” Wittgenstein 
identifies something similar to what Dewey indicates in 
the “overflow” as an act of expression that goes beyond 
the rational form of knowledge. Gestures allow elements 
to be arranged and organized in such a way as to reflect a 
lived experience; they allow meaning without using logic 
nor symbolism and are fundamental elements of forms of 
life (Lebensform). But this faculty of “making sense” is not 
a simple physical capacity, a simple sensation of the body 
through which one somatically feels this “going together” 
of things. It is “a modified concept of sensation” 
(Wittgenstein 1953, Second Part, XI, 209) insofar as the 
demonstrative aspect of “grasping” requires imagination 
in order to allow a passage, a bridge, a surpassing that 
does not take place by “strong” means (intention, 
physiology, biological order): the passage takes place by a 
weak, or supposedly weak link (sociology, friendly 
relationship, cultural). If imagination is demonstration, it is 
because it has the ostensive power of the play of 
language, of the primitive stage of language which is 
profoundly demonstrative and ostensive. This imagination 
allows us to perfectly picture a situation like waiting at a 
train station, as we have seen at the beginning.  
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Following Wittgenstein, we may try to accept that 
words and meaningful exchanges between people are 
made possible by the demonstrative, gestural and 
imaginative nature of speaking because the processes 
linked to the experience of understanding are all ways of 
“discovering” the meaning of thought. It is not a 
question of identifying something that is “hidden”, 
inaudible or invisible, quite the contrary. It is precisely 
because the meaning is there before us, since it is 
indicated to us by the gesture of the hand, and 
accompanied by a sound of a voice, that this meaning is 
not to be discovered in the sense that we see it for the 
first time
6
. This discovery concerns rather the 
arrangement of real so to relate to the immediate 
quality of the gesture. In this “discovery” lies a sort of 
immediate experience by which understanding is also 
often a question of “guessing” organizational aspects, in 
a language game that Wittgenstein names “guessing 
thoughts” (Wittgenstein 1953, Second Part, XI, p. 225). 
The indexicality of gestures as they are used in ordinary 
language does not only need the impulse of habits but 
also the imagination of a mental composition or the 
capacity of “guessing thoughts”. 
Wittgenstein, like Dewey, also poses himself against 
Darwin, allowing us to think the consistency of ordinary 
language beyond the illusion of a natural language or the 
creation of an ideal language such as that of 
metaphysical philosophy. It is on the basis of 
anthropological observation that Dewey and 
Wittgenstein agree and both depart from Darwin's 
biologism. In Experience and Nature, Dewey recalls that 
the act of expression is a construction, and that this 
construction is necessarily participatory and requires 
cooperation between at least two people. Similarly to 
Wittgenstein, Dewey's sense of gesture is also not 
external, nor antecedent to the very expression of this 
gesture, and its expression is nothing if it is not in 
agreement in a reciprocal activity with others. Meaning 
                                                 
6
 For this reading of the second Wittgenstein see Cavell 
1969 and McDowell 1994. 
is not given by a declarative force; meaning is not 
claimed, but it is given by consent and agreement 
between subjects within a shared activity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Wittgenstein and Dewey, although from different 
backgrounds, have shown the way forward for an 
attempt to discredit metaphysics but not simply to 
replace it with the physical and the biological, but rather 
to hold together the biological and the sociological, the 
sensitive impression with the intellectual grasp, the 
confused with the reflected, the gesture with the word. 
From this aspect, this kind of immediate experience acts 
like a gesture, insofar as a gesture mostly links two 
things: for example, a reality and the sound of the word; 
the meaning of what I want to say and what is expressed 
by the tone of my voice; my physical attitude and my 
emotion. The gesture is what allows a correspondence, a 
“bridge” between two dimensions; but differently from 
iconicity, the correspondence produced by a gesture 
with an immediate quality is not definite and clear. It is 
not a real arrow, linear and clear, but rather a sketch, a 
draft whose meaning we discover almost immediately 
even if we find it difficult to describe. Wittgenstein and 
Dewey teach us that the primitive forms of language 
(especially gestures) can neither be reduced to words 
nor to concepts, yet they give consistency to our 
existence: they indicate our individuality and our 
particularity. Wittgenstein's famous formula: “meaning 
is use” is therefore entirely pragmatist. This form of 
language should be able to account not for what the 
gestures mean but rather how they mean, because what 
is essential is the “certain way” by which they express 
their immediate quality.  
Here we see the possibility of a social behaviourism 
common to Wittgenstein, Dewey and of course to Mead, 
in which the rejection of intentionality makes it radically 
different from classical behaviourism: life forms are a 
way of acting, they put in place a premise and a context, 
an announcement and a beginning of action. They are 
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activities, they are actions and meanings in which living 
beings find themselves in agreement. The activity thus 
becomes a manner, a way of doing things, a form of life, 
and a gestural overflow. It is a question of insisting on 
the overflowing capacity of the almost nothing, of those 
secondary gestures, aiming at condensing in a point, a 
punctum, a particular rhythm, the energy of a flow which 
can mark time, memory and produce an experience.  
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ABSTRACT: The purpose of the article is to make a 
distinction between two concepts of experience, 
singular and general. They track two ways in which we 
connect experientially to the world. The former is 
captured by the idea of “having an experience”; the 
latter is captured instead by the idea of “having 
experience”. Classical and contemporary pragmatists 
contribute to this distinction, and the article explores 
some of their views. Finally the article indicates some 
consequences of the distinction. In fact, in the spirit of 
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, those consequences are the 
very meaning of the conceptual distinction at stake, 
since they point out how we inferentially treat in 
different ways the fact of having an experience and the 
fact of having experience. 
 
Keywords: empiricism; experience; law; pragmatic 
maxim; signs 
 
On ne sait plus comment ramasser tout  
ce que l’on gagne 
à la loterie de l’expérience.  
Tous les résultats parlent à la fois… 
(Paul Valéry, L’Idée fixe) 
 
 
The purpose of this article is to make a distinction 
between two concepts of experience. They track two 
ways in which we connect experientially to the world. In 
absence of better names, I would call the one singular 
and the other general. The former is captured by the 
idea of “having an experience”, be it religious, aesthetic, 
ethical, or else. The latter is captured instead by the idea 
of “having experience”, be it located in this or that 
domain of our life. The double use of “experience”, as 
countable and uncountable noun, signals the point I 
want to make. The relevant conceptual distinction will 
be presented and discussed in more detail in § 1 of the 
article. 
In § 2 I will show how the classical pragmatists 
contributed to that distinction. I will pick some insights 
from the writings of Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead in 
particular. Moreover, I will claim that some 
contemporary philosophers would profit from that 
contribution, for that distinction between two concepts 
of experience is somehow neglected in their work and it 
would likely strengthen their views if accepted. 
Finally, I will explore in § 3 some of the 
consequences of the distinction. In fact, in the spirit of 
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim (CP 5.402), those 
consequences are the very meaning of the conceptual 
distinction at stake, since they point out how we 
inferentially treat in different ways the fact of having an 
experience and the fact of having experience. 
 
1. The Basic Distinction 
  
Let me focus on the difference between (A) having an 
experience and (B) having experience (or being 
experienced). In (A) something novel is involved; it is a 
novelty for the person having the experience.
1
 The 
subject-matter of the experience is an object, or a 
situation, or an activity which is novel to the person in 
question. 
In (B) something past is involved. Having experience 
(or being experienced) means having some training, or 
practical skill, or valuable habit acquired with cognition 
and exercise. 
Saint Paul’s conversion experience on the road to 
Damascus has the character of (A). It was presented as a 
divine revelation, the experience of a blinding light, 
something that was entirely new to Paul.
2
 The same is 
true of many forms of experience, though to a lesser 
extent. We have experiences in this sense when we 
attend a concert, when we taste some new food, when 
we visit a place we have never been to, when we face a 
puzzling ethical situation, even when we run a scientific 
experiment. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In some Continental languages the point is even 
stronger: fare un’esperienza or faire une expérience is 
stronger than to have an experience, for the latter 
sounds less active. 
2
 On religious experience see, of course, James 
1902/1985. Cf. Putnam 2017 and Misak 2017. 
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Instead, the surgeon’s professional experience has 
the character of (B). A teacher, a performer, a veteran 
can be said to have this sort of experience. It is the 
experience which stems from training, exercise, habit. It 
requires time, repetition, cumulative receptivity. And 
intelligence of course. 
Hence, (A) has a singular character. I shall call it 
singular experience. (B) has a general character. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, I will call it general 
experience. Consider the following examples: 
 
(1) Going to Tibet was an exciting experience; 
(2) The guide was quite experienced. 
 
The two can refer to the same scenario, but they use 
different concepts of experience. (1) is about a singular 
experience, namely visiting Tibet. (2) is about the 
general experience of the guide. I don’t see any reason 
to deny their obvious difference. But at the same time I 
wish to point out that there are interesting cases where 
the two are less easily distinguishable. Consider this:  
 
(3) I don’t remember anything like that in my 
experience. 
 
Is this a case of experience in the singular or in the 
general sense? It is not entirely clear. The reference to 
the speaker’s experience alludes to something past, so it 
is in line with experience of kind (B). But the subject-
matter of the statement is something novel, surprising, 
puzzling. So it is an experience of kind (A), in tune with 
the novelty condition pointed out above.  
Perhaps, if preferable, we might weaken the novelty 
condition and use the concept of a singular experience 
to encompass any kind of direct acquaintance with 
something, including what we have already experienced 
(tasting a certain food for a second time, etc.). In this 
sense, any perceptual experience, aesthetic experience, 
or life experience concerning a singular object, situation, 
or activity, would be a singular kind of experience. I am 
doubtful on the usefulness of such a larger category, but 
I am also ready to revise this attitude if presented with 
reasons for dropping, or at least weakening, the novelty 
condition of singular experience. 
An interesting aspect of the matter is the degree of 
interdependence between the two. What our example 
(2) is about is the general experience of the guide, but 
this has developed out of the singular experiences of the 
guide. In order to be experienced, one has to have 
experiences. On the other hand, experiences of a certain 
kind are only possible if one is experienced. In order to 
develop some sensitivity to music one has to undergo 
musical experiences. But some musical experiences (for 
instance enjoying an innovative interpretation of a 
musical piece) are only possible if one has musical 
experience.
3
 Consider this question: 
 
(4) Have you ever experienced a bass clarinet solo in 
a smoky jazz club?  
 
The experience the question is about is singular, for sure, 
but the question presupposes the capacity to 
discriminate a bass clarinet from other instruments, let 
alone the understanding of what a solo is and what the 
atmosphere of a smoky jazz club is like. Thus, this kind of 
singular experience requires some general experience 
about musical instruments and places where jazz is 
performed. 
The pragmatist insights that I am going to discuss 
show that our distinction is fruitful and unstable at the 
same time. Fruitful because it helps us give an account of 
different aspects of our life and connection to the world; 
unstable because the two forms of experience interact in 
several ways and make it difficult to separate what is 
singular from what is general. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 For similar considerations on “now” and “here” 
experiential concepts, see Soldati 2016, 161-3. 
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2. Some Pragmatist Insights 
 
First, I will consider some of the writings of the classical 
pragmatists that are relevant to our topic. Second, I 
will address some claims of other philosophers who are 
considered to have some family resemblance with 
pragmatism. Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead are the 
classical pragmatists I will refer to. Wittgenstein, Quine 
and McDowell are their relatives. 
Of course, given space and knowledge limits, I will 
just address some aspects of their views. I don’t 
pretend to be exhaustive. In a sense I will do injustice 
to all of them, for the benefit of conceptual 
reconstruction at the price of idiosyncratic 
simplification. 
 
2.1. Classical Pragmatists 
 
The early Peirce had a tendency to reduce individuals 
to general properties.
4
 From his realist and anti-
nominalist metaphysical standpoint, he contended that 
the cognition of an individual always depends on the 
ascription of some properties to it and, of course, the 
ascription of properties to individuals depends on the 
grasping of general properties instantiated in them. 
The most extreme version of this view has it that there 
are no individuals, properly speaking: there are only 
bundles of properties. This can be put into inferential 
terms, claiming that the cognition of individuals is 
always inferential: not only a judgment as “This is a 
chair” depends on the inferential categorization of 
what is perceived, but also a judgment like “This is my 
cousin Max” does so, for the thing indicated has the 
general property of being the speaker’s cousin, known 
as “Max”. 
 
                                                 
4
 I refer in particular to his papers of the 1860s. The 
same tendency is shown, to a lesser extent, in the papers 
of the 1870s. His views changed significantly around 
1885. Cf. Murphey1961/1993, 299ff; Fisch 1986, 321ff; 
Short 2007, 46ff. 
This is not the place to discuss that metaphysical 
standpoint of Peirce.
5
 What is relevant here is the idea 
that experience is experience of general things. In this 
sense there are no singular experiences. 
However, the later Peirce admits that individuals are 
not reducible to generals. He reaches this conclusion 
elaborating on his theory of categories and claiming that 
the category of “Secondness” (what exists, what is 
present, here and now) cannot be reduced to other 
categories.
6
 What happens hic et nunc is not a mere 
instantiation of general properties. It is not entirely 
reducible to them. 
If we look at the same issue from the point of view of 
semiotics, we realize that indices have a key role here. 
Such are the signs that bear an existential connection 
with their object (notably a causal connection). They are 
different from symbols, which can be used to describe 
real as well as imaginary things.  
 
The real world cannot be distinguished from a 
fictitious world by any description. It has often 
been disputed whether Hamlet was mad or not. 
This exemplifies the necessity of indicating that 
the real world is meant, if it be meant. […] It is 
true that no language (so far as I know) has any 
particular form of speech to show that the real 
world is spoken of. But that is not necessary, 
since tones and looks are sufficient to show 
when the speaker is in earnest. These tones and 
looks act dynamically upon the listener, and 
cause him to attend to realities. They are, 
therefore, the indices of the real world. (CP. 
2.337, c. 1895) 
 
The early Peirce conceived of semiotics as a general 
theory of representation (see W1: 169-70, 280ff, of 
1865); at that time he was interested in the functioning 
of symbols as signs that represent their object and that, 
unlike other signs, allow the construction of arguments 
(CP 1.559, 1867). Around 1885, he became more 
                                                 
5
 See among others Tiercelin 1985, 1997, 2016 and 2019. 
6
 I deliberately set aside Peirce’s phaneroscopy (the 
theory of what is “present to the mind, quite regardless 
of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not” – CP 
1.284), since it would need a work on its own. Let me 
only say that categories have parallels in phaneroscopy. 
See Short 2007, 60ff. 
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interested than earlier in icons and indices. One of his 
reasons to go deeper into the study of icons was the fact 
that they allow certain forms of reasoning on possible 
objects (such as mathematical reasoning; see e.g. CP 
3.363, 4.531, 2.267). And one of the reasons for focusing 
on indices (see W5: 111) was the fact that they are 
characterized by a direct relationship with an existing 
thing, something which is untrue of icons and symbols 
(see CP 3.361, 3.363).
7
 Language hooks on to the world 
in virtue of indices. 
The features of icons, indices and symbols can be 
also understood in terms of time experience: 
 
An icon has such being as belongs to past 
experience. It exists only as an image in the 
mind. An index has the being of present 
experience. The being of a symbol consists in the 
real fact that something surely will be 
experienced if certain conditions be satisfied. (CP 
4.447) 
 
Now, the experience of a thing indicated and present in 
a given context is a singular experience. It has the 
character of Secondness, but also the character of 
Firstness if it is the experience of something novel 
(Firstness being the category of what is novel, fresh, 
spontaneous; see e.g. CP 1.302). So, if we insist on the 
novelty condition of singular experiences, they have, 
using Peirce’s categories, the dimensions of Firstness 
and Secondness. If we drop the novelty condition from 
our account of singular experiences, Secondness suffices 
to characterize them. General experience, on the 
contrary, is indeed the domain of Thirdness (namely the 
category of what is general, mediated, rational; see e.g. 
CP 1.427). 
Turning now to epistemology, Peirce stressed in 
1877 that the felt quality of doubt (that is, the 
experience of it) is the factor that motivates inquiry, 
whose aim is the fixation of belief (CP 5.370-6). More 
specifically, he claimed that the “irritation of doubt” 
causes “a struggle to attain a state of belief” and he 
                                                 
7
 See Burks 1949, 680ff. Cf. Thibaud 1975, 85, 166-8; 
Atkin 2005; Short 2007, 219-20. 
named this struggle inquiry (CP 5.374). To the purpose of 
belief fixation he recommended the “method of 
science,” which is superior to others (namely to the 
methods of tenacity, of authority and of the a priori) 
because by following it “any man, if he have sufficient 
experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to 
the one True conclusion.” (CP 5.384) He added in a 
passage of 1902 c. that inquiry “must react against 
experience in order that the ship may be propelled 
through the ocean of thought” (CP 8.118).
8
 And he 
stressed in 1893 that what matters is “not ‘my’ 
experience, but ‘our’ experience” (note 2 to CP 5.402; cf. 
8.101-2). What matters for science and inquiry is the 
social dimension of experience. 
Notwithstanding these relevant insights, the notion 
of experience, in my view, is less central to Peirce’s 
thought than it is to other pragmatists. James made of it 
something more substantial. In particular, in A World of 
Pure Experience (published in 1904 and collected in his 
Essays in Radical Empiricism of 1912) he established a 
certain account of experience as the crucial point of his 
“radical” empiricism. 
 
To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit 
into its constructions any element that is not 
directly experienced, nor exclude from them any 
element that is directly experienced. For such a 
philosophy, the relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced 
relations, and any kind of relation experienced 
must be accounted as “real” as anything else in 
the system. (1912/1976, 22) 
 
Everything which is experienced is in the system 
(including relations between experiences), and 
everything which is not experienced is out of it.
9
 The 
experiences James talks about are basically singular 
(which is in tune with his nominalist attitude). They 
                                                 
8
 On inquiry and the ship metaphor, see Haack 2018. Cf. 
CP 5.51 (1903) on the “action of experience.” 
9
 “Direct acquaintance, knowing in its first intention, is 
not readily available to the philosopher in the way that 
concepts are (taken not as pure experiences, but as 
referring to them), but it is identifiable, James thinks, 
partly because of the unpredicted trail of novel 
determinacy it leaves behind.” (Lamberth 1999, 43) 
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involve, epistemically, a form of direct acquaintance, or 
“knowledge of acquaintance”,
10
 and they let novelty 
accrue to our account of the world. James’ insistence on 
the “that” of singular experiences shows quite well their 
indexical dimension (1912/1976, 8ff). The irony of it is 
that James, who was in a sense the most pragmatist of 
the pragmatists,
11
 seems to neglect here the active or 
practical dimension of experience. Dewey vindicated it. 
As it is for James, the complexity and richness of 
Dewey’s philosophy cannot be rendered here. Let me 
mention his Art as Experience of 1934, whose chapter 3 
is entitled “Having an Experience” and addresses how 
singular experiences, distinct from experience at large, 
are “integrated within and demarcated in the general 
stream of experience from other experiences” (LW 10: 
42). Dewey focuses on the fulfillment or 
“consummation” conditions of singular experiences 
(eating a meal, playing a game of chess, etc.) and, in a 
subsequent part of the same work, he also stresses the 
role of what is stored from past experience, something 
therefore generalized (LW 10: 78). This general 
experience results in responses to present conditions 
and habits. Some habits develop into crafts and arts that 
make enjoying experiences possible (LW 10: 53), as, in a 
mundane example, the cook has some general 
experience and the consumer has singular ones.  
Let me also mention one work of 1917, The Need for 
a Recovery of Philosophy, where Dewey claims that 
experience “is a matter of simultaneous doings and 
sufferings” (MW 10: 9) and he highlights five points that 
mark the distinction from the traditional and empiricist 
conception of it: 
 
1) experience is not only a “knowledge-affair,” it is 
also the intercourse of a living being with its physical 
and social environment; 
                                                 
10
 See James 1890/1981, 216-8. 
11
 Remember Peirce’s complaint (CP 5.414) about the 
kidnapping (presumably by James) of the term 
“pragmatism,” which lead him to introduce a new term 
that was “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers,” 
namely “pragmaticism.” 
2) it is not a purely subjective thing, since it is the 
way in which the objective world enters into the 
actions and sufferings of men and undergoes 
modifications through their responses; 
 
3) it is not only and not mainly the registration of 
past events, for in its “vital form” it is 
“experimental,” it is the “effort to change the given,” 
and it connects with the future; 
 
4) it is not “committed to particularism,” because 
connections are central to it and to the effort of 
changing existing conditions; 
 
5) it is not opposed to thought, for it is “full of 
inference” (MW 10: 6).
12
 
 
I will comment below on the inferential dimension of 
experience. Now notice that, as experience is a matter of 
“doings and sufferings,” Dewey’s notion of “transaction” 
is similar, in that it conveys the idea of a balance 
between doing and receiving.
13
 The word “transaction” 
is notoriously used in economics to name a kind of 
interaction between economic agents, namely an 
exchange of goods or services. In Dewey’s use it helps us 
give an account of our “exchange” with the world: we 
obtain information from the world, and, at the same 
time, we give structure to it and elaborate practical 
responses to it. Dewey emphasized the active and 
predictive (anticipatory) aspects of experience. Not only 
do we give structure to experience imposing concepts 
and relevance criteria on it, but we also take it in a 
practical sense (see also LW 10: 50). We anticipate what 
                                                 
12
 However, see Ryder 2005 (claiming that Dewey’s 
conception of experience remains epistemological, and 
expressing doubts on the idea that experience is “full of 
inference”). Cf. Cometti 1999, Shook 2000. See also 
Experience and Nature of 1925 (LW 1), and Reichenbach 
1938 on the predictive aspects of experience. 
13
 See e.g. LW 12: 24, 105-6. Cf. Mead 1926 on aesthetic 
experience, and LW 10: 42ff on the relation, in having an 
experience, between doing and undergoing. See also 
Calcaterra 2003. 
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is meaningful to us, and we generally elaborate 
responses to it. 
Mead contributed to this view. His nice example of 
the ball illustrates the inferential aspects of experience 
(beyond the strictly perceptual ones) and, for our 
purposes, shows how the singular and general 
dimensions intertwine: 
 
We see a ball falling as it passes, and as it does 
pass part of the ball is covered and part is being 
uncovered. We remember where the ball was a 
moment ago and we anticipate where it will be 
beyond what is given in our experience. 
(1934/1967, 176) 
 
It is the singular experience of a falling ball. But the 
anticipation of where it will be is driven by the general 
experience of the cognitive subject. This sort of 
predictive inference goes “beyond what is given in our 
experience,” where “experience” is taken in the singular 
sense. 
In other passages, Mead addresses the dispositional 
properties of things and gives an account of them in 
terms of hypotheses of future experiences: 
 
Our environment exists in a certain sense as 
hypotheses. “The wall is over there,” means “We 
have certain visual experiences which promise to 
us certain contacts of hardness, roughness, 
coolness.” Everything that exists about us exists 
for us in this hypothetical fashion. Of course, the 
hypotheses are supported by conduct, by 
experiment, if you like. We put our feet down 
with the assurance born out of past experience, 
and we expect the customary result. (1934/1967, 
247)
14
 
 
Such hypotheses about the hardness and other 
properties of things are “supported” by our general 
experience of how things work and how we react to 
them. But of course this experience is not a guarantee of 
                                                 
14
 Compare this with the emphasis on memory in the 
following passage by Austin (1979, 92): “Any description 
of a taste or sound or smell (or colour) or of a feeling, 
involves (is) saying that it is like one or some that we 
have experienced before: any descriptive word is 
classificatory, involves recognition and in that sense 
memory.” 
what will truly happen in the future. This is the point, as 
anyone knows, of Hume’s attack on inductive inference, 
and, more recently, of Goodman’s “new riddle of 
induction”.
15
 General past experience, made of singular 
experiences, does not concern future cases and cannot 
make us sure about them. Still, it is what we have and it 
is our best resource to deal with the future, making 
testable hypotheses and anticipations of future 
experience. 
Now, “our” experience, taken as something that we 
socially share, depends for Mead upon individual 
physiological processes:  
 
individual experience and behavior is, of course, 
physiologically basic to social experience and 
behavior: the processes and mechanisms of the 
latter (including those which are essential to the 
origin and existence of minds and selves) are 
dependent physiologically upon the processes 
and mechanisms of the former, and upon the 
social functioning of these. (Mead 1934/1967, 1-
2) 
 
So, given the “social functioning” of the basic elements, 
physiological processes are just a part of the story. 
Psychological processes and behavior develop in a social 
dimension, where singular and general experience 
intertwine.  
 
The experience and behavior of the individual 
organism are always components of a larger 
social whole or process of experience and 
behavior in which the individual organism – by 
virtue of the social character of the fundamental 
psychological impulses and needs which 
motivate and are expressed in its experience and 
behavior – is necessarily implicated, even at the 
lowest evolutionary levels. (Mead 1934/1967, 
228)
16
 
                                                 
15
 “The problem of the validity of judgments about 
future or unknown cases arises, as Hume pointed out, 
because such judgments are neither reports of 
experience nor logical consequences of it.” (Goodman 
1954/1983, 59) Goodman’s riddle is “new” because it 
asks not whether induction is justified, but what 
induction is so. 
16
 “The biologic individual lives in an undifferentiated 
now; the social reflective individual takes this up into a 
flow of experience within which stands a fixed past and a 
more or less uncertain future.” (Mead 1934/1967, 351) 
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If I may briefly shift the focus, let me mention that some 
juridical discussions at the end of the XIX century, 
through the first decades of the XX century, run parallel 
to the philosophical ones I have recalled here. One 
example is Justice Holmes’ “prediction theory” of law, 
according to which the law amounts to the “prophecies 
of what the courts will do in fact” (1897, 461).
17
 To say 
that you have a certain right is to anticipate what a court 
will decide in given conditions, not very differently from 
anticipating sensory experiences when we say, 
borrowing from Mead, “The wall is over there”. 
Another example is Holmes’ well-known dictum 
concerning the nature of the law: the life of the law has 
not been logic, it has been experience. Holmes’ claim is 
worth quoting at length: 
 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions 
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even 
the prejudices which judges share with their 
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by 
which men should be governed. (Holmes 
1881/1923, 1) 
 
This is an appeal to general experience in the social 
sense of it.
18
 In this context, general experience is social 
experiment, it is practical experience, habit, skill, craft. 
And it is also the transmission and refining of it through 
time, from generation to generation. Holmes’ words had 
a large impact on legal culture and practice. Other 
authors, though, embraced a more conciliatory position 
as to logic and experience in the law. Max Radin, for 
instance, claimed that the “law as experience is 
desperately aware of its logical insufficiencies and the 
law as logic is uneasily conscious that its authority to 
                                                 
17
 Remember that Holmes was a member of the 
“Metaphysical Club”; see Fisch 1942. Actually the 
prediction theory has been criticized on semantic 
grounds by Hart 1994, 10-1; cf. Tuzet 2007 and 2013. 
18
 Cf. Radin 1940, Pound 1960 and Hart 1963. In 
evidence scholarship, the phrase “general experience” 
figures in the title of a landmark work, i.e. Wigmore 
1913. 
represent experience to the mind has never been 
ratified.” (1940, 33) And Roscoe Pound contended that 
law “is neither wholly reason nor wholly experience. It is 
experience developed by reason, and reason checked 
and directed by experience.” (1940, 367) Experience 
assesses logical constructions and legal means to social 
ends. It tests them over time, refining them or 
substituting them with new ones if needed. 
In any event we need not take general experience as 
necessarily shared by a group of people. In principle it 
can be individual: the experience of the person with a 
certain habit, skill, etc. But it is generally true that 
individuals acquire competences and skills in social 
contexts where other people educate them and give 
them forms of feedback. 
  
2.2. Pragmatist Relatives 
 
Ramsey made Wittgenstein familiar with some 
pragmatist themes and claims (see Misak 2016, 155ff). 
Concerning the topic we are investigating, when in the 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein refers to the 
experiences associated with the act of pointing to 
something (1953, §§ 34-5), he plausibly uses the concept 
of experience in the singular sense. But when he refers 
to the habits and skills involved in language games or in 
forms of life (e.g. 1953, § 7), he presupposes some 
concept of general experience in line with the pragmatist 
emphasis on habits (natural or acquired) and on social 
interactions. Going backwards, the concept of 
experience more prominent in the Tractatus was the 
singular one,
19
 but the general one had some room too: 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 For instance: “The “experience” which we need to 
understand logic is not that such and such is the case, 
but that something is; but that is no experience.” 
(Wittgenstein 1922, 5.552) I leave aside the issue of 
“private experience” and “sense data,” which is relevant 
to the concept of singular experience but would deserve 
a specific work that I cannot carry out here; see, 
however, Wittgenstein 1968. 
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The process of induction is the process of 
assuming the simplest law that can be made to 
harmonize with our experience. (Wittgenstein 
1922, 6.363) 
 
What Wittgenstein calls here “our experience” is the 
experience of generations, or at the least of some 
people through time, or of many people belonging to the 
same context. In any case, it is the general experience 
with which a law “can be made to harmonize”. Harmony 
with past experience is a first step and prediction of 
future experience a second step. Then future experience 
will confirm or refute such inductions. 
The pragmatist attitude is more apparent in Quine’s 
work, as widely known. For our purposes I will focus on 
his celebrated paper of 1951 on the dogmas of 
empiricism, noting that an effect of abandoning these 
dogmas was for Quine a “shift toward pragmatism” 
(1951, 20).
20
 Consider his attack on the dogma of 
reductionism, namely on “the belief that each 
meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical 
construct upon terms which refer to immediate 
experience.” (1951, 20) No reduction to immediate 
experience is possible according to Quine. On the other 
hand, experience is crucial for the testing of our 
statements about the world. To convey this idea he used 
the legal metaphor of a tribunal and claimed that the 
“tribunal of experience” works holistically. As he 
famously put it, 
 
our statements about the external world face 
the tribunal of sense experience not individually 
but only as a corporate body. (Quine 1951, 38)
21
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 See also Quine 1981, where he distinguishes his own 
position from that of the classical pragmatists and of 
Peirce in particular. The key points, for Quine, are these: 
the shift of semantic focus from sentences to systems of 
sentences, methodological monism, and naturalism. 
21
 Notice a second legal metaphor in the “corporate 
body” of our statements about the world. 
Atomist reductionism is the critical target of this view.
22
 
Abandoning such dogma does not mean, for Quine, 
abandoning empiricism. Empiricism remains the best 
option for those who wish to give an account of the 
world, but only if it is understood holistically. This holism 
makes sense of past experience and predicts future one. 
 
As an empiricist I continue to think of the 
conceptual scheme of science as a tool, 
ultimately, for predicting future experience in 
the light of past experience. (Quine 1951, 41) 
 
Now it seems to me that, notwithstanding his holism, Quine 
maintains a notion of experience which is basically singular. 
Experience is “sense experience” and it is of individuals. 
Actually the phrase “past experience” figures in the last 
quote, but it sounds to me as a summative view of singular 
experiences. Notwithstanding his appeal to a pragmatist 
“shift” as an effect of abandoning those dogmas, Quine 
does not truly discuss the practical aspects of experience, 
nor general experience as such. His views fit basically the 
singular dimension of experience. And perhaps a broader 
understanding of it and a distinction of the two relevant 
concepts (singular and general experience) would have 
made his conception even more interesting and more 
pragmatist. 
In contemporary philosophy, John McDowell takes 
seriously the idea of experience as a tribunal of thinking, 
and claims that it cannot be so if it is conceived in a strict 
empiricist sense: “if we conceive experience as made up of 
impressions [...] it cannot serve as a tribunal, something to 
which empirical thinking is answerable.” (1996, xv) He 
wants to show that “the very idea of experience is the idea 
of something natural and that empirical thinking is 
answerable to experience.” (1996, xix) So, if strict 
empiricism is an unsatisfying position, what is the positive 
side of his story? He claims that humans acquire a second 
nature, in part, by being initiated into conceptual capacities, 
which are already operative “in the transactions in nature 
                                                 
22
 “Taken collectively, science has its double dependence 
upon language and experience; but this duality is not 
significantly traceable into the statements of science 
taken one by one.” (Quine 1951, 39) 
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that are constituted by the world’s impacts on the receptive 
capacities of a suitable subject.” (1996, xx)
23
 Experiences 
already have conceptual content and our conceptual 
capacities are active in judgment and passive in sensibility 
(1996, 10, 12, 39). 
His thesis, in a nutshell, is that “experiences themselves 
are states or occurrences that inextricably combine 
receptivity and spontaneity.” (McDowell 1996, 24)
24
 This is 
a claim, again, about singular experiences. And it allows a 
parallel between experience and agency: 
 
experiences are actualizations of our sentient 
nature in which conceptual capacities are 
inextricably implicated. The parallel is this: 
intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our 
active nature in which conceptual capacities are 
inextricably implicated. (McDowell 1996, 89-90) 
 
McDowell criticizes Quine’s view of experience as 
stimulation of sensory receptors. Despite his attack on the 
dogmas of empiricism, for McDowell Quine remained an 
empiricist as to the nature of experience. “Quine conceives 
experiences so that they can only be outside the space of 
reasons, the order of justification.” (McDowell 1996, 133) 
This empiricist view renders totally opaque the process of 
empirical justification of beliefs and judgments. For 
McDowell it is fundamental not to separate conceptual 
spontaneity and sensory receptivity: 
 
the idea of an interaction between spontaneity and 
receptivity can so much as seem to make it 
intelligible that what results is a belief, or a system 
of beliefs, about the empirical world – something 
correctly or incorrectly adopted according to how 
things are in the empirical world – only if 
spontaneity’s constructions are rationally 
vulnerable to the deliverances of receptivity. (1996, 
138-9) 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Notice the reappearance here of the notion of 
“transaction,” echoing Dewey. Cf. Lindgaard 2008. 
24
 See also McDowell 1996, 26 on experience as 
openness to reality. Cf. Senchuk 2001, 172-3 (contrasting 
Dewey’s conception of experience as active with 
McDowell’s view on the passivity of experience, 
notwithstanding McDowell’s claims on the implication of 
conceptual capacities in experience). 
This is singular experience, with the view that it involves 
conceptual capacities and constructions. So it is a 
broader understanding of singular experience, if 
compared to Quine’s. But again the general dimension of 
experience is neglected. And its practical implications 
are neglected as well. 
On the contrary, to my sense, a pragmatist is 
expected to incorporate both concepts of experience in 
a non-partial account of it, and to maintain their 
conceptual distinction at the same tame. Hopefully 
faithful to the spirit of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, I will 
elaborate on their distinction in the last section of this 
work, where I point out some of their different 
consequences.  
 
3. Some Consequences of the Distinction 
 
What are the consequences of the distinction we made? 
They are various. Some of them are practical, some of 
them are not. All of them, in any case, are displayed in 
the inferences that we are disposed or supposed to 
make when we assume that a certain kind of experience 
is the case. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
(5) You attended a piano concert, therefore you can 
play the piano; 
 
(6) You studied piano for years, therefore you can 
play the piano. 
  
(5) is clearly an illegitimate inference, whereas (6) is 
legitimate on the implicit and acceptable assumption 
that a person who studies a musical instrument for years 
is capable of playing it (at least to a minimal extent). (5) 
tries to draw a certain consequence from a singular 
experience, but that consequence can only be drawn 
from the general experience of the person involved. 
That is not to downplay singular experience. 
Someone who has made a singular experience is 
supposed to know what the character of that singular 
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experience was. (Or at least, they are supposed to have 
some justified belief about it). A specific knowledge of 
this kind is not involved in general experience. If 
someone tells me they attended a certain event, but 
then are unable to report me how the event was, I am 
entitled to put either their sincerity or their cognitive 
capacities into doubt. I would not be entitled to this if 
my interlocutor was simply claiming to have a general 
experience in the field: from such general experience no 
detailed report of a singular event is expected.  
However, some inferences about singular cases are 
justified by general experience assumptions. If the police 
stops me while I’m driving a stolen car, they are entitled 
to make an abduction to the conclusion that I am the 
thief, or at least that I have something to do with the 
theft of the car. The truth is not necessarily so, of course. 
I might be really unaware that it was a stolen car; it 
might be the case that I was framed by someone, or so. 
In fact, abductive conclusions are hypotheses, not 
necessary truths. But if I am unable to offer any 
counterevidence or explanation, it is reasonable to 
believe that I have something to do with the theft. 
(More boldly, my being involved in it is the best 
explanation of the fact that I was driving the stolen 
vehicle). Now, why is it reasonable so to infer? Because 
it is a general teaching of experience that thieves have 
the stolen goods upon them, at least for a while after 
the criminal act. 
The German jurist Friedrich Stein called 
Erfahrungssätze the statements reporting what 
experience has taught us about certain kinds of 
situations and independently from the case in hand 
(Stein 1893). The case in hand, for Stein, is to be decided 
using not only the evidence presented by the parties but 
also the knowledge that general experience gives to 
judges. 
Many authors have addressed this evidentiary issue, 
often under different names. William Twining, a leading 
evidence scholar and legal theorist, has discussed the 
topic of “background generalizations” used in judicial 
reasoning and argumentation. He claims that 
generalizations are necessary because every inferential 
step from particular evidence to particular conclusion 
“requires justification by reference to at least one 
background generalization” (2006, 334).
25
 Every 
abductive inference, I would say, requires a major 
premise stating some generalization. Without it, it would 
be impossible to move from the minor premise reporting 
some evidence to the conclusion providing an 
explanatory hypothesis. Twining also claims that 
generalizations are dangerous: 
 
Generalizations are dangerous in argumentation 
about doubtful or disputed questions of fact 
because they tend to provide invalid, 
illegitimate, or false reasons for accepting 
conclusions based on inference. They are 
especially dangerous when they are implicit or 
unexpressed (2006, 335). 
 
Of course abductive inferences are invalid from a 
deductive point of view. They instantiate the “affirming 
the consequent” fallacy. Their conclusions can be false 
even if their premises are true. But we cannot dispense 
with them if we want to explain puzzling facts. In any 
case I agree with Twining on the importance of making 
them explicit. 
Interestingly, Twining contrasts generalizations with 
“stories,” namely accounts of particular facts (2006, 
338). When witnesses tell such stories, they purportedly 
provide an account of their singular experiences (about 
the doubtful or disputed facts).
26
 And when, using some 
generalizations, judges or juries draw conclusions from 
such stories, they make appeal to general experience. 
Let us move now to thoroughly practical and 
normative consequences. Someone who has a kind of 
                                                 
25
 Generalizations are a continuum that goes from 
scientific laws and well-founded scientific opinions, 
through commonly held, but unproven or unprovable, 
beliefs, to biases and prejudices (Anderson, Schum and 
Twining 2005, 102; cf. Dahlman 2017). 
26
 Perhaps this is a kind of situation that provides a 
reason for weakening the novelty condition of singular 
experience: we don’t want witnesses to limit their 
stories to what was novel, surprising, or puzzling; we 
want them to tell everything which is relevant to the 
case. 
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general experience may be liable for the consequences 
of the activity in which their general experience is used, 
or should be used. It is not so for someone who simply 
has an experience. In law the distinction is quite clear 
and contributes to the establishment of the 
(professional) standards of due care and liability.
27
 
A surgeon is supposed to have some general 
experience concerning certain medical conditions and 
the ways to treat them. If a patient dies out of an 
omission the surgeon is responsible of (because they 
didn’t intervene when general experience told them, or 
should have told them, to intervene), then that surgeon 
is morally and legally liable for the death of the patient. 
This makes sense if we assume that some general 
experience exists. It may be the experience of the person 
in question, or the experience of generations collected 
and synthetized in the medical science of the time. If the 
surgeon had it, or should have had it, they should have 
intervened to save the life of the patient. If they did not 
(because of negligence, laziness, or else), then they are 
liable. This is not the case if we imagine a young medical 
student facing a suffering patient. For sure the young 
student can have the painful experience of a patient who 
suffers terribly; but they are not supposed to intervene 
and save the life of the patient in virtue of their 
experience.  
In brief, consider these inferences: 
 
(7) You are an experienced surgeon, therefore you 
should have intervened; 
 
(8) You are a medical student, therefore you should 
have intervened. 
 
 
                                                 
27
 For a philosophical discussion of the major liability 
schemes, see Coleman 2003, 212ff. With a “strict” 
scheme, there is liability when the victim has suffered a 
compensable loss and the injurer’s conduct caused the 
loss. With a “fault” scheme, there is liability when, in 
addition to those conditions, the injurer’s conduct was 
negligent. 
(7) is fine, (8) is not. The reasons are obvious enough, there 
is no need to restate them. Let me only stress one more 
time that the practical and normative consequences of 
general experience cannot be identical to those of singular 
experiences. 
Practical knowledge (knowing-how) depends on general 
experience. And liability for an omission or improper use of 
practical knowledge is also dependent on it. It would be 
unreasonable, in any context, to hold liable a person who 
lacks the relevant practical knowledge and the general 
experience that is needed to successfully perform a certain 
act. 
Expertise raises similar concerns. Legal systems usually 
have specific rules that govern the intervention of experts in 
legal proceedings and in trials in particular (for instance, 
Rules 702-6 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence).
28
 Experts 
are so because they are supposed to have experience. Being 
such, they are supposed to draw certain inferences about 
particular cases, and to take some course of action when 
needed. This is entirely foreign to the case of the person 
who simply has an experience. Of course it is general 
experience which is required in expert knowledge issues. 
And of course this knowledge doesn’t come out of 
nowhere: it is the result of starting singular experiences – 
and of time, repetition, cumulative receptivity, training, etc. 
Such singular experiences are basic, but, in order to run 
scientific experiments and have the relevant experiences, 
experts need some kind of general experience. This enables 
them to perform the relevant operations and determine the 
relevant findings. So the two forms of experience interact, 
as we already pointed out. They do not occur in completely 
different contexts.  
                                                 
28
 Rule 702, in particular, states that a “witness who is 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient 
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.” 
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The conclusion I would like to draw is simple: 
singular and general experience interact but remain 
different things. The different consequences they have, 
according to our inferences, show their different aspects 
and why we care about them. We care about singular 
experiences because we care about novelty, surprise, 
enjoyment. And we care about general experience 
because we care about learning, rationality, and 
responsibility. 
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Somaesthetics, the conception created by Richard 
Shusterman, is arguably one of the most promising areas 
in the humanities and social sciences. There is nothing 
surprising about this. Somaesthetics is a unique 
discipline which brings together a plethora of various 
research fields giving them clear guidance as to 
directions and aims of their investigations. The reviewed 
book is a remarkable example of the significance of 
somaesthetics for contemporary thought. It originated 
from the conference on somaethetics organized by 
Alexander Kremer in Budapest in June 2014. The 
conference was an important step in the expansion of 
somaethetics as it showed its significant potential for the 
interpretation of works of arts as well as for the 
cultivation of aesthetic experience.  
The book consists of the papers presented at the 
conference as well as some written especially for the 
volume. It is the first book published in the Brill series 
devoted to somaethetics edited by its founder Richard 
Shusterman. He has written the first chapter of the book 
Introduction: Aesthetic Experience and Somaesthetics 
where he writes about the origin of the concept that: 
“…it derived from pragmatist aesthetics, which 
emphasizes the importance of aesthetic experience for 
the philosophy of art but also, more generally, for the 
philosophy of life.” (p.1) However, somaesthetics 
Shusterman argues has transcended its pragmatist 
genesis developing into an original domain. Thus, it is 
defined as “the critical study and meliorative cultivation 
of the body as the site of sensory appreciation 
(aesthesis) and creative self-fashioning. A field that seeks 
to integrate theory and practice, somaesthetics argues 
that our sensory perceptions (and consequently the 
feelings and performances based on those perceptions) 
can be improved by cultivating one’s somatic capacities 
that include both sensorimotor skills and powers of body 
consciousness. Somaesthetics, therefore, examines (in 
theory and through concrete bodily practice) the various 
methods designed to improve those capacities and their 
actual expression in experienced feelings, 
representational appearance, and performative 
achievement.” (p.1) 
Departing from these premises Shusterman 
enumerates various aspects of somaesthetics’ interest in 
aesthetic experience. First, he stresses that 
somaesthetics in “[i]ts integration of theory and practice, 
along with its melioristic thrust to improve (rather than 
merely correctly describe) somatic experience and 
practice, reflects somaesthetics’ roots in pragmatist 
aesthetics which puts aesthetic experience at the center 
of its philosophy of art.” (p.2) A second important aspect 
of the relation between aesthetic experience and 
somaesthetics is “..rooted in the idea of philosophy as an 
art of living… As the soma is the central and necessary 
medium through which a philosopher (or anyone) lives, 
it is therefore important to cultivate it as part of the 
effort to live a better life.” (p.3) Third, he briefly but very 
interestingly raises the issue of the relationships 
between somaesthetics, ethics, and politics: “Aesthetic 
norms are clearly entrenched in our established artistic 
practices in which we find implicit (and sometimes even 
explicit) rules or conventions for proper composition or 
correct performance, along with other normative 
aesthetic criteria for better and worse. 
On the other hand, aesthetic experience can 
sometimes be powerful enough to challenge the existing 
norms and create room for different sorts of artistic 
practices involving different norms.” (p. 3) It is obvious 
that political and social order is based on norms so the 
aesthetic experience can be a vehicle of the 
emancipatory change. Therefore, somaesthetics has a 
potential of liberating individuals from the oppression 
through even small changes in everyday life of 
individuals.  
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I have decided to present Shusterman’s introduction 
at length not only because it is very interesting in itself 
as an elaboration of the relationships between 
somaesthetics and art and aesthetic experience but also 
because these ideas serve as theoretical background for 
the texts included in the book.  
The first part of the book entitled: Embodiment in 
Philosophy and Aesthetic Experience contains three 
essays which tackle the fundamental questions of 
somaesthetics in the context of the contemporary 
philosophy. The first chapter is written by Catherine F. 
Botha Nietzsche on Embodiment: A Proto-somaesthetics? 
is an examination of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the 
body. The author corrects Shusterman’s reading of 
Nietzsche that his position on mind-body problem is 
merely a reversal of Cartesian paradigm. She claims 
convincingly that: “Nietzsche’s work could be argued to 
be a kind of (proto-) somaesthetic position, because of 
its affinities to Shusterman’s work” (p. 28) and 
enumerates two aspects of this affinity. First, Nietzsche 
stresses that the complicated character of various ways 
of interaction between the body and the mind. Second, 
he also considers the body as a “locus of creative self-
fashioning.” The paper is thus an important contribution 
to the genealogy of somaesthetics showing its rooting in 
the Western philosophical tradition.  
The second article in this part Experience and 
Aesthetics written by Béla Bacsó takes up a crucial topic 
of reconsidering “a new version of the aesthetic or 
somatic experience.” As the author writes: “It seems to 
be a very democratic and liberal version of thinking. It 
has become free from the abstract limitations of theory 
in the aesthetic field and has made it possible to speak 
freely and truly about the affective encounters with 
artworks.” (p.36) The author does a very detailed 
analysis of the concept of aesthetic experience in various 
traditions and confronts them with that developed by 
Richard Shusterman. It seems that what Bacsó finds the 
most interesting in Susterman’s pragmatist notion of 
aesthetic experience is its connection with the deepest 
layers of our existence which a new interpretation of an 
artwork can reveal. “The artwork as already existent and 
covered by the dust of various interpretations is ready to 
open up different ways of interpretation, approaches 
that do not simply negate the previous ones but actually 
affect me. These experiences cannot be predicted based 
on earlier or preliminary meaning-attributions. This is 
why it is necessary to conceive the artwork as an in-
between – known but never utterly experienced. We are 
only able to accept our own proper existence –that is 
usually hidden from us – in such changeable, uncertain 
situations.” (p.39) 
Alexander Kremer in his paper Art as Experience: 
Gadamer and Pragmatist Aesthetics deals with the 
comparison of two seemingly distant traditions: that of 
pragmatism and that of German hermeneutics. He 
demonstrates very competently how both traditions 
influenced Shusterman’s concept of art and aesthetic 
experience and consequently he shows that: “They both 
speak about the same primary features and essences of 
art and artworks, but with different terminology. 
Gadamer uses a hermeneutical and Shusterman a 
pragmatist language, but they both emphasize the 
importance of a special action or experience in the 
artwork and hold that that the artwork in some sense 
presents a truer world; they moreover attribute similar 
roots to art.” (p. 52) 
The next part of the book Somaesthetic Approaches 
to the Fine Arts deals with various dimensions of arts. 
The first chapter in this part Art as Embodied and 
Interdisciplinary Experience is a dialogue between the 
well-known artist Olafur Eliasson and the art historian 
Else Marie Bukdahl. I think that a key point in this 
dialogue is Eliasson’s recognition of Shusterman’s 
concept of soma as the crucial for the interpretation and 
creation of contemporary art. Ellison makes it clear 
stating: “Vision is still the predominant theoretical tool, 
though once you move into the realm of theatre and 
performance. This attitude changes. I like Shusterman’s 
idea of connecting the notions of soma and aesthetics. It 
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reflects my view of the body as well. As I understand it, 
somaesthetics implies that you are not only capable of 
shaping but that you are also being shaped. The body 
learns from different layers of experience, both 
constituting and being constituted, as we know from 
phenomenology.” (p. 64) Following this thesis, he 
develops the concept of felt meaning stressing that 
meaning is not only a cognitive phenomenon but also it 
is something we sense “without the conceptual grid or 
architecture of words to attach to it.” (p. 69) It is clear 
that somaesthetics is an ideal tool for capturing this 
aspect of meaning.  
The succeeding chapter is written by Yanping Gao 
Winckelmann’s Haptic Gaze: A Somaesthetic 
Interpretation contains a revisionist interpretation of the 
work of famous German aesthetician Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann with the stress on his haptic engagement 
which brings him close to somaesthetics. Referring to 
Winckelmann’s works but to his biography, she 
concludes: “Behind this charm, charisma, enthusiasm, 
and intuitive perception lies Winckelmann’s 
somaesthetic approach—his deeply embodied way of 
perceiving art that brings together the different senses 
and one’s emotional sensibility in the pursuit of 
understanding and pleasure.” (p. 84) Therefore, we can 
assume that at the fundamentals of aesthetics lies in 
corporeal experiences which are conceptualized into 
ideas, notions, and so on.  
In the following chapter Rethinking Aesthetics 
through Architecture? Bálint Veres discusses aesthetic 
ambivalences of architecture from a somaesthetic 
perspective. His intention is not the substitution of 
somaesthetics and pragmatism for imagination, 
intimacy, and spirituality but to combine both sets of 
values. This approach is necessary as according to Veres 
architecture „…never witnessed the tendency of 
overcoming sensuality, never acknowledged the 
interpretation-heavy mentalism of the so-called 
‘artworld,’ and never legitimized the suspension of the 
physical-corporeal reality. On the contrary, architecture 
mediates between the mental and the corporeal.”(p. 99) 
John Golden in the next chapter ‘The Co-Presence of 
Something Regular’: Wordsworth’s Aesthetics of Prosody 
examines the role of prosody as a means for 
harmonizing the text with the rhythms of our bodies. He 
writes at the beginning of his article: “Literary texts 
engage our bodies perhaps most immediately through 
the sounds of the words they enlist us in saying—or in 
imagining we say—with our own breath. And of all of 
literature’s sonic effects, the poetic meter has perhaps 
the most suggestive connections with the body: both 
meter and human bodies involve felt pulses and 
repeated movements.” (p. 101) The author discusses 
various perspectives on the role of the prosody in the 
text using William Wordsworth’s poems. Although 
Golden does not refer directly to somaesthetics, it is 
clear from his considerations that prosody constitutes a 
link between the text and corporeal activity and 
somaesthetics would be a useful tool for examining this 
relationship. Moreover, the author argues: “…that meter 
is as pure an expression of the communal dimension of 
poetry as we can expect to find within the borders of a 
text.” (p. 118) This aspect of prosody is also significant 
from the perspective of somaesthetics as it shows the 
importance of the corporeal dimension for social life.  
The last chapter in this part Singing, Listening, 
Proprioceiving: Some Reflections on Vocal Somaesthetics 
is written by Anne Tarvainen deals with vocal 
somaesthetics which “[I]n contrast to the traditional 
research of human vocality…will be interested in the 
bodily sensations of what it feels like to vocalize and to 
listen to another person vocalizing. Vocal sound as heard 
is understood here being only a part of the multimodal 
experience of vocalizing and listening. Vocal 
somaesthetic experience is auditive, proprioceptive, 
aesthetic, motional, affective and intersubjective.” (p. 
121) The point of departure for the author is 
Shusterman’s division between representational, 
performative, and experiential somaesthetics. 
Experiential somaesthetics is devoted mainly to the issue 
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of experiencing our bodies and how by the various 
method we can enrich our experience. Tarvainen 
concentrates in this context on the proprioceptive vocal 
experience as a necessary although the often neglected 
aspect of singing. Such approach has far-reaching 
consequences as it leads to “[T]he disappearance of the 
clear distinction between subject and object, inside and 
outside, as well as body and mind…” (p. 129) Moreover, 
it also confirms the status of somaesthetics as in the 
conclusions Tarvaines asserts: “The broad aim of vocal 
somaesthetics is to create a comprehensive 
understanding of human being as a bodily, sentient and 
vocal being. It will illuminate the human being’s diverse 
vocal, sensory and aesthetic relations to his/her 
environment and other people.” (p. 138) 
The third part of the book Somaesthetics in the 
Photographic Arts and the Art of Living consist of four 
papers. The first one Spectral Absence and Bodily 
Presence: Performative Writings on Photography is 
written by Éva Antal. She interprets Shusterman’s 
writings on photography as well as his performative 
activity opposing them to the perspective on 
photography developed by Susan Sontag, Roland 
Barthes, and Jacques Derrida. It seems that 
Shusterman’s consciousness of the body enables him to 
capture a new sense of photography. “Barthes and 
Sontag call attention to the loss of the meaningful event 
that characterized old photography, while Derrida’s 
creative writing on Bonhomme’s old-new photos 
incorporates his philosophical ideas on time, death and 
writing mise en abyme. 
Toma and Shusterman try to capture the auratic 
essence of the subject in their artistic transactional 
project. Shusterman’s essay gets closest to the meaning 
of performance in photography: not only does the bodily 
SOMAFLUX project present the performative process 
itself, but also his performative writing about it displays 
the features of somaesthetic discourse.“ (p. 159) 
The subsequent chapter Cosmetic Practices: The 
Intersection with Aesthetics and Medicine examines the 
aesthetic meaning of surgical and cosmetic intervention 
into the body. Elisabetta Di Stefano shows the 
importance of artistic practices of the transformation of 
the body as well as cosmetic practices of the 
beautification of the body. Somaesthetics “can provide a 
meeting point between high culture and popular culture, 
while reconciling the different ways of evaluating 
cosmetic practices from the medical and aesthetic 
perspectives in the light of a rediscovered psychosomatic 
unity.” (p. 163) It enables us to find a harmony behind 
the excesses of the artistic creations but also helps us to 
“improving everyday life and experience.” 
Nóra Horváth’s paper Santayana on Embodiment, 
the Art of Living, and Sexual Aesthetics refers to the 
ideas of George Santayana whose conception is in many 
aspects parallel to that of the pragmatists. Horváth 
writes that for Santayana “Aesthetic experience is … 
central to his philosophy of life. For him, perfection and 
beauty are not separable ideas; beauty is an objectified 
pleasure, and the feeling of pleasure gives the feeling of 
perfection.” (p. 186) This perspective puts him near to 
Shusterman’s notion of the transfiguration of ordinary 
experience into the more refined experience of self-
creation although Shusterman is more suspicious of an 
excessive aestheticism. Similarly, Santayana claims to 
refer to Ancient Greece that “…the attraction of sex 
relies upon the attraction of senses, which suggests that 
a man with a refined aesthetic sense has a better sexual 
sense.” (p. 190) Shusterman who also is preoccupied 
with the role sexual desires play in our bodily self-
fashioning draw his inspiration mainly from Asian 
culture. 
The last paper in the volume Thinking through the 
Body of Maya: Somaesthetic Frames from Mira Nair’s 
Kamasutra written by Vinod Balakrishnan and Swathi 
Elizabeth Kurian is an interesting exploration of the 
usefulness of somaesthetics for the interpretation 
ancient Indian bodily rituals as presented in the 
contemporary movie Kamasutra: A Tale of Love which is 
a narrative about two women: the 16
th
-century 
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courtesan Maya and the princess Tara. They represent 
two parallel concepts of relation to one’s own body. 
“Tara’s perception of her beauty is cosmetic and 
epidermal. Maya’s understanding is more somaesthetic 
as she believes in an enhancement of beauty by turning 
the soma into a receptacle of practices and 
experiences.” (p. 204) 
Philosophy of science claims that the crucial criterion 
for the usefulness of a theory is its fruitfulness for posing 
problems. I am sure that the book is a significant 
argument for the fruitfulness of somaesthetics. The book 
shows that somaesthetics can generate in many areas 
new interpretations that in turn enable the researcher to 
re-conceptualize a research field. This somaesthetics’ 
ability has been demonstrating in all papers included in 
the collection. Some of them develop the original 
insights of somaesthetics, some enter into a dialogue 
with its underlying assumptions, but all prove that it is a 
unique conception which opens new ways of research 
for the humanities and social sciences.   
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